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 The two essays in this dissertation study issues related to the board of directors’ external 
connections, i.e., social ties to directors and executives of other firms. The first essay examines 
whether and how directors’ external connections affect the operating performance of the firm for 
which they are board members. Using a large sample of 393,481 directors and executives from 
7,627 companies over the time period from 2000 to 2010, I map the social network of directors 
and senior level executives, and construct a measure of directors’ external connections capturing 
how connected an individual director is to directors and executives of other firms. I find a 
positive association between the extent of directors’ external connections and firm performance. 
In addition, I find that firms experience efficiency gains through cost reductions in the presence 
of well-connected directors. Overall, my findings suggest that directors’ external connections 
provide economic benefits to firms by increasing sales growth, lowering production costs, and 
improving firm profitability. 
The second essay investigates whether directors’ external connections influence director 
compensation and appointment. Drawing on my findings in the first essay, I argue that the 
external connections of directors are reflected in labor market outcomes for directors. Consistent 
with prior literature, I find that directors’ external connections are positively associated with the 
level of their compensation and that directors with more extensive external connections earn 
more than those with more limited external connections. I then examine the impact of directors’ 
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external connections on director appointments. Using the subsample of directors who departed as 
a director of one firm during the period from 2003 to 2010, I examine whether directors’ external 
connections impact the likelihood of being selected as a new director at another firm. I find that 
the extent of a director’s external connections increases the likelihood that he/she will obtain a 
new directorship at another firm, suggesting that external connections play an important role in 
director selection process. Collectively, this dissertation provides empirical evidence that 
relational capital captured in directors’ external connections provides access to valuable 
resources and information to the firm, thereby enhancing its financial performance, and has 
significant impact on labor market outcomes for directors in the form of director compensation 
and director appointment. 
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1.0  THE IMPACT OF DIRECTORS’ EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
“There is a growing belief on the part of institutional investors that board of directors, as 
legally the highest authority in the company, are in a position to exert a significant impact on 
firm performance” (Petrovic 2008, p. 1373). A board of directors serves two main functions, 
monitoring management and providing resources. First, boards monitor top executives to ensure 
that they act in good faith and bring about firm performance that satisfies the interests of the 
owners. Second, boards provide resources in the form of advice and counsel, and bring their 
expertise and connections to meetings to help management improve firm performance. Most 
prior research seeking to understand how boards can influence firm performance has focused on 
the monitoring function. Such research has examined the condition under which board members 
are more or less effective as monitors (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker 1999; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Hwang and 
Kim 2009, 2011; Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan 2013).  
This paper is about the second function, the provision of resources. I explore a 
mechanism by which boards help improve firm performance. Connections between directors in 
the corporate networks can facilitate access to resources and be helpful in acquiring resources 
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from important elements outside the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). While the impact of social 
networks on firms’ economic outcomes has recently received much attention in academic 
research in finance and accounting, these studies have primarily focused on intra-board 
connections such as the links between chief executive officers’ (CEOs) and his or her board 
members (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013; Liu 2010; Hwang and Kim 2009, 2011; Dey and 
Liu 2011; Fracassi and Tate 2012). Relatively fewer studies have provided empirical evidence to 
assess the impact of directors’ external connections, social ties to directors and executives in 
other firms, on firms’ economic outcomes.1 In this chapter, I examine the relationship between 
the extent of directors’ external connections and firm performance. 
As the predominant theory used in the corporate governance literature, agency theory 
suggests that directors are responsible for effective oversight of corporate managers, and board 
effectiveness depends on a board’s ability to perform its monitoring role effectively. Continuing 
research in agency theory has investigated the board’s role in monitoring management and 
studied the effectiveness of boards in their monitoring of management. The literature finds that 
links between the CEO and board members may reduce governance quality and impair economic 
value. For example, Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that powerful CEOs hire directors who are 
socially connected with them, leading to weaker monitoring, and more value-destroying mergers. 
Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala (2010) find a significant relation between the likelihood of 
fraud and CEO-board connectedness. Dey and Liu (2011) document that social connections 
between the CEO and board members are associated with lower operating performance, lower 
accruals quality, and a higher probability of restatements. Hwang and Kim (2011) show that 
1 Ishii and Xuan (2011) investigate the impact of social ties between the senior executives and directors of the 
acquiring and target firms on merger outcomes, focusing on ties across the two merging firms. Ishii and Xuan 
(2011) find that between-firm social ties have a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer 
and to the combined entity upon the merger announcement. 
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social ties between the CEO and members of the audit committee are associated with high levels 
of earnings management. Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan (2013) show that political alignment between 
CEOs and Directors can increase managerial entrenchment and the likelihood of fraud. 
In addition to agency theory, resource dependence theory has also influenced the 
corporate governance literature. However, in contrast to the agency theory literature, which 
focuses on the board’s monitoring role, resource dependence theory suggests that a board plays 
another distinct role, i.e., that of providing essential resources, which may be directly related to 
firm performance (Pfeffer 1972).2 Resource dependence theory asserts that the board’s function 
as a link to the external environment is important in that directors bring essential resources in the 
form of advice and counsel, channels of information flow, preferential access to resources, and 
legitimacy to firms through linkages to the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), 
and directors also bring access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, lenders, public 
policy decision makers, and social groups (Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000), resulting in 
reducing dependency between the firm and external contingencies, diminishing uncertainty for 
the firm, lowering transaction costs, and ultimately aiding in the survival of the firm (Hillman 
and Dalziel 2003). 
An important channel through which directors provide essential resources to firms is their 
external connections. Directors’ external connections can provide channels for communicating 
important information between external organizations and the firm, such as industry trends, 
market condition and regulatory changes, and lead to shared contacts. As a result, directors’ 
external connections are believed to affect firms’ decisions and firm performance. A board with 
well-connected directors can facilitate access to resources such as capital and improved terms of 
2 Peng (2004, p. 455) states that “it [i.e., resource dependence theory] predicts that the more resource-rich outside 
directors are on the board to help bring in needed resources, the better the firm performance.” 
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contracts, link the firm to important stakeholders or other important entities, and aid in the 
formulation of strategy or other important decisions. Moreover, directors’ external connections 
could potentially affect the flow and the quality of information available to managers, create 
links among decision makers across firms, and influence the corporate decision making process, 
leading to better decision making and management practices, and improve firm performance. I 
expect that directors with more extensive external connections increase the ability of boards to 
bring in needed resources, resulting in a positive effect on firm performance.  
While most prior studies using resource dependence theory to examine board 
effectiveness as a provider of resources have primarily focused on board human capital, such as 
directors’ expertise, experience, knowledge, skill, reputation, and skills (Pearce and Zahra 1992; 
Certo, Daily, and Dalton 2001), less attention has been paid to the association between board 
relational capital, i.e., directors’ contacts with and connections to external entities, and firm 
performance. Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) show that top executives’ external ties 
contribute to the shaping of the firm’s strategic conformity to the industry’s central tendencies 
and it will be beneficial to firm performance. Using survey data from China, Peng and Luo 
(2000) find that managers’ ties with top executives at other firms and with government officials 
have a positive influence on firm performance. Most recently, Larcker, So, and Wang (2011) 
measure the centrality of firms in the boardroom network by counting the total number of shared 
directorates between companies. They document that central firms earn significantly higher 
future returns than non-central firms, and also find that central firms experience significantly 
higher increases in profitability compared to non-central firms.  
In this chapter, I focus on board relational capital, captured in directors’ external 
connections and explore how the external connections of individual directors affect the operating 
4 
performance of the firm for which they serve as board members. Using a large sample of 
393,481 directors and executives from 7,627 companies over the time period from 2000 to 2010, 
I map the social network of directors and executives, and construct a measure of directors’ 
external connections. The measure captures how connected an individual director is to other 
directors and executives in the network of firms.  
I find a positive association between changes in directors’ external connections and 
changes in the firm’s sales revenue. This association holds after controlling for governance 
attributes, directors’ human capital, and other related firm characteristics. This suggests that, on 
average, the revenue of a firm increases after the firm brings well-connected individuals to the 
board. This is consistent with the view that relational capital is positively associated with the 
provision of resources by the board, which, in turn, is positively associated with firm 
performance. Prior literature suggests that the impact of managers’ external ties on firm 
performance differs among firms in different stages of a firm’s life cycle (Peng and Luo 2000). 
Consistent with this prior literature, which finds that the impact of external connections on firm 
performance is more pronounced among firms that stand to benefit the most from such resources 
(Larcker, So, and Wang 2011), I find that the impact of the external connections is most 
pronounced among firms that have high growth potential and are at an earlier stage in their life 
cycle. I also examine the impact of directors’ external connections on profitability. I find a 
positive association between changes in directors’ external connections and changes in firm 
profitability. This suggests that the ROA of a firm increases after the firm appoints well-
connected directors. 
I then examine whether firms experience efficiency gains through cost reductions in the 
presence of well-connected directors. I find that the extent of directors’ external connections is 
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negatively associated with cost of goods sold. Firms experience efficiency gains through 
production cost reductions after the firm appoints well-connected directors. However, the extent 
of directors’ external connections is not significantly associated with SG&A expenses. Overall, 
my findings suggest that companies with well-connected boards have better operating 
performance than companies whose boards are less well-connected, thus directors’ external 
connections provide economic benefits to firms by helping to increase sales growth, improve 
profitability, and lower production costs. 
In addition, I investigate the impact of different types of directors’ external connections 
on firm performance. I partition directors’ external connections into professional, educational, 
and other connections and examine their impact on firm operating performance. The results 
indicate that directors’ past professional and educational connections have a greater impact on 
firm performance than other connections. Further industry analysis shows that the importance of 
directors’ external connections in providing resources to a firm may vary by industry. The 
impact of directors’ external connections on firm performance is most significant in the regulated 
and relatively smaller customer and supplier base industries. In industries with very large 
customer and supplier bases, such as wholesale and retail industries, directors’ external 
connections appear to have little immediate effect on firm performance. In addition, I examine 
whether the improvements in profitability of firms with well-connected directors comes from 
improved asset turnover, increased profit margin, or improvement in both. My results suggest 
that the significant improvements in ROA after the appointment of well-connected directors are 
more driven by the improvements in asset turnover of the firm than the improvements in profit 
margin. 
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This chapter contributes to the literature along several lines. First, this paper adds to the 
literature on the role of boards by complementing agency theory with resource dependence 
theory. Prior studies have examined the role of boards of directors, but the focus has primarily 
been on the monitoring function of the boards by examining the relationship between proxies for 
board incentives to monitor and firm performance. The resource provision function of the boards 
has been less explored (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Results from this chapter provide evidence 
that directors’ external connections may help boost the role of directors in improving firm 
performance. 
Second, this study integrates resource dependence and social network theories. Prior 
resource dependence studies focus primarily on the impact of one aspect of board capital, human 
capital, on firm performance. Building on social network theory, I examine the impact of another 
aspect of board capital, relational capital, on firm performance. This paper provides some of the 
first empirical evidence that directors’ external connections enhance firm performance by 
providing access to resources and information to the firm. The results would also shed light on 
the relative importance of board relational capital to firm performance. 
Third, this paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of social 
networks among all board members. While much of the existing literature on social networks 
among board members has focused primarily on the CEO’s social ties, less attention has been 
paid to the social connections of other directors. I believe that my results will extend the existing 
literature that has largely focused on a CEO’s social ties. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
one of the first papers to study social networks of directors, broadening the scope of social 
network literature beyond the CEO’s social network to include directors’ social networks. 
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Finally, this paper utilizes the most comprehensive measure of directors’ external 
connections by examining executives and directors from over 7,000 companies. Prior studies use 
small-samples of the 30 largest publicly traded firms in the branded food and computer industries 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997) or of 127 surveyed firms (Peng and Luo, 2000). My measure 
captures several aspects of external connections including directors’ employment history, 
educational background, and other social ties. I also differentiate my measures from others by 
analyzing external connections of each individual director. Related studies focus on external 
connections of CEOs (Liu, 2010) or shared director positions (Larcker, So, and Wang 2011). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the background 
literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics on the external 
networks of directors. Section 1.4 describes the construction of variables and research design, 
and presents empirical results, which are analyzed further in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
The link between boards of directors and firm performance has been studied from two 
different perspectives, “agency theory perspective” and “resource dependence perspective”. 
Agency theorists argue that a key activity for boards is monitoring management and effective 
monitoring can improve firm performance by reducing agency costs (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
These researchers explore the monitoring role of boards and examine the relationship between 
effective monitoring and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya 2003; Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson 1998). A large number of studies have investigated the 
characteristics of the board and examined whether the characteristics of the board affect board 
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effectiveness in monitoring management and firm performance. The most widely discussed 
question regarding the characteristics of the board is how board composition, such as the 
proportion of outside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Mehran 1995; Klein 1998; and 
Bhagat and Black 2000), demographic diversity (Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003), and size 
(Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Yermack 1996) are 
related to monitoring management and firm performance. There is also a large and growing 
literature on directors serving on multiple boards (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Fich and 
Shivdasani 2006; Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003). However, prior research on this topic 
seems still inconclusive. 
In contrast, resource dependence theorists focus on the board as providers of resources 
and contend that boards are chosen to maximize the provision of important resources to the firm 
(Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Klein 1998; Lynall, Golden, and Hillman, 2003). In 
this research, scholars examine the relationship between boards’ provision of resources and firm 
performance. Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) seminal work on resource dependence theory 
suggested that “directors bring four benefits to organizations: (a) information in the form of 
advice and counsel, (b) access to channels of information between the firm and environmental 
contingencies, (c) preferential access to resources, and (d) legitimacy” (Hillman, Withers, and 
Collins 2009, p. 1408). Board research based on resource dependence perspective suggests that 
directors provide advice and counsel to top management (Mintzberg 1983; Lorsch and MacIver 
1989), bring their own experiences, knowledge, and expertise to the firm (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson 1990), aid in the formulation of important firm decisions (Judge and Zeithaml 1992; 
Lorsch and MacIver 1989), and enable firms to gain linkages to important stakeholders or other 
important entities (Burt 1980; Hillman, Keim, and Luce 2001). 
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Resource dependence theorists argue that board capital encompassing both human 
capital, such as directors’ expertise, experience, knowledge, skill, reputation, and skills, and 
relation capital, such as directors’ contacts to external organization and connections, can bring 
substantial resources to a firm. Prior empirical studies in this area examine the relationship 
between boards capital and firm performance Pearce and Zahra (1992) find that board 
composition as measured by size of board members is positively associated with future firm 
performance, suggesting that a large board enhances a company’s ability to understand and 
respond to diverse stakeholders. Certo, Daily, and Dalton (2001) document that firms with more 
prestigious boards are likely to have lesser underpricing that occurred in the initial public 
offering, suggesting that prestigious directors help firms overcome information asymmetry 
problems that might otherwise deter potential investors. In general, board capital helps firm 
strengthen the linkages with the external environment by acquiring additional access or control 
over resources so that such board capital can positively affect a firm’s performance.  
Social network theory posits that social ties create trust, goodwill, or expectations of 
reciprocity, which enable the individual to obtain the needed resources from other (Aldrich and 
Cliff 2003; Coleman 1988). The literature in social network theory has documented that having 
broad networks can enhance the ability of people to convey complex ideas to diverse audiences 
(Reagans and McEvily 2003). Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) find that more effective managers 
have less constrained networks. Managers with better connections tend to earn more income, get 
more frequent promotions, and have better careers (Burt 1997; Granovetter 1985). Barnea and 
Guedj (2009) report evidence that connections between directors and top executives are related 
to executive compensation.  
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In a similar line of research, there have been numerous studies on the interlocking 
directorates. Levine (1972) finds the existence of interlocked directorates between the boards of 
major banks and the boards of major industrials. Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) show that 
interlocking directorates enable firm to gain outside funding. Gulati and Westphal (1999) find 
that formation of alliance is positively related to the number of board interlocks. Haunschild and 
Beckman (1998) document that interlocking board members may facilitate an exchange of 
important information, leading to better firm performance. On the other hand, Hallock (1997) 
observes a positive correlation between CEO compensation and interlocked boards, and Bizjak, 
Lemmon, Whitby (2009) document that interlocked boards play a significant role in the spread 
of employee stock options backdating. However, research on interlocking directorates has 
provided inconclusive evidence on a link between board interlocks and firm performance 
(Mizruchi 1996). 
Recently, literature in finance investigates the impact of CEO’s social connections on 
economic outcomes. Liu (2010) finds that an outside CEO candidate benefits significantly by 
having connections to the board of the hiring firm. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013) 
document that CEOs with extensive networks of personal connections to those outside the firm 
earn more than those with smaller networks. Hwang and Kim (2009) measure social ties between 
the CEO and outside directors at Fortune 100 firms and find that social ties have an effect on 
how directors monitor and discipline CEOs based on compensation and turnover. Dey and Liu 
(2011) examine whether an independent director’s social connections with the firm’s CEO are 
associated with the directors’ monitoring effectiveness. They document that firms with directors 
who have social and professional connections to the CEO are associated with lower usefulness 
and reliability of reported earnings numbers. Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala (2010) examine 
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the relation between fraud probability and CEO-board social connectedness. They find that 
professional connections formed due to common prior employment decrease fraud while 
nonprofessional connections due to shared educational and non-business antecedents increase 
fraud probability. 
The influence of social networks on the provision of resources function of directors has 
received considerable attention through a series of articles. D’Aveni (1990) finds that well-
connected managers influence creditors to support the existing top management’s right to 
continue in control of the firm without supervision by the bankruptcy courts. Westphal (1999) 
find that social ties between CEO and outside directors facilitate interaction by raising the 
frequency of advice and counsel, leading to increase in firm performance. Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) document that boards consisting of directors having ties to strategically related 
organizations were able to provide better advice and counsel. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) find 
that politically experienced directors are more prevalent in firms with greater government 
contracts, exports, and lobbying and lawyer-directors are more prevalent in firms where costs of 
environmental regulation are higher. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) find that mutual fund 
managers invest in firms where board members share the same education network. Engelberg, 
Gao, and Parsons (2012) demonstrate that firms with connection to capital suppliers enjoy more 
favorable terms of lending, improved credit ratings, and superior stock price performance. 
Anecdotal evidence also shows that boards’ connections and expertise help a start-up company 
lay the groundwork for growth. For example, directors’ past professional connections have 
helped win key license to build a fixed wireless network, raised financing, and helped find 
strategic partners for the venture company (Lipin 1999). 3  However, the net economic 
3 See Appendix for more details. 
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consequences of boards’ social networks on firm performance have yet to be firmly established 
empirically (Larcker, So, and Wang 2011). 
Only a few papers explore the impact of executives’ external connections on firm 
performance. Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) find that top executives who held board 
appointments in different industries, which presumably follow different strategic practices, were 
more likely to initiate strategic change at their own firm, and top executives’ external ties 
enhance firm performance. I differentiate my approach from Geletkanycz and Hambrick’s (1997) 
study, which focuses on the board capital of top executives rather than that of directors by 
examining the depth of relational capital of all board members. 
Also, this paper goes beyond their sample of 30 largest publicly traded firms in the 
branded food and computer industries for 1983 – 1987. Using survey data from China, Peng and 
Luo (2000) conduct a study closely related to Geletkanycz and Hambrick’s (1997) study. They 
find that managers’ ties with top executives at other firms and with government officials help 
improve firm performance. I study the extensive external connections formed by directors and 
executives in over 7,000 U.S companies. However, Peng and Luo (2000) employ relatively 
small-sample survey data of 127 responses and rely primarily on perceptual measures of external 
ties. Most recently, Larcker, So, and Wang (2011) examine whether the position of a firm in the 
boardroom network formed by shared directorates is associated with future stock price and firm 
performance. They find that centrally positioned firms in the boardroom network have higher 
future stock price returns and greater future profitability than non-centrally positioned firms. 
However, their study focuses on shared director positions rather than individual directors’ 
external connections.  
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In summary, directors’ external connections may play an important role as channels of 
information, advice, counsel, and access to essential resources enable a firm to accomplish 
higher economic outcomes, which improve firm performance. 
1.3 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
I construct executive and director networks from BoardEx database provided by 
Management Diagnostics Limited, an independent private research company specializing in 
collecting and classifying social network data on the board of directors and executives of US and 
European public and private companies. BoardEx consolidates in-depth information concerning 
the board of directors and senior management of publicly quoted and large private companies. 
The database contains executives and directors’ current and past employment history (including 
positions held and the start and end dates of the position), educational background (including 
undergraduate, graduate and professional education and degree information), other activities 
such as memberships in general social associations, organizations and charitable groups. The 
personal biographical information in BoardEx dates back to as early as 1926. 
BoardEx covers over 435,000 directors and executives of over 15,000 publicly quoted 
and large private companies. The coverage is split into over 8,250 US company boards, 2,700 
UK company boards, and a further 5,000 company boards, split between Continental Europe and 
the rest of the world. For this study, I focus on US companies over the time period from 2000 to 
2010, because BoardEx’s coverage prior to 2000 is not complete. Using these data, I construct 
each individual board member’s network.  
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Financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The key firm identification variable in 
BoardEx is “Company ID”. Since there is no existing link between “Company ID” as reported in 
BoardEx and identifiers from other commonly used databases (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 
2013), I created links between the BoardEx database and COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases in 
multiple steps. Following Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013), I, first, match “Company ID” as 
reported in BoardEx with GVKEY (S&P identifier) by ticker symbol, which is provided in the 
BoardEx database, and CUSIP which is derived from the International Security Identification 
Number (ISIN) in BoardEx database for companies that are currently trading. Second, for 
companies in the BoardEx database without ticker symbols and ISIN, I match the company name 
recorded in BoardEx with the name of a company on COMPUSTAT and CRSP using the name 
matching algorithm in SAS. All matches are manually checked. I also look up similar company 
names using similar name matching algorithms and verify such matches by checking their 
information from various sources. I collect corporate governance variables from the IRRC and 
BoardEx. This results in the final sample of 7,627 matched companies consisting of 393,481 
executives and directors over the time period from 2000 to 2010. 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of sample firms. It shows the number of sample 
firms and firm characteristics, expressed in million dollars from 2000 to 2010. It suggests that 
many small firms were added to the BoardEx database around the fiscal year of 2003. 
[Insert Table 1.1] 
Panel A of Table 1.2 presents summary statistics on the directors’ external connections 
that I construct. On average, a director has 372.2 external network connections to all other 
directors. The directors’ external connections vary by types of directors. An employee director 
has an average of 247 external network connections. A grey director (affiliated non-executive 
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directors)4 has an average of 326.8 external network connections. Independent directors have the 
biggest network connections, an average of 417.7 external network connections. Panel B of 
Table 1.2 reports the average external connections of directors per firms by industry. Industries 
are defined by the Fama-French 12-industry categories. 5  Firms in Chemicals, Business 
Equipment (which includes computers, software, and electronic equipment), and Utilities 
industries have directors with relatively extensive external network connections. Financial firms 
have directors with relatively limited external network connections. 
[Insert Table 1.2] 
1.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
I begin by describing my measures for directors’ external connections used in the regression 
analyses in Section 1.4.1. I present my research design in Section 1.4.2, and discuss the results of 
my analyses in Section 1.4.3. 
4 According to definitions stated in the Combined Code (2003), grey directors have personal or commercial ties with 
the firm or executives. Such ties are inferred where the non-executive is related to any of the firm’s directors, 
advisors or senior employee, has served on the board for more than nine years, was formerly an employee of the 
company or group, has received additional remuneration apart from director’s fee, has any material business 
relationships with the company, represents a significant shareholder, or interlocking directors. 
5  See Ken French’s website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html for the 
definition of the twelve Fama-French industry categories. 
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1.4.1 Variable Descriptions 
Following Fracassi (2008), I construct a measure of directors’ external connections. The 
measure captures how connected an individual director is to other directors and executives in the 
boardroom networks. The external connections of a director r at year t is defined by  
∑ ++= ectionsOther Connonsl ConnectiEducationannectionsssional CoPast ProfeDEC tr , , 
where Past Professional Connections represent the number of directors and executives whom the 
director has worked with, or sat either on the board of directors or on the top management group 
in the past in the same company at the same time, Educational Connections represent the number 
of directors and executives with whom the director went to the same school and graduated within 
two years with the same undergraduate, professional, masters or doctorate degree, and Other 
Connections represent the number of directors and executives with whom the director shares 
membership in general social associations, organizations or charitable groups. A firm i’s total 
external connections at year t is the sum of external connections belonging to all N board 
members of the firm, defined as 
∑
=
=
N
r
trti DECTDEC
1
,, . 
My measure of firm i’s directors’ external connections is the average of external connections 
belonging to N board members of the firm, defined as 
∑
=
=
N
r
trti DECN
ADEC
1
,,
1 . 
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1.4.2 Research Design 
To examine the relationship between the extent of directors’ external connections and 
firm performance, I focus on the contemporaneous association between changes in directors’ 
external connections and changes in firm operational performance. I use various measures of 
firm performance: sales growth, ROA, cost of goods sold, and selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses. The empirical models are specified in the following equation: 
tititi riablescontrol vaADECSALES ,,1, εβα ++∆+=∆   (1) 
tititi riablescontrol vaADECROA ,,1, εβα ++∆+=∆    (2) 
tititi riablescontrol vaADECCOGS ,,1, εβα ++∆+=∆   (3) 
tititi riablescontrol vaADECSG&A ,,1, εβα ++∆+=∆   (4) 
where, for each firm i and year t: 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC , 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES , 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA , 
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In these models, dependent variables are changes in financial performance measures. 
Using changes in financial performance measures allows for control of the level of financial 
performance measures prior to the test period, and I use a natural logarithmic transformation to 
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control for skewness in the directors’ external connections (DEC), although the results are 
similar when this transformation is not used.  
The control variables I use in equations (1) through (4) are consistent with those used in 
prior research (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Barnea and Guedj 2009; Dey and Liu 2010; 
Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013; Larcker, So, and Wang 2011). For firm characteristic 
variables, I include firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, and leverage ratio. I use a 
natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. Larger firms tend to have larger boards. 
As a consequence, larger firms will likely have more directors with more extensive connections. 
I use a natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio and firm age to control for the presence of 
high growth opportunities. The market-to-book ratio is calculated as the market value of equity 
divided by the sum of the book value of equity and deferred taxes. Firm Age is the age of the 
firm (years) based on the date in which a firm’s share price first appeared on the CRSP. The 
inclusion of the market-to-book ratio and firm age reflects the fact that firms with high growth 
opportunities and firms in an early stage of their life cycle are more likely to benefit from the 
external connections of their senior executive and board members. Thus, I expect a positive 
association between directors’ external connections and market-to-book ratio and a negative 
association between directors’ external connections and firm age. Leverage ratio is computed as 
the fraction of long-term debt in total assets. 
To control for the effectiveness of monitoring, I include board characteristic variables 
such as board size, the proportion of outside directors on the board, CEO and board chair duality, 
and the fraction of busy directors on the board. Board size is the number of directors on the 
board. The proportion of outside directors (Outside Director) is calculated as the percentage of 
directors defined as independent directors or non-employee directors. CEOCHAIR is a dummy 
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variable that takes the value one when CEO is serving as chairman of the board. The fraction of 
busy directors (Busy Director) is calculated as the percentage of directors holding more than two 
directorships. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that boards with a majority of busy directors are 
associated with weak corporate governance and operating profits. 
I construct two intra-board social connection variables to capture the degree of the 
relational capital among the board members, 1) social ties among board members and 2) social 
tie between CEO and independent directors. Social ties among board members (Intra-Board 
Ties) are measured by the number of pairs of connected directors scaled by the number of pairs 
of board members. Social tie between CEO and independent directors (Tie to the CEO) is 
measured by the fraction of the independent directors having social tie to the CEO. 
I also construct four variables to capture the board’s human capital, 1) industry 
experience, 2) board experience, 3) graduate degrees, and 4) elite educations. Industry 
experience (IndExp) is computed as the proportion of the board members possessing the same 
industry experience. Board experience (BoardExp) is defined as the sum of the cumulative years 
directors have served as a director scaled by the number of board members. Graduate degrees 
(Graduate) is the fraction of directors holding graduate degrees such as MBA, Master, JD, MD, 
or PhD degree on the board. Elite education (Elite) is measured by the percent of directors who 
graduated from Ivy League undergraduate schools. 
Finally, I include the new appointments of directors to the board in the year before, 
1, −∆ tiADEC  as control variable to eliminate the lagging effect of external connections of directors 
who are appointed to the board in the previous year on firm performance because I focus on the 
contemporaneous association between changes in directors’ external connections and changes in 
firm operational performance in this study. 
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1.4.3 Empirical Results 
Table 1.3 reports descriptive information for the key variables in my sample. Panel A 
provides means, medians, standard deviations, first quartile, and third quartile values for the key 
variables in my sample. Panel B shows a simple correlation matrix for the key variables in the 
sample. For the univariate data, I average across time for each firm and then determine the mean 
for the sample by averaging across firms. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that on average, a firm has 
372.2 total external connections, 247.4 professional connections, 72.3 educational connections, 
and 36.3 other connections. In terms of board characteristics, the average firm in my sample has 
8.7 directors on board, 68.7% are independent directors, and 17.3% are busy directors. 61.3% of 
CEOs serve as the chairperson of the firm of which he or she is the CEO. The average social ties 
among board members is 0.155 and 18.8% of board members have social connection with the 
CEO of the firm of which he or she sits on the board. In terms of board human capital, on 
average, 19.8% of directors have an specific industry experience, they have 14.7 years board 
experience, 52.2% of directors have graduate degrees, 30.4% of directors graduated from Ivy 
League undergraduate schools. Panel B of Table 1.3 provides a correlation matrix for some of 
the key variables in the analysis. Directors’ external connections appear to bear a positive 
association with firm size, firm profitability, and board size. In addition, directors’ external 
connections are positively correlated with board human capital variables. 
[Insert Table 1.3] 
Table 1.4 presents results from ordinary least squares regressions of changes in sales 
revenue on changes in directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.4 shows the results of 
regression analysis based on all directors sample. Column (1) reports the results of base 
regression. I find changes in directors’ external connections at year t are significantly (p < 0.01) 
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positively associated with changes in total sales revenue at year t. This association holds after 
controlling for the governance and other firm and board characteristic variables. This finding 
implies that the addition of directors with more extensive external connections to the board bring 
increases in total sales of the firm. The coefficient of market-to-book ratio is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), and the coefficient of firm age is significantly negative, suggesting that 
firms with high growth opportunities and firms in an early stage of their life cycle are more 
likely to benefit from directors’ external connections. Column (2) adds the control variable, 
changes in directors’ external connections at year t−1. The results suggest that even after 
controlling for the addition of directors with more extensive external connections to the board in 
the year before, the relation between changes in directors’ external connections at year t and 
changes in total sales revenue at year t is still significantly positive (p < 0.01). Year and Fama-
French 49 industry controls are added in column (3) and (4). Similar to results in column (1) and 
(2), the coefficient of changes in directors’ external connections at year t is significantly positive 
(p < 0.01), indicating that new appointments of directors with more extensive external 
connections to the board accrues value to the firm by boosting sales revenue of the firm. 
Panel B of Table 1.4 report the results of regression analysis based only on the subsample 
of directors who are defined as independent by the BoardEx database. In each column, the results 
are very similar to those reported in column (1) through (4) of Panel A of Table 1.4 based on all 
directors sample except the coefficients of changes in directors’ external connections of the firm 
for independent directors only are slightly weaker than those of changes in directors’ external 
connections of the firm for all directors. Taken together, this evidence suggests that directors’ 
external connections as board relational capital play an important role in enhancing firm 
performance by increasing sales growth. 
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[Insert Table 1.4] 
Next, I examine whether there is an association between the extent of directors’ external 
connections and firm profitability. Table 1.5 presents results from regressing changes in ROA on 
changes in directors’ external connections Panel A of Table 1.5 shows the results of regression 
analysis based on all directors sample. Column (1) reports that changes in directors’ external 
connections at year t are significantly (p < 0.01) positively associated with changes in ROA at 
year t, indicating that directors’ external connections provide economic benefit to firms by 
improving profitability. Similar to the results in Table 1.4, the results suggest that controlling for 
the governance and other firm and board characteristic variables, firms with more well-
connected directors show higher profitability than firms with less well-connected directors. The 
results also suggest that firms in an early stage of their life cycle are more likely to benefit from 
directors’ external connections. Column (2) adds the control variable, changes in directors’ 
external connections at year t−1. The results show that the coefficient of the change in directors’ 
external connections at year t−1 is not statistically significant. After controlling for the change in 
directors’ external connections at year t−1, the association between the change in directors’ 
external connections at year t and the change in ROA at year t is marginally positive (p < 0.1). 
Column (3) and (4) show the result of the regression including year and Fama-French 49 
industry controls. In the presence of both year and industry controls, the results are very similar 
to those reported in column (1) and (2). I find the coefficient of the change in directors’ external 
connections at year t is significantly positive (p < 0.01) in column (3) and the coefficient of the 
change in directors’ external connections at year t is marginally positive (p < 0.1) in column (4). 
The findings imply that new appointments of directors with more extensive external connections 
to the board help firms improve their profitability.  
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Panel B of Table 1.5 report the results of regression analysis based only on the subsample 
of independent directors. Consistent with my results based on all directors sample, I find a 
significantly positive association between the extent of directors’ external connections and firm 
profitability except specifications controlling the change in directors’ external connections at 
year t−1, which show the positive, but not statistically significant association. Together, the 
results are consistent with directors’ external connections providing economic benefit to firms by 
improving profitability. 
[Insert Table 1.5] 
To examine whether firms experience efficiency gains through cost reductions in the 
presence of directors with more extensive external connections, I investigate the relationship 
between the change in directors’ external connections and the change in cost of goods sold and 
SG&A expenses for the firm. Table 1.6 presents the results from regressing changes in cost of 
goods sold on changes in directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.6 shows the results 
of regression analysis based on all directors sample. Column (1) reports the results of the base 
regression. I find that the association between the change in directors’ external connections at 
year t and the change in cost of goods sold at year t is significantly (p < 0.01) negative, 
indicating that the firm experiences product cost reductions after the appointment of new 
directors to the board with more external connections. This association holds after controlling for 
the governance and other firm and board characteristic variables. The results also suggest that 
firms in an early stage of their life cycle are more likely to benefit from directors’ external 
connections though cost reductions. Column (2) adds the change in directors’ external 
connections at year t−1 as a control variable. The results suggest that even after controlling for 
the addition of directors with more extensive external connections to the board in the year before, 
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the relation between the change in directors’ external connections at year t and the change in cost 
of goods sold at year t is still negative, although the coefficient is marginally significant at a 10% 
significant level. These associations hold after controlling for the influence of industry and year 
fixed effects, shown in column (3) and (4).  
Panel B of Table 1.6 report the results of regression analysis based only on the subsample 
of independent directors. While the signs of the coefficients of changes in directors’ external 
connections are all negative, none of these coefficients is statistically significant, indicating that 
external connections of employee directors contribute more to product cost reductions than those 
of independent directors. To examine the relationship between changes in directors’ external 
connections and changes in cost of goods sold, I use changes in cost of goods sold scaled by 
sales. Given my findings in Table 1.4 show that changes in directors’ external connections are 
significantly positively associated with changes in sales revenue, it is possible that additional 
subtraction by the changes in sale measure captured in the changes in cost of goods sold measure 
may lead to strong negative association between changes in directors’ external connections and 
changes in cost of goods sold in Table 1.6. To rule out this possibility, I estimate another model 
using a measure of cost of goods sold without scaling. The results (untabulated) from this 
analysis are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the analysis reported in Table 1.6. 
[Insert Table 1.6] 
Then I investigate the relationship between changes in directors’ external connections 
and changes in SG&A expenses of firms. Table 1.7 presents the results from regressing changes 
in SG&A expenses on changes in directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.7 shows 
the results of regression analysis based on all directors sample. The results are mixed depending 
on the control variables. Column (1) reports the results of the base regression. I find the 
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association between changes in directors’ external connections at year t and changes in SG&A 
expenses at year t is negative, but not statistically significant. This association is valid only after 
controlling for the changes in directors’ external connections at year t−1, shown in column (2) 
and (4). Panel B of Table 1.7 report the results of regression analysis based only on the 
subsample of independent directors. Those results are consistent with the results based on all 
directors sample. Overall, these findings suggest that firms may experience efficiency gains 
through cost reductions, particularly, for cost of goods sold, in the presence of directors with 
more extensive external connections. Directors’ external connections may contribute less to 
lower SG&A expenses. 
[Insert Table 1.7] 
Taken together, my results suggest that the social capital captured in directors’ external 
connections provides economic benefits to firms by increasing sales growth, lowering production 
costs, and improving profitability of firms. 
1.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
1.5.1 Impact of Different Types of Directors’ External Connections on Firm Performance 
“The sociology literature suggests that different types of networks are activated in 
different situations and may therefore have different effects on the board’s monitoring and 
advising roles.” (Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala 2012, p. 10). In this section, I further 
examine the impact of three different types of directors’ external connections; professional 
connections, educational connections, and other connections to firm operating performance.  
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I partition the measure of directors’ external connections (DEC) described in Section 1.4 
into Professional Connections, Educational Connections, and Other connections. My measure of 
firm i’s directors’ professional connections is the average of professional connections belonging 
to N board members of the firm, defined as 
∑
=
=
N
r
trti PCN
APC
1
,,
1 . 
My measure of firm i’s directors’ educational connections is the average of educational 
connections belonging to N board members of the firm, defined as 
∑
=
=
N
r
trti ECN
AEC
1
,,
1 . 
My measure of firm i’s directors’ other connections is the average of other connections 
belonging to N board members of the firm, defined as 
∑
=
=
N
r
trti OCN
AOC
1
,,
1 . 
I repeat the main regression model (1) to (4), described in Section 1.4. Specifications (1) 
to (3) include only one of three external connection measures, APC, AEC, AOC, as a main 
explanatory variable, and Specification (4) includes all of three external connection measures as 
main explanatory variables.  
Table 1.8 reports that results from regressing changes in sales revenue on changes in 
three different types of directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.8 shows the results of 
regression analysis based on all directors sample. Specification (1) presents the regression 
estimates for the professional connections. The results show that the coefficient for professional 
connections is significantly positive (p < 0.01) so professional overlaps tend to increase sales 
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growth. Specification (2) presents the regression estimates for the educational connections. The 
results also show that changes in directors’ educational connections are significantly (p < 0.01) 
positively associated with changes in sales revenue. Specification (3) presents the regression 
estimates for the other connections. The results show that the coefficient of the change in 
directors’ other connections is marginally positive (p < 0.1). All these associations hold after 
controlling for the governance, other firm and board characteristic variables, and industry and 
year effects. Specification (4) shows that the coefficients of professional and educational 
connections remain positive and significant, but the coefficient of other connections is not 
statistically significant. To measure relative importance of three connection variables to the 
changes in sales revenue, I provide standardized regression coefficients of three connection 
variables. The standardized regression coefficients of changes in professional, educational, and 
other connections are 0.015, 0.015, and 0.006 respectively. The results indicate that directors’ 
past professional and educational connections have greater impact on firm performance than 
directors’ other connections. Panel B of Table 1.8 reports the results of regression analysis based 
only on the subsample of independent directors. The results are very similar those reported in 
Panel A of Table 1.8. 
[Insert Table 1.8] 
Table 1.9 reports that results from regressing changes in ROA on changes in three 
different types of directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.9 shows the results of 
regression analysis based on all directors sample. Specification (1) presents the regression 
estimates for the professional connections. The results show that the coefficient for professional 
connections is significantly positive (p < 0.05) so professional overlaps tend to improve 
profitability. Specification (2) presents the regression estimates for the educational connections. 
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The results also show that changes in directors’ educational connections are significantly (p < 
0.05) positively associated with changes in ROA. Specification (3) presents the regression 
estimates for the other connections. The results show that the coefficient of the change in 
directors’ other connections is positive, but not statistically significant. All these associations 
hold after controlling for the governance, other firm and board characteristic variables, and 
industry and year effects. Specification (4) shows that the coefficient of professional connections 
is only significant, and that the coefficients of educational and other connections are not 
significant. Panel B of Table 1.9 reports the results of regression analysis based only on the 
subsample of independent directors. The results are similar those reported in Panel A of Table 
1.9 except for Specification (4) indicating that the impact of all three types of connections are 
significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.1 respectively). To measure relative importance of three 
connection variables to the changes in ROA, I provide standardized regression coefficients of 
three connection variables. The standardized regression coefficients of changes in professional, 
educational, and other connections are 0.010, 0.009, and 0.002 respectively. The results indicate 
that directors’ past professional and educational connections have greater impact on firm 
performance than directors’ other connections. 
[Insert Table 1.9] 
Table 1.10 reports that results from regressing changes in cost of goods sold on changes 
in three different types of directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.10 shows the 
results of regression analysis based on all directors sample. Specification (1) presents the 
regression estimates for the professional connections. The results show that the coefficient for 
professional connections is significantly negative (p < 0.01) so professional overlaps tend to 
contribute product cost reductions. Specification (2) presents the regression estimates for the 
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educational connections. The results also show that changes in directors’ educational connections 
are significantly (p < 0.01) negatively associated with changes in cost of goods sold. 
Specification (3) presents the regression estimates for the other connections. The results show 
that the coefficient of the change in directors’ other connections is not significant. All these 
associations hold after controlling for the governance, other firm and board characteristic 
variables, and industry and year effects. Specification (4) shows that the coefficients of 
professional and educational connections remain negative and significant, but the coefficient of 
other connections is not statistically significant. To measure relative importance of three 
connection variables to the changes in cost of goods sold, I provide standardized regression 
coefficients of three connection variables. The standardized regression coefficients of changes in 
professional, educational, and other connections are -0.025, -0.024, and 0.000 respectively. The 
results indicate that directors’ past professional and educational connections have greater impact 
on firm performance than directors’ other connections. Panel B of Table 1.10 reports the results 
of regression analysis based only on the subsample of independent directors. The results show 
that the impact of educational connections is the most significant, and the impact of both 
professional and other connections are not statically significant, indicating that independent 
directors play a slightly different role in providing resources for cost reductions.   
[Insert Table 1.10] 
Table 1.11 reports that results from regressing changes in SG&A expenses on changes in 
three different types of directors’ external connections. Panel A of Table 1.11 shows the results 
of regression analysis based on all directors sample. Consistent with my main results, 
Specifications (1) to (4) show that none of three types of connections is associated with changes 
in SG&A expense. Panel B of Table 1.11 reports the results of regression analysis based only on 
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the subsample of independent directors. I find the similar results as the results in Panel A of 
Table 1.11. The significance levels of the external connections variables are all comparable to 
those shown in Panel A of Table 1.11. 
[Insert Table 1.11] 
Taken together, my results indicate that directors’ past professional connections have 
greater impact on firm performance than directors’ educational connections and other 
connections. 
1.5.2 Industry Analysis 
The literature in sociology describes how social capital such as managerial ties and 
networks is a function of brokerage opportunities in a network and explains when and where 
social capital is valuable (Granovetter 1973; Freeman 1977; Cook and Emerson 1978). Burt 
(1997) argues that the value of social capital to an individual is contingent on the number of 
peers and finds that social capital is especially valuable to individual with few peers. 
Furthermore, several researchers (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Zahra and Pearce 1989) suggest 
that boards may vary significantly in the level of resources they bring to the firm and some 
resources may be more critical to one specific firm than others depending on the firm’s internal 
and external contingencies. I expect that the impact of directors’ external connections on firm 
performance is more pronounced among industries that are not yet fully open for market 
competition, regulated by government, or have relatively smaller customer and supplier base.  
I use 12 industry classifications of Fama-French (Consumer Non-Durables, Consumer 
Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, Chemicals, Business Equipment, Telecommunication, 
Utilities, Wholesale and Retail, Healthcare, Finance, Other) to test the impact of directors’ 
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external connections on firm performance by industry. I then repeat the main regression model 
(1) to (4), described in Section 1.4 for each of the 12 industry groups.  
Table 1.12 presents the impact of directors’ external connections on firm operating 
performance by different industry groups. Column (1) reports the results from regressing 
changes in sales revenue on changes in directors’ external connections. 6 The coefficients of 
directors’ external connections in Finance, Utilities, Healthcare, Business Equipment, and 
Manufacturing industries are all positive and statistically significant. The results show that the 
impact of directors’ external connections on firm performance in terms of increases in sales 
revenue is significant among firms in regulated industries and firms in relatively smaller 
customer and supplier base industries. The industries that have very large customer and supplier 
base like wholesale and retail industry appear to have little immediate effect on sales boosting.  
Column (2) presents the impact of directors’ external connections on profitability. The 
coefficients of directors’ external connections in Finance and Energy industries are positive and 
statistically significant. The results show that the impact of directors’ external connections on the 
improvement in profitability is significant among firms in regulated industries. 
Column (3) and (4) report the impact of directors’ external connections on cost of goods 
sold and SG&A expenses respectively. The results show that the coefficients of directors’ 
external connections are not significant in any industries, suggesting that the impact of directors’ 
external connections on cost of goods sold and SG&A expenses do not vary across the different 
industries. 
6 Total revenue for Finance industry is defined as the gross income received from all divisions of the company 
including interest and related income, investment securities, investment banking income, commissions and fees 
(Broker/Dealer, Real Estate), development revenue (Real Estate), insurance premiums (Insurance), investment 
income (Real Estate, Insurance). 
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Results from Table 1.12 suggest that by accessing to critical firm resource through 
relational capital captured in directors’ external connections, a firm may improve its operational 
performance, but the importance of directors’ external connections in providing resources to a 
firm may vary by industry. 
[Insert Table 1.12] 
1.5.3 DuPont Analysis 
In Section 1.4, I documented significant improvement in both revenue and return on 
assets (ROA) of the firm following the addition of well-connected directors to the board. While 
revenue increase is consistently significant across all models I examine in Section 1.4, alternative 
explanations exist concerning which component of ROA, i.e., either asset turnover or profit 
margin might drive the observed ROA increase.  
To examine two fundamental elements of firm profitability (ROA), I disaggregate ROA 
(net income ÷ average total assets) into two components, profit margin (net income ÷ sales) and 
asset turnover (sales ÷ average total assets). Asset turnover measures the firm’s ability to 
generate sales with a given level of investment, and product margin measures the firm’s ability to 
control costs at a given level of sales activity (Atkinson, Banker, Kaplan, and Young 2001). I use 
the same models elaborated in Section 1.4. In these models, dependent variables are changes in 
asset turnover (∆ATO) and profit margin (∆PM) respectively. 
I expect the addition of well-connected directors to the board to be associated with 
improved asset turnover. The resources that well-connected directors bring to the board may be 
integrated to create a strategic direction so that the firm can increase its asset turnover through 
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improved production efficiencies, improved inventory management, proper outsourcing, or 
reductions in capital costs. 
I also expect the addition of well-connected directors to be associated with increased 
profit margin. Although the results in the Section 1.4 show that there is no association between 
the extent of directors’ external connections and SG&A cost reduction, the results suggest that 
directors’ external connections are associated with lower production costs. The firms with well-
connected directors are more likely to develop cost-saving solutions, thereby increasing profit 
margin. 
First, I examine the relationship between changes in directors’ external connections and 
changes in asset turnover of the firm (∆ATO). Table 1.13 presents the results from regressing 
changes in asset turnover (∆ATO) on changes in directors’ external connections. Column (1) 
reports the results of base regression. I find the association between the change in directors’ 
external connections and the change in asset turnover at year t is positive, but not statistically 
significant. However, after controlling for year and industry fixed effects, I find that directors’ 
external networks have some impact on asset turnover of the firm. That is, conditional on year 
and industry factors, the firm experiences an improvement in asset turnover following addition of 
well-connected directors to the board, shown in column (3). Columns (2) and (4) show the 
results after controlling for the changes in directors’ external connections at year t−1. Even after 
controlling the addition of directors with more extensive external connections to the board in the 
year before, the relation between the change in directors’ external connections at year t and the 
change in asset turnover at year t is still positive and statistically significant. Overall, these 
findings suggest that addition of well-connected directors to the board is associated with the 
improvement in asset turnover of the firm. 
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[Insert Table 1.13] 
Next, I examine the relationship between changes in directors’ external connections and 
changes in profit margin of the firm (∆PM). Table 1.14 investigates the relationship between 
changes in directors’ external connections and changes in profit margin of the firm (∆PM). 
Column (1), (2), (3) and (4) report that changes in directors’ external connections at year t are 
positive associated with changes in profit margin at year t, but those are not statistically 
significant. Overall, these results provide little evidence that the addition of well-connected 
directors to the board is significantly associated with the improvement in profit margin. 
[Insert Table 1.14] 
Taken together, my empirical findings suggest that the significant improvements in ROA 
after the appointment of well-connected directors are more driven by the improvements in asset 
turnover of the firm than the improvements in profit margin. 
1.5.4 Robustness Tests 
An alternative explanation for my main findings is that well-connected directors who 
develop reputations might acquire directorships in better performing firms. Directors seek to 
develop and maintain a favorable reputation as active representatives of shareholder welfare, 
thus enhancing their human capital on the boards on which they sit and increasing their 
attractiveness as candidates for board appointments at other firm (Zajac and Westphal 1996). 
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) examine whether the overall performance of a 
company affects the number of board seats secured by its outside directors under general and not 
extraordinary conditions. They find a positive association between performance and directors 
obtaining new board seats. To the extent to which this is the case, my findings of the better 
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performance observed for firms with newly appointed well-connected directors may not be due 
to the resources that the directors bring to the firms but due to well-connected directors acquiring 
directorships only in firms with better prospects.  
To rule out this alternative explanation, I restrict the sample to firms that experienced a 
decrease in sales revenue prior to appointing well-connected directors to the board. I also restrict 
the sample to firms whose profit (ROA) deteriorated before well-connected directors are 
appointed to the board. Using these two alternative sets of sample data, I repeat the main 
regression model (1) to (4), described in Section 1.4. Table 1.15 presents results from regressing 
changes in sales revenue on changes in directors’ external connections using two alternative sets 
of sample data. Panel A of Table 1.15 shows the results of regression analysis based on the 
alternative sample of firms that experienced a decrease in sales revenue before director 
appointments. The coefficient of changes in directors’ external connections on changes in sales 
revenue is positive and statistically significant. Panel B of Table 1.15 shows the results of 
regression analysis based on the alternative sample of firms whose profit deteriorated before the 
well-connected directors are appointed. The coefficient of changes in directors’ external 
connections on changes in sales revenue is also positive and statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1.15] 
Table 1.16 presents results from regressing changes in ROA on changes in directors’ 
external connections using two alternative sets of sample data. Panel A of Table 1.16 shows the 
results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of firms that experienced a decrease 
in sales revenue before director appointments. The coefficient of changes in directors’ external 
connections on changes in ROA is positive and statistically significant. Panel B of Table 1.16 
shows the results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of firms whose profit 
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deteriorated before the well-connected directors are appointed. The coefficient of changes in 
directors’ external connections on changes in ROA is also positive and statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1.16] 
Table 1.17 presents results from regressing changes in cost of goods sold on changes in 
directors’ external connections using two alternative sets of sample data. Panel A of Table 1.17 
shows the results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of firms that experienced 
a decrease in sales revenue before director appointments. The coefficient of changes in directors’ 
external connections on changes in cost of goods sold is negative and statistically significant. 
Panel B of Table 1.17 shows the results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of 
firms whose profit deteriorated before the well-connected directors are appointed. The 
coefficient of changes in directors’ external connections on changes in cost of goods sold is also 
negative and statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1.17] 
Table 1.18 presents results from regressing changes in SG&A expenses on changes in 
directors’ external connections using two alternative sets of sample data. Panel A of Table 1.18 
shows the results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of firms that experienced 
a decrease in sales revenue before director appointments. The coefficient of changes in directors’ 
external connections on changes in SG&A expenses is negative, but not statistically significant. 
Panel B of Table 1.18 shows the results of regression analysis based on the alternative sample of 
firms whose profit deteriorated before the well-connected directors are appointed. The 
coefficient of changes in directors’ external connections on changes in SG&A expenses is 
negative, but not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1.18] 
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Throughout this chapter, I use a contemporaneous measure of directors’ external 
connections, ∆ADECi,t as a baseline specification for my regression models. Given that the 
possibility of reverse causality, I estimate models using lagged variable of directors’ external 
connections, ∆ADECi,t-1 as a conservative baseline specification. The results (untabulated) from 
these models are qualitatively similar to those obtained from models using the contemporaneous 
measures of directors’ external connections. 
In summary, my results are robust to the alternative explanation and specification. I 
obtain similar inferences when using two alternative samples, and using a conservative 
specification, indicating that relational capital captured in directors’ external connections 
provides economic benefits to firms by helping to increase sales growth, improve profitability, 
and lower production costs. 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of directors’ external connections on firm 
performance. Resource dependence theory suggests that directors provide critical resources to 
the firm through linkages with the external environment. I argue that relational capital captured 
in directors’ external connections plays an important role as links that provides access to 
strategic inputs including raw materials and capital, information about the general environment, 
and knowledge of the industry and of the general business environment. I expect that well-
connected directors in the boardroom networks create these benefits for the firm. Consistent with 
this, I find that directors’ external connections help improve firm operating performance. Firms 
that appoint well-connected directors to the board experience significant increases in sales 
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revenue, product cost reduction, and improvement in profitability, even after controlling for year 
and industry effects, and other control variables. I also find that firms that have high growth 
potential and are in an earlier stage of their business life cycle are more likely to benefit from 
directors’ external connections. 
In addition, I investigate the impact of different types of directors’ external connections 
on firm performance. I partition directors’ external connections into professional, educational, 
and other connections and examine their impact on firm performance. I find that directors’ 
professional and educational connections have greater impact on firm operating performance 
than directors’ other connections. In further analysis, I find that the importance of directors’ 
external connections in providing resources to a firm may vary by industry. The impact of 
directors’ external connections on firm performance is most significant in the regulated and 
relatively smaller customer and supplier base industries. In industries with very large customer 
and supplier bases, such as wholesale and retail industries, directors’ external connections appear 
to have little immediate effect on firm performance. In addition, I extend the impact of directors’ 
external connections on firm profitability by using DuPont analysis. I find that the significant 
improvements in ROA after the addition of well-connected directors to board seem to be realized 
mainly by significant increases in asset turnover. 
This paper expands on our understanding of what boards do and how they affect firm 
performance by documenting that in addition to the common perspective that boards create value 
by monitoring management, the relational capital captured in directors’ external connections 
provides economic benefits to firms. My results also extend the existing literature that has 
largely focused on the relationship between CEO’s social ties and firm performance. As a first 
study to provide empirical evidence on how, under what circumstance, and to what extent,  
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directors’ external connections affect firm operational performance, this paper opens up further 
questions in this area for future research. An interesting area of future research would be to 
provide an explanation of the processes whereby firms transform what well-connected directors 
bring into the boardroom into economic benefit to firms. For example, the connections between 
the respective directors of buyers and suppliers may have the implications of cost reductions for 
buyers. Another interesting area of future research would be to examine whether firms in 
financial trouble are likely to get directors with extensive connections. Comparing pre- and post-
firm performance on the events such as sudden death of well-connected director is also left to 
future research. 
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2.0  THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS ON DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION AND APPOINTMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
While CEO compensation and appointment have attracted significance attention from 
both researchers and practitioners, compensation paid to directors and appointment/selection of 
directors have received relatively less attention. Extant empirical research on director 
compensation and appointment has been largely grounded in agency theory perspectives by 
exploring the relations between the structure of director compensation and board of director 
independence (e.g., Bryan, Hwang, and Klein 2000; Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006; Farrell, 
Friesen, and Hersch 2008). The agency theory perspective suggests that inside board members, 
large boards, CEOs who also chair the board, and entrenched CEOs result in less independent 
and less effective boards of directors (Ryan and Wiggins 2004). Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) 
find a significantly positive association between CEO and director compensation after 
controlling for monitoring proxies and provide evidence that this relation is due to the excessive 
compensation received by directors and managers associated with an environment of ineffective 
monitoring. Anecdotal evidence of the Enron scandal seems to suggest that excessive 
compensation of directors may have prevented directors from fulfilling their responsibilities in 
monitoring management on behalf of shareholders. Farrell, Friesen, and Hersch (2008) identify 
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an asymmetric relation between changes in director compensation and changes in the value of 
firm equity. Firms that fall below the market level begin adjusting director compensation back to 
the market immediately. However, there is no immediate downward-adjustment when 
compensation rises above the market level due to passive increases in the equity value.  
In contrast, Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) find that board compensation 
packages are designed largely around agency-cost reduction, arising from management oversight 
and control that is separate from ownership. Recent studies on CEO compensation explore the 
impact of CEO’s network connections on his/her compensation. However, to my knowledge 
there has been no research on how directors’ external network connections impact their 
compensation and appointment.  
This chapter examines the relationship between directors’ external connections and 
director compensation and appointment. First, I explore the following question: How do 
directors’ external connections affect director compensation? Drawing on my findings in Chapter 
1 that document that directors’ external connections have a positive impact on firm performance, 
I argue that the external connections of directors should also be reflected in director 
compensation. Consistent with prior literature, which finds that CEO networks are positively 
associated with CEO compensation (Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein 2001, Engelberg, Gao, 
and Parsons 2013, Liu 2010), I find that directors’ external connections are positively associated 
with the level of their compensation and that directors with more extensive external connections 
earn more than those with more limited external connections, supporting the argument that 
directors’ external connections are strategically valuable to firms (Geletkanycz and Hambrick 
1997). This association holds after the controlling for the influence of the firm characteristics, 
industry and year fixed effects. 
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It is possible that this association merely reflects the endogeneity of directors’ external 
connections, whereby directors’ external connections are correlated with directors’ attributes 
such as experience and education. To evaluate this explanation, I further examine the association 
by controlling for directors’ experience and educational attainments which are potentially related 
to director compensation, and decomposing the external connection variable into three individual 
components; professional, educational, and other connections. Even after controlling for these 
director characteristics, human capital, I find that the main association still holds. I find that 
professional connections of outside directors are important determinants of pay for serving as a 
director, but educational and other connections of outside directors are not associated with their 
compensation. This finding is in contrast to Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013) who find that 
CEO’ educational connections are more valuable than either professional or other connections. 
One interpretation of this result is that directors and CEOs have different roles within the firm. 
CEO ability is important in managing the operations of the firm, while directors are concerned 
with monitoring and resource provision. As a result, we may expect that different connections 
play different roles for CEOs and directors in benefiting the firm. This claim is supported by an 
additional test using the subsample of employee directors. I find that educational connections of 
employee directors as well as professional connections of employee directors are significantly 
associated with their compensation.  
In addition, I examine whether the association between the extent of external connections 
and director compensation is confounded by CEO and board related governance characteristics. I 
find that the impact of directors’ external connections on director compensation is significantly 
positive, suggesting that my primary results are unlikely to be confounded by CEO and board 
related governance characteristics. 
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Next, I discuss the impact of directors’ external connections on another director labor 
market outcome, director appointment. Using the subsample of directors who departed as a 
director from the firm on which he/she served during the period from 2003 to 2010, I examine 
whether directors’ external connections impact the likelihood of being selected as a new director. 
O’Neal and Thomas (1995) argue that director selection occurs primarily through networking 
rather than through recruiting channels. Consistent with this argument, I find that directors who 
exit are more likely to obtain new directorships through their external connections, suggesting 
that external connections play an important role in the director selection process. In particular, I 
find that professional connections are more valuable in increasing the likelihood of receiving 
additional board seats than educational and other connections.  
The effects of control variables on director appointment are also interesting. I find that 
the existence of a social connection between the exiting director and other board members in the 
new firm, the number of qualifications, the number of other directorships which the exiting 
director currently holds, aggregate board experience, and big corporation board experience 
increase the likelihood of obtaining a new director appointment. The profitability measured by 
ROA of the firm on which the director previously served is marginally associated with the 
likelihood of gaining a new director appointment. However, the stock return of the firm on which 
the director previously served and gender of the exiting director are not associated with the 
likelihood of gaining a new director appointment. Consistent with prior literature (Srinivasan 
2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007), I find that directors who served on the board of firms that had 
financial restatements during their tenure are less likely to obtain a new director appointment. I 
also find that older exiting directors are less likely to obtain a new director appointment. 
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Collectively, my findings suggest that directors’ external connections increase the likelihood of 
obtaining additional board seats. 
Given that large sample data on supply and demand in director labor market are not 
readily available, the subsample of the exiting directors used in this study is informative. 
However, it is a small and potentially biased sample. To check the robustness of the results, I use 
the sample of all directors in the BoardEx database during the period 2003 to 2010. I find that 
my finding is robust to the alternative analysis. 
Unlike datasets in other studies that are largely based on board interlocks, I map the 
entire network of over 393,000 board level directors and executives, and construct my measure 
of directors’ external connections, using detailed biographical data for directors and executives 
provided by the BoardEx database. While interlocks capture only current direct ties among 
directors and executives, my external connection measure captures indirect ties as well as direct 
ties developed in the past and present. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on board of director compensation in the 
following ways. Prior research examines the relationship between director compensation and 
board independence (e.g., Ryan and Wiggins 2004). While I also provide some insight into how 
director independence contributes to the level and structure of director compensation, I identify 
an important attribute in a director that explains director compensation. Examining how 
directors’ external connections affect director compensation provides additional insights, 
increasing our understanding of director compensation. My findings suggest that the external 
connections of directors accrue value to the firm, and thus impact director compensation. The 
results extend the prior literature that shows that CEOs with larger networks of personal 
connections to those outside the firm earn more than those with smaller networks (Engelberg, 
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Gao, and Parsons 2013) by identifying a specific director attribute that has meaningful impact on 
director compensation. 
This paper also contributes to the existing literature that investigates the determinants of 
the selection or retention of individual directors. Using a subsample of exiting directors, I 
provide the evidence that external connections of directors increase the likelihood of the exiting 
directors getting new board seats. This result complements prior research that documents that 
CEOs play a key role in selecting new board members (Lorsch and MacIver 1989), or find that 
directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract additional 
directorships (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003). This result also extends prior literature 
that finds an outside CEO candidate benefits significantly by having connections to the board of 
the hiring firm (Liu 2010).  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the background 
literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and the construction of variables, and provides 
descriptive statistics on external connections, compensation, and appointments of directors. 
Section 2.4 describes research design, and presents empirical results on director compensation 
including several robustness tests. Section 2.5 provides research design, and presents empirical 
results on director appointment. Section 2.6 provides concluding remarks. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Section 2.2.1 provides a review of prior research that considers the determinants of the 
director compensation. Section 2.2.2 summarizes the studies on the director appointment. 
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2.2.1 Director Compensation 
While executive compensation is the subject of a vast literature, director compensation is 
relatively less explored. Existing research on director compensation can be broadly divided into 
two categories: research which examines the impact of director compensation on board decision 
making and firm performance, and research which considers the determinants of director 
compensation. 
Most existing empirical research has focused on the impact of director compensation on 
board decision making and firm performance. A large number of studies have investigated the 
association between directors’ compensation mix and board effectiveness and/or firm 
performance. Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999) examine the relationship between outside director 
stock ownership and effective monitoring and firm performance. They find that outside director 
stock ownership is significantly associated with firm performance and the likelihood that 
executives are replaced following poor performance. Vafeas (1999) finds that a significant 
predictor of the adoption of equity based director incentive plans is the proportion of outside 
directors, which is positively related to adoption. Perry (2000) examines whether the structure of 
director compensation affects CEO turnover and find that equity-based compensation increases 
the level of monitoring and the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance. Ryan 
and Wiggins (2004) examine the relation between the structure of director compensation and 
board independence. They find that director compensation is determined by the board’s power 
relative to that of the CEO, and varies with barriers to effective monitoring, suggesting that 
powerful managers use their power to influence the directors’ compensation to provide fewer 
incentives to monitor by reducing the directors’ pay sensitivity to overall firm performance. Fich 
and Shivdasani (2005) examine the market reaction to the adoption of equity based director 
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incentive plans. They show that firms with high market-to-book ratios are more likely to utilize 
option compensation for their directors than firms with low market-to-book ratios. They also find 
that the market reacts positively to the adoption of a director stock option plan. Bryan and Klein 
(2004) examine whether there is an association between director stock option grants and 
managers taking on more risky, higher net present value projects. They find that significantly 
positive associations between the stock option compensation for directors and future 
investments, volatility of returns and firm performance. Becher, Campbell, and Frye (2005) 
examine how regulatory changes affect equity-based compensation for non-employee directors. 
They find that deregulation within the banking industry is associated with an increase in the use 
of equity-based compensation for bank directors and that this increase accompanies improved 
accounting profitability. Adams and Ferreira (2008) investigate the impact of board meeting fees 
on outside directors’ attendance at board meetings. They find the positive association between 
board meeting fees and outside directors’ attendance records. 
The empirical research on the determinants of director compensation has been relatively 
less explored. Most of the existing empirical research has focused on the independence of 
directors comprising the board in this line of literature. Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) find 
CEO and directors indirectly influence their own pay and CEO pay tends to be higher when 
director pay is higher, suggesting that the positive relationship between CEO and director excess 
compensation is due to mutual back scratching. Linn and Park (2005) find that elements of 
outside director compensation are significantly related to the investment opportunity set. Firms 
with more investment opportunities pay a higher level of compensation to their outside directors 
than firms with fewer investment opportunities. In addition to paying more total compensation, 
firms with greater investment opportunities compensate directors more heavily with stock-based 
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forms of compensation than with cash. They also document a positive relation between total 
compensation of outside directors and firm size. They conclude that firms pay more and 
emphasize incentive-based compensation to motivate outside directors to act in the interests of 
shareholders when the costs of monitoring are high. 
Bryan, Hwang, Klein, and Lilien (2000) find that board compensation is structured to 
mitigate agency problems inherent in firms whose management control is separated from 
ownership. Thus, compensation packages paid to outside directors are designed to resemble 
compensation packages paid to the CEO. Prior literature examines whether director 
independence affects the level of director compensation. Yermack (2004) investigates the 
incentives received by outside directors. He finds that “outside directors receive positive 
performance incentives from compensation, turnover, and opportunities to obtain new board 
seats” (p. 2282). Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) find that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 
there are significant increases in director pay and overall director costs, particularly among 
smaller firms. 
Recently, literature in finance investigates the impact of CEO’s social connections on 
CEO labor market outcomes. Hwang and Kim (2009) measure social ties between CEOs and 
outside directors at Fortune 100 firms and examine the effect of social ties on executive 
compensation. They find that CEOs with social ties to board members receive more 
compensation. The study by Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013) is perhaps most closely related 
to this paper. They find that CEOs with large networks of personal connections to those outside 
the firm earn more than those with smaller networks. I extend this literature by identifying a 
specific director attribute that has meaningful impact on director compensation. Specifically, my 
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results suggest that directors with more extensive external connections earn more than those with 
more limited connections. 
2.2.2 Director Appointment 
Prior literature that examines the selection or retention of individual directors has 
concentrated on the role of the CEO in the director selection process. Mace (1971) provides 
anecdotal evidence on the influence of CEOs in director selection. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
find CEOs play a key role in selecting new board members. Westphal and Zajac (1995) find that 
relatively powerful CEOs are likely to appoint individuals to the board who are demographically 
similar to themselves. Conversely, relatively powerful boards are more likely to appoint 
individuals who are demographically similar to the existing board. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999, p. 1830) find that “when the CEO is involved, firms appoint fewer independent outside 
directors and more gray outsiders.” Collectively, this evidence supports the hypothesis that CEOs 
play a dominant role in the identification and selection of directors. 
Another stream of research investigates the role of network in the director selection 
process. O’Neal and Thomas (1995) argue that director selection through networking such as 
board memberships, professional associations, social contacts, personal acquaintances, and 
school ties rather than through the recruiting channels is the primary process in executive 
selection, and director networks have been the dominant means of identifying candidates for new 
directors. A recent study by Liu (2010) examines the role of prospective CEOs’ social 
connections to board members in the new CEO selection process. She finds that an outside CEO 
candidate benefits significantly by having connections to the board of the hiring firm. I extend 
this literature by providing empirical evidence that networking plays an important role in the 
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director selection process and that directors with more extensive connections are more likely to 
obtain new directorships. 
Several other papers examine the market for directors. Gilson (1990) finds that a director 
will be less likely to remain with the firm after the conclusion of bankruptcy or debt 
restructuring. Directors who resign from financially distressed firms subsequently serve on fewer 
boards of other companies. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find that directors who 
serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract additional directorships. They 
also find that the past performance of the firm for which an individual serves as a director 
correlates with the number of directorships subsequently held by that individual. Harford (2003) 
documents that directors at firms that are the target of hostile takeover are unlikely to be retained 
on the new board. Coles and Hoi (2003) examine the relation between a board’s decision to 
reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market 
opportunities of those same board members. They find that directors who served on the board of 
Pennsylvania firms that decided to reject all or some antitakeover provisions of SB1310 are more 
favorably received in the market for external board seats than are directors who served on the 
board of Pennsylvania firms that decided to retain all of the law’s provisions. Srinivasan (2005) 
examine career and litigation consequences of accounting restatements for outside directors. He 
finds that outside directors lose positions on other boards following a restatement. Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007) investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors. 
They find that outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but 
experience a significant decline in other board seats held following a financial fraud lawsuit. 
Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010) examine the consequences of the implementation decision of 
majority-vote shareholder proposals for outside directors' reputations in the labor market. They 
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find that the implementation of majority-vote shareholder proposals is associated with 
approximately a one-fifth reduction in both the probability of director turnover and the 
probability of losing other directorships. 
2.3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
2.3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
As described in Chapter 1, the primary data source for this study is BoardEx database. 
The database covers over 435,000 directors and executives of over 15,000 publicly quoted and 
large private companies. It contains biographical information of directors and executives and 
directors including current and past employment history, educational background, and other 
activities like memberships in general social associations, organizations, or charitable groups, 
and directors’ qualification such as CPA, CFA, or JD. I collect corporate governance variables 
from BoardEx. 
I obtain director compensation data during the period from 2000 to 2010 from three 
sources, ExecuComp, BoardEx, and company proxy statements. I collect compensation data for 
outside directors and employee directors separately since these two types of directors are 
compensated differently. For example, depending on the firm, outside directors may receive an 
annual cash retainer, meeting fees, committee fees and equity awards. However, employee 
directors are not compensated for their service on the board. I define directors who are also 
officers of the firm as employee directors. According to definitions stated in the Combined Code 
(2003), I classify non-employee directors who have personal or commercial ties with the firm or 
52 
executives as grey directors. I classify all other directors as outsider directors. I measure the total 
compensation received by each outside director including fees earned in cash, stock and option 
awards, and all other compensation. Cash compensation received by each outside director is 
composed of the sum of fees earned in cash and all other compensation, and equity-based 
compensation received by each outside director is composed of the sum of stock and option 
awards. Employee directors’ total compensation comprises salary, bonus, total value of restricted 
stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation. Employee directors’ cash 
compensation is composed of the sum of salary, bonus, and all other total compensation. 
Employee directors’ equity-based compensation is composed of the sum of stock and option 
awards. 
I obtain director appointment and departure data from two sources, BoardEx and 
company proxy statements. I identify director departures and director appointments that occurred 
during the period from 2003 to 2011. Then I follow each exiting director, and track the exiting 
director’s new position.  
I use COMPUSTAT for firm-specific financial data and CRSP for stock price data. I use 
the Audit Analytics to identify restated quarterly and annual reports. My final sample is the 
intersection among BoardEx, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and Audit Analytics matched by following 
multiple steps described in Chapter 1. This results in 7,627 matched companies consisting of 
52,146 unique directors.  
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on the compensation of outside director. 
The average cash compensation for outside directors is $84 thousand in 2010. The average value 
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of equity-based compensation for outside directors is $213 thousand in 2010. The average total 
compensation for outside directors increased from $183 thousand to $285 thousand between 
2000 and 2010. By types of outside directors, on average, grey directors (Panel B of Table 2.1) 
receive total compensation of $923 thousand and independent directors (Panel C of Table 2.1) 
receive total compensation of $253 thousand for serving as a director in 2010. While the average 
cash and equity-based compensation of grey directors are $134 thousand and $859 thousand 
respectively, those of independent directors are $81 thousand and $183 thousand respectively 
suggesting that grey directors earn more than independent directors for serving as a director and 
the difference in pay package between grey directors and independent directors is mainly due to 
the significantly higher equity-based compensation for grey directors. The total compensation of 
grey directors is significantly higher than that of independent directors throughout my sample 
period (2000 – 2010). However, the proportion of grey directors in boards decreases significantly 
from 28.3% to 5.0% between 2000 and 2010. 
Panel D of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on the compensation of employee 
directors. The average cash compensation for employee directors is $975 thousand in 2010. The 
average value of equity-based compensation for employee directors is $12,761 thousand in 2010. 
The average total compensation for employee directors is $13,049 thousand in 2010. 
Panel E of Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on the compensation of employee directors 
excluding CEO. The average cash compensation for employee directors excluding CEO is $550 
thousand in 2010. The average value of equity-based compensation for employee directors is 
$7,974 thousand in 2010. The average total compensation for employee directors is $7,562 
thousand in 2010. 
[Insert Table 2.1] 
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Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of annual director departures and appointments. 
There are total of 15,708 director departures and total of 16,917 new director appointments 
during the period from 2003 to 2011. 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics on the firms, their boards, executives and directors. 
They provide several characteristics for 52,146 directors and executives from 7,627 companies 
from 2000 to 2010. Panel A of Table 2.3 provides univariate statistics on key variables. 
On average, a director has approximately 372 external network connections to all other 
directors. The directors’ external connections vary by types of directors. The median director has 
213 external connections. An employee director has an average of 247 external network 
connections. The median employee director has 123 external connections. A grey director (an 
affiliated non-executive director) 7  has an average of approximately 327 external network 
connections. The median grey director has 167 external connections. Independent directors have 
the biggest network connections, the mean (median) is approximately 418 (255) external 
network connections. 
The average total assets of the firms in my sample are approximately $9.3 billion. The 
median total assets are $705 million. The average market-to-book asset ratio is 3.76, and the 
median market-to-book asset ratio is 1.85. The return on assets (ROA) is 0.024 on average, and 
the median is 0.030. The average stock return is 0.003, and the median is 0.004. The average 
tenure of a director is approximately 7.8 years, and the median is 5.7 years. Approximately 41 
7 According to definitions stated in the Combined Code (2003), grey directors have personal or commercial ties with 
the firm or executives. Such ties are inferred where the non-executive is related to any of the firm’s directors, 
advisors or senior employee, has served on the board for more than nine years, was formerly an employee of the 
company or group, has received additional remuneration apart from director’s fee, has any material business 
relationships with the company, represents a significant shareholder, or interlocking directors. 
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percent of the directors have a social tie with the CEO of the firm for which the director serves. 
The average number of directors per firm is 8.67 directors. The median is 8. A firm has 
approximately 29 percent of inside directors on the board on average, and the median is 25 
percent. The average tenure of CEOs is approximately 5.5 years, and the median is 3.6 years. 
Approximately 61 percent of the CEOs are also the chairperson of the board. Panel B of Table 
2.3 provides a correlation matrix for some of the key variables in the analysis. Directors’ external 
connections appear to bear a positive association with compensation, firm size, market-to-book, 
firm profitability, and board size.  
[Insert Table 2.3] 
2.4 EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS AND DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 
2.4.1 Empirical Results 
To examine the impact of external connections on director compensation, I estimate 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of director compensation on directors’ external 
connections. First, I investigate the relationship between directors’ external connections and total 
compensation, and then analyze two compensation components, cash compensation and equity-
based compensation separately. I use a natural logarithmic transformation to control for 
skewness in the directors’ external connections, although the results are similar when this 
transformation is not used. In each case, my key explanatory variable is directors’ external 
connections, and I include control variables for director characteristics such as tenure of 
directors, and an indicator variable for the types of director which equals one if the director is an 
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independent director, or equals zero if the director is a grey director in the conventional 
classification, and firm characteristics such as size, performance, growth opportunity, and risk. I 
also control for year and industry fixed effects.  
I run both linear and log-linear (using the natural logarithm) specifications of director 
compensation models to examine both the dollar impact of directors’ external connections and 
the elasticity of directors’ external connections. 
I start with outside directors’ compensation. Table 2.3 reports my regression results on 
the relationship between outside directors’ external connections and compensation. Panel A of 
Table 2.3 reports the linear specification where the dollar value of outside director compensation 
is regressed on various determinants. Panel B of Table 2.3 reports the log-linear specification 
where the natural logarithm of outside director compensation is regressed on various 
determinants (where several determinants are also transformed via the natural logarithm).  
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the results from regressing dollar value of compensation of 
outside directors on external connections. Column (1) report the relationship between outside 
directors’ external connections and total compensation. I expect total compensation of outside 
directors to be positively related to the provision of resources by outside directors. Consistent 
with my expectation, the results show that the estimated coefficient of outside directors’ external 
connections on total compensation is positively and statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting 
that directors’ external connection is associated with higher compensation and additional 1% 
increase in connection is worth roughly $346. Column (2) shows the results from regressing cash 
compensation of outside directors on external connections. The coefficient of outside directors’ 
external connections on cash compensation is also positive and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting 
that cash compensation of outside directors with extensive connections is higher than that of 
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outside directors with limited connections. Column (3) reports the relationship between outside 
directors’ external connections and equity-based compensation. The coefficient of outside 
directors’ external connections on equity-based compensation is also positive, but marginally 
significant (p < 0.1), suggesting that cash compensation of outside directors with extensive 
connections is higher than that of outside directors with limited connections. Overall, my results 
imply outside directors’ external connections are a significant determinant of pay for serving as a 
director, and the compensation of outside directors with extensive connections is higher than that 
of outside directors with limited connections.  
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports the results from regressing the natural logarithm of 
compensation of outside director on external connections. Similar to the results in Panel A, the 
estimated coefficients of outside directors’ external connections on total, cash, and equity-based 
compensation are positively and statistically significant (p < 0.01). The coefficients of outside 
directors’ external connections on total, cash, and equity-based compensation are 0.112, 0.099, 
and 0.089 respectively. These suggest that a 10% increase in outside directors’ external 
connections is associated with a 1.10%, 0.95%, and 0.85% increase in outside directors’ total, 
cash, and equity-based compensation respectively. In other words, we expect about 1.1% higher 
in total compensation when outside directors have 10% more external connections. Interestingly, 
the coefficients of the indicator variable for independent directors on total, cash, and equity-
based compensation are significant and negative, indicating that the compensation of 
independent directors is less than that of grey directors. This result is puzzling since the external 
connections of independent directors appear to be larger than those of grey directors on average. 
I ran the subsample analysis excluding grey directors who were former CEOs of the firm of 
which he or she sits on the board. Table 2.5 shows the results for the subsample analysis. Unlike 
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the results reported in Table 2.4, the coefficients of the indicator variable for independent 
directors on compensation are negative but statistically significant, indicating that after 
controlling for former CEO directors, the types of outside directors are not associated with 
director compensation. In sum, these findings suggest that outside directors with more extensive 
connections earn more than those with more limited connections, supporting the argument that 
director external connections are strategically valuable to firms, thus, directors should be paid for 
it. 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
[Insert Table 2.5] 
Next, I look at employee directors’ compensation. Table 2.6 reports my regression results 
on the relationship between employee directors’ external connections and compensation. Panel A 
of Table 2.6 reports the linear specification where the dollar value of employee director 
compensation is regressed on various determinants. Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the log-linear 
specification where the natural logarithm of employee director compensation is regressed on 
various determinants (where several determinants are also transformed via the natural logarithm).  
Panel A of Table 2.6 shows the results from regressing dollar value of compensation of 
employee director on external connections. Column (1) reports the relationship between 
employee director’s external connections and total compensation. I also expect total 
compensation of employee director to be positively related to the provision of resources by 
employee directors. Consistent with the results in Table 2.4 and my expectation, the results show 
that employee directors’ external connection is associated with higher compensation. The 
magnitude of the association is much higher than that of outside directors. The estimated 
coefficient of employee directors’ external connections on total compensation is 2,157.64, 
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suggesting that an additional 1% increase in social network connections is worth roughly 
$21,576 of total compensation of employee directors. Column (2) shows the results from 
regressing cash compensation of employee directors on external connections. The results show 
that external connections have an impact on employee directors’ cash connections. The 
coefficient of outside directors’ external connections on cash compensation is also positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), indicating that an additional 1% increase in social network connections is 
worth roughly $3,236 of cash compensation of employee directors. Column (3) reports the 
relationship between employee director’s external connections and equity-based compensation. 
The association between employee directors’ equity-based compensation and the extent of 
external connections is positive and statistically significant. The results indicate that additional 
1% increase in correction is worth roughly $19,840 of equity-based compensation of employee 
directors. Overall, my results suggest that similar to outside directors, the compensation of 
employee directors with more extensive connections is higher than that of employee directors 
with more limited connections.  
Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the results from regressing the natural logarithm of 
compensation of employee director on external connections. Similar to the results in Panel A, the 
estimated coefficients of employee directors’ external connections on total, cash, and equity-
based compensation are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). The coefficients of 
employee directors’ external connections on total, cash, and equity-based compensation are 
0.382, 0.258, and 0.399 respectively. These suggest that a 10% increase in employee directors’ 
external connections is associated with a 3.71%, 2.49%, and 3.88% increase in employee 
directors’ total, cash, and equity-based compensation respectively. In sum, my results suggest 
60 
that employee directors with more extensive connections earn more than those with more limited 
connections. 
[Insert Table 2.6] 
Taken together, there is strong and consistence evidence that directors’ external 
connections have significant impact on his or her compensation. Directors with more extensive 
connections earn more than those with more limited connections. It adds to the empirical results 
reported in Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013) that only consider CEO’s compensation. 
2.4.2 Robustness Tests 
Section 2.4.2 presents the main results of the paper concerning the impact of external 
connections on director compensation. In this section, I consider several additional tests that 
assess the robustness to extra controls. There are several possible explanations for the positive 
relationship between external connections and director compensation. First, there is a possibility 
that the external connection variable is correlated with other determinants for directors’ wage 
such as intelligence, skill, charisma, etc. (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013). I test this 
argument in Section 2.4.3.2. Second, Ryan and Wiggins (2004, p. 498) expect that “the party 
with bargaining advantage, either the director or the CEO, to influence the size and the structure 
of the compensation package in its own interest.” I examine whether the association between the 
extent of external connections and director compensation is confounded by CEO and board 
related governance characteristics in Section 2.4.3.2. Finally, given the large difference between 
the mean and median of director compensation in my sample, I perform median regression of 
director compensation on external connections in Section 2.4.3.3. 
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2.4.2.1 Decomposition of Directors’ External Connections 
To control for some other directors’ attributes which are potentially related with 
directors’ compensation, I decompose the external connection variable into three individual 
components: Professional, Educational, and Other connections. I also control for other 
observable director personal characteristics such as industry experience, graduate degrees, and 
elite educations. Industry experience is a dummy variable that equals one if the director 
possesses the same industry experience and zero otherwise. Graduate degrees is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the director holds graduate degrees such as MBA, Masters, JD, MD, or 
PhD degree and zero otherwise. Elite education is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
director graduated from Ivy League undergraduate schools and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) 
to (3) include one of three individual components of the external connection measures; 
Professional, Educational, and Other connections, as a main explanatory variable, and 
Specification (4) includes three individual components of the external connection measures as 
main explanatory variables.  
Table 2.7 reports that results from regressing outsider directors’ total compensation on 
the individual components of the external connection measures. Panel A of Table 2.7 shows the 
results from regressing dollar value of total compensation of outside director on the external 
connection measures. Among three components, Professional connections are significantly 
associated with outside directors’ total compensation, but the other two components are not 
significant. This finding is in contrast to Engelberg, Gao, and Parson (2013) that document that 
each of three components of CEOs’ external connection variable “Rolodex” is individually 
significant, with Educational connections being about four times as valuable as either 
Professional or Other connections, suggesting that as shown in Chapter 1, directors’ professional 
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connections may provide economic benefits to the firm the most; the firm considers the outside 
director’s professional connection as the most important determinant of pay for serving as a 
director. However, as we expect, CEOs have a different role within the firm, so the firm 
considers the CEOs’ educational connection as the most important determinant of pay for 
managing firms’ day-to-day operation. The impact of other directors’ personal characteristics on 
outside directors’ compensation is also interesting. While the effect of Industry experience on 
outside director compensation is not statistically significant, Graduate degrees and Elite 
education increase outside directors’ compensation. These associations still hold after controlling 
for year and industry fixed effects. 
Panel B of Table 2.7 reports the results from regressing the natural logarithm of total 
compensation of outside director on the external connection measures. Similar to the results in 
Panel A of Table 2.6, Professional connections are significantly associated with outside 
directors’ compensation, but the coefficients of Educational and Other connections are not 
significant. Outside directors holding graduate degree and graduated from Ivy League schools 
earn more, but the effect of Industry experience on outside directors’ compensation is not 
significant. 
[Insert Table 2.7] 
Table 2.8 reports that results from regressing employee directors’ total compensation on 
the individual components of the external connection variable. Panel A of Table 2.8 shows the 
results from regressing dollar value of total compensation of employee director on the external 
connection measures. Unlike the results in Table 2.7, not only Professional connections, but 
Educational connections are also significantly associated with employee directors’ total 
compensation while Professional connections remain the most valuable connections among three 
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components. This finding indicates that in addition to the role of director, employee directors 
also play a role as executives who involve more in day-to-day activities within the firm, so the 
firm considers both professional and educational as the important determinant of pay for 
employee directors. Similar to the results with outside directors, while the effect of Industry 
experience on outside director compensation is not significant, Graduate degree and Elite 
education increase outside directors’ compensation. 
Panel B of Table 2.8 reports the results from regressing the natural logarithm of 
compensation of employee director on the external connection measures. Similar to the results in 
Panel A of Table 2.8, both Professional and Educational connections are significantly associated 
with employee directors’ total compensation. Employee directors holding graduate degree and 
graduated from Ivy League schools earn more, but the effect of Industry experience on employee 
directors’ compensation is not significant. 
[Insert Table 2.8] 
Taken together, the evidence in Table 2.7 and 2.8 suggest that directors’ external 
connections, particularly past professional connections, are associated with director 
compensation. 
2.4.2.2 Governance and Director Compensation 
Following Ryan and Wiggins (2004), I add a set of control variables to the regression 
models presented in Table 2.4 and 2.6 to control for CEO and board related governance 
determinants of director compensation: the logarithm of board size, the proportion of insider 
directors on the board, the logarithm of CEO tenure, an indicator variable for CEO and board 
chair duality which equals one if the CEO holds the board chairman position and zero otherwise, 
an indicator variable for social connection to the CEO which equals one if the director has a 
64 
social connection to the CEO and zero otherwise, and an indicator variable for intra-board 
connections which equals one if the director has a social connection to other non-CEO board 
members and zero otherwise. 
Table 2.9 repeats the analysis presented in Table 2.4. Panel A of Table 2.9 shows the 
results from regressing dollar value of compensation of outside director on external connections. 
The results show that directors’ external connection is positively and significantly associated 
with total and cash compensation (p < 0.01). However, the equity-based compensation is not 
significant. Consistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2004), the effect of board size on outside 
directors’ compensation is significant and negative (p < 0.01), suggesting that outside directors 
on larger boards receive less both cash and equity-based compensation. However, the effect of 
the proportion of inside directors is significant and negative only on outside directors’ cash 
compensation, indicating that outside directors on boards with more insiders receive less equity-
based compensation. The effect of CEO tenure and CEO/Chair duality is also significant and 
negative (p < 0.01), indicating that outside directors of firms with entrenched managers receive 
significantly smaller compensation. The social ties to CEO and among board members are 
positively and significantly associated with outside directors’ compensation. 
Panel B of Table 2.9 reports the results from regressing the natural logarithm of 
compensation of outside director on external connections. I obtain the similar results as the 
results reported in the results in Panel A of Table 2.9 except that the coefficient of external 
connections on equity-based compensation is significantly positive, suggesting that outside 
directors’ external connection is associated with higher equity-based compensation, and the 
coefficient of proportion of inside directors on total compensation is significantly negative, 
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indicating that outside directors on firms with more inside directors receive less total 
compensation. 
[Insert Table 2.9] 
To assess robustness of the impact of external connections on employee director 
compensation, using employee director subsample, I repeat the analysis presented in Table 2.9. 
Panel A of Table 2.10 shows the results from regressing dollar value of compensation of 
employee director on external connections. Consistent with my finding in Panel A of Table 2.9, 
employee directors’ external connection is positively and significantly associated with 
compensation (p < 0.01). There are small discrepancies between the results based on the outside 
directors subsample (shown in Panel A) and the results based on the employee directors 
subsample (shown in Panel B) in that the coefficients of external connections on employee 
directors’ equity-based compensation is significantly positive and the coefficients of some 
control variables are not significant. 
Panel B of Table 2.10 shows the results from regressing dollar value of compensation of 
employee director on external connections. I find the similar results as the results in Panel B of 
Table 2.9. The significance levels of the external connection variables are all comparable to 
those shown in Panel B of Table 2.9, suggesting that employee directors’ external connection is 
positively and significantly associated with compensation (p < 0.01).  
[Insert Table 2.10] 
Overall, the above results are consistent with a significant impact of directors’ external 
connections on director compensation. These results give me more confidence in my inferences 
that directors with more extensive external connections earn more than those with more limited 
connections. 
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2.4.2.3 Additional Test 
There is the presence of large outliers and right skewness in director compensation data 
(as reported in Table 2.1). Following previous research (Hall and Liebman 1998; Aggarwal and 
Samwick 1999; Milbourn 2003), I repeat the analysis presented in Table 2.9 and 2.10 using 
median regression to reduce the influence of outliers. Table 2.11 and 2.12 presents the results of 
the median regression. My findings in the previous sections are robust to estimating median 
regression. I find that the estimated coefficients of the external connection variable are still 
positive and statistically significant under all specifications. The results of the median regression 
suggest that after controlling governance determinants of director compensation, there is still a 
positive relation between directors’ external connections and director compensation.  
[Insert Table 2.11] 
[Insert Table 2.12] 
2.5 EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS AND DIRECTOR APPOINTMENT 
2.5.1 Empirical Results 
My findings in Section 2.4 show a positive association between the extent of external 
connections and director compensation. In this section, I turn to the influence of external 
connection in another director labor market outcome, director appointments. I explore whether 
firms tend to appoint well-connected directors. I conduct tests to examine the determinants of 
director appointments.  
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I estimate a logit model to examine whether the likelihood of obtaining new directorship 
from other firms is a function of the exiting director’s external connections. The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable which equals one if the exiting director has new director 
appointment and zero otherwise. My key explanatory variables are directors’ external 
connections. I decompose the external connection variable into three individual components: 
Professional, Educational, and Other connections. I also include director specific characteristics 
variables such as an indicator variable for social connection to the CEO which equals one if the 
director has a social connection to the CEO and zero otherwise, and an indicator variable for 
other board connections which equals one if the director has a social connection to other non-
CEO board members. As proxies for directors’ qualifications, I include the aggregate number of 
directors’ qualifications reported in BoardEx, an indicator variable for graduate degrees that 
equals one if the director holds graduate degrees such as MBA, Masters, MD, or PhD degree and 
zero otherwise, an indicator variable for professional certifications which equals one if the 
director has CFA, CPA, or JD as proxies for financial or legal expertise, and the number of other 
directorship which the director currently holds. I also include the directors’ aggregate board 
experience. The aggregate board experience is defined as the sum of the cumulative years 
directors have served as a director. I include an indicator variable for big corporate board 
experience which equals one if the director has been on the board of S&P 500 companies and 
zero otherwise. I include director age, and an indicator variable for gender which equals one if 
the director is male, and zero if the director is female. I include the firm size and two 
performance measures, industry-adjusted ROA and industry-adjusted stock return of the firm on 
which the director previously served. I use total assets of the firm on which the director 
previously served as a proxy for firm size. I calculate prior two years average industry-adjusted 
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ROA and prior two years average industry-adjusted stock return of the firm on which the director 
previously served as performance measures. I include an indicator variable for the experience of 
financial restatement which equals one if the firm on which the director previously served had a 
financial restatement during the director’s tenure at the firm and zero otherwise. I also control for 
industry, year, and firm fixed effects. Specifications (1) to (3) include each of the individual 
external connection measures, professional connections, educational connections, and other 
connections, as a main explanatory variable, and Specification (4) includes all of the three 
external connection measures as main explanatory variables. Specification (5) uses a firm fixed 
effects model. 
Table 2.13 presents the results of logit regressions. Specification (1) through (3) shows 
that the coefficients of professional, educational, and other connections are significantly positive 
(p < 0.01, p < 0.01, and p < 0.05, respectively). Specification (4) shows that the coefficients of 
professional, educational, and other connections are also significantly positive individually, with 
the magnitude of the coefficient of professional connections (0.040) being higher than that of 
educational connections (0.002) and other connections (0.001). Specification (5) corresponds to 
Specification (4) but with firm fixed effects. The results indicate that, even after controlling for 
firm fixed effects, the coefficients of external connection variables remain positive and 
significant. These results indicate that my findings in Specification (4) are not all due to cross-
sectional differences. The results suggest that having more extensive connections increases the 
likelihood of obtaining new directorship from other firms for the exiting directors and impact of 
professional connections on obtaining new directorship for the exiting directors is greater than 
educational and other connections. 
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The existence of a social connection between the exiting director and the CEO and other 
board members is associated with significantly higher possibility of obtaining new directorship. 
The coefficients of social tie to the CEO and connections to board members are significantly 
positive (p < 0.01). Having more qualifications, in general, increases the likelihood that the 
exiting director obtains a new directorship. The coefficients of the number of qualifications, 
graduate degrees, and professional certifications are all significant positive (p < 0.01). I also find 
that the number of other directorship which the exiting director currently holds increases the 
likelihood of obtaining a new director appointment. Director prior experience variables, 
aggregate board experience and big corporation board experience have a positive estimate, 
indicating that the exiting directors are more likely to obtain a new directorship if they have 
spent more time on board and served on the boards of more prominent firms. I find that older 
exiting directors are less likely to obtain a new director appointment, and all else being equal, 
gender is not associated with the likelihood of gaining a new director appointment. Previous 
directorship on a large firm also increases the likelihood of obtaining a new director 
appointment. While the coefficient of the prior two years average ROA is positive, but 
marginally significant (p < 0.1), the coefficient of the prior two year average stock return is 
positive, but not statistically significant. Consistent with prior literature (Srinivasan 2005; Fich 
and Shivdasani 2007), I find that directors served on the board of firms had financial 
restatements during their tenure are less likely to obtain a new directorship.  
[Insert Table 2.13] 
Taken together, the results provide evidence that directors’ external connections are 
positively associated with the likelihood that the exiting directors obtain a new directorship from 
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other companies, suggesting that the more external connections directors have, the more likely 
they are to receive additional board seats. 
2.5.2 Robustness Test 
The sample used in my main analysis reported in Section 2.5.1 is the subsample of the 
exiting directors during the period from 2003 to 2010. Although it is an informed sample, it may 
be also a biased sample. To examine the robustness of the results presented in Section 2.5.1 to an 
alternative sample, I use all directors sample in BoardEx during the period from 2003 to 2010, 
and repeat the analysis presented in Table 2.13. There is also a caveat in this sample in that an 
individual currently sitting on the board of a company is not eligible for a board seat at that 
company, which slightly understates the results. The key difference between the analyses 
presented in Table 2.13 and the analysis in this section is that the dependent variable in the 
analysis in this section is an indicator variable which equals one if a director gains a board seat in 
the given year and zero otherwise.  
Table 2.14 present the result of logit regressions based on the alternative sample. While 
the magnitude of coefficients of external connection variables is slightly less than that reported in 
Table 2.13, the coefficients of professional, educational, and other connections are positive and 
statistically significant. Collectively, these results remain unchanged and are statistically similar 
to the results reported in Table 2.13, which are based on the subsample of the exiting director 
sample. 
[Insert Table 2.14] 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I assess whether directors’ external connections influence director labor 
market outcomes, director compensation and appointments. I find that directors with more 
extensive external connections earn more than those with more limited external connections, 
supporting the argument that directors’ external connections are strategically valuable to firms, 
thus, directors should be paid for it (Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997). My findings show that 
the directors’ external connections are positively associated with the level of director 
compensation. This association holds after controlling for other directors’ experience and 
educational attributes which are potentially related with director compensation. It also holds after 
controlling for firm specific fixed effects. I also find that the level of compensation of grey 
directors is not different from that of independent directors only when I control for grey directors 
who were former CEOs of the firm of which he or she sits on the board. 
In further analysis, I find that professional connections are the most important 
determinant of pay for serving as a director for outside directors. However, I find that 
educational connections as well as professional connections are significantly associated with the 
level of compensation for employee directors. My robustness test shows that my primary results 
are unlikely to be confounded by CEO and board related governance characteristics. These 
results suggest that directors with more extensive connections earn more than those with more 
limited connections. 
In addition, I find that external connections increase the likelihood of obtaining new 
directorships from other firms for the exiting directors, suggesting that directors’ external 
connections play an important role in the director selection process. 
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The effects of control variables on director appointment are also interesting. I find that 
the existence of a social connection between the exiting director and other board members in the 
new firm, the number of qualifications, the number of other directorship which the exiting 
director currently holds, aggregate board experience, and big corporation board experience 
increase the likelihood of obtaining a new director appointment. Prior two years average ROA of 
the firm on which the director previously served is marginally associated with the likelihood of 
obtaining a new director appointment. However, prior two year average stock return of the firm 
on which the director previously served and gender of the exiting director are not associated with 
the likelihood of obtaining a new director appointment. Consistent with prior literature 
(Srinivasan 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007), I find that directors who served on the board of 
firms that had financial restatements during their tenure are less likely to obtain a new director 
appointment. I also find that older exiting directors are less likely to obtain a new director 
appointment. Overall, my findings indicate that even after controlling for directors’ other 
characteristics, the more external connections directors have, the more likely they are to receive 
additional board seats. 
My results in Section 2.5 are subject to some limitations. The sample I used for the main 
analysis is based on the subsample of the exiting directors and their future positions. While it is 
still informative in that large sample data on supply and demand in director labor market are not 
readily available, it may be also a biased sample. The ideal data on director appointments for the 
questions I pose in Section 2.5 would include the appointed directors and the candidates losing to 
the appointees for all firms in the sample. Future research could be specifically designed to 
handle this issue.  
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Although this chapter focused on the association between the extent of directors’ external 
connections and the level of director compensation and provided evidence that directors with 
more extensive connections earn more and firms are willing to pay for the connections, it would 
be interesting to expand the questions I posed in this chapter by examining whether the way in 
which directors are compensated has to do with how to motivate directors to work hard as 
monitors and resource providers in the future research. Extending Hwang and Kim (2009), who 
find that firms whose boards are socially connected to the CEO award a significantly higher level 
of compensation to their CEOs and exhibit lower pay-performance sensitivity, by examining 
whether directors’ excess compensation predict future poor performance of firms, is also 
interesting. 
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APPENDIX 
How a Little Start-Up With No Revenue Attracted an All-Star Board  
By Steven Lipin. Wall Street Journal, 14 Dec 1999: B, 1:2.8 
 
For most start-up companies, simply finding qualified directors to fill the board is a struggle. 
Then there’s FirstMark Communications International LLC, which has assembled the most 
prestigious, star-studded board of any start-up you never heard of. 
Its directors include Nathan Myhrvold, chief technology officer at Microsoft; Bert Roberts, 
chairman of MCI WorldCom; Washington power broker Vernon Jordan and former Secretary of 
state Henry Kissinger; Sir Evelyn de Rothschild, chairman of N.M. Rothschild & Sons; and 
Michael Price, a former partner of Lazard Freres, who signed on as co-chief executive. 
Why did all these business and political glitterati agree to join the board of an obscure company 
with no revenue? None of them were willing to say no to Lynn Forester, the wireless 
entrepreneur and New York socialite who founded the company.  
Known in Democratic circles as a fund-raiser and pal of the Clintons, and in New York as a 
successful telecom investor and backer of Hillary Clinton’s Senate bid, Ms. Forester until now 
has gotten more ink on the society pages than in the business pages. (Sir Evelyn is obtaining a 
divorce, and is now dating Ms. Forester, giving the gossip pages plenty to write about.) 
But after studying at the knee of John Kluge, the legendary chief of Metromedia – whom Ms. 
Forester met when her ex-husband, former Manhattan Borough President Andrew Stein, was 
running for mayor – the ambitious networker set out to make her fortune using her connections, 
street smarts and entrepreneurial drive. And she has succeeded: Two home runs in the wireless 
area have swelled her personal net worth to an estimated $100 million or more. 
Now, Ms. Forester, 45 years old, is aiming even higher. FirstMark is one of a handful of U.S. 
upstarts that, along with many established American telecom concerns, are setting their sights on 
Europe in the global free-for-all to wire the world. To help carry out its strategy of building a 
network that would provide phone, Internet and video services, little-known FirstMark is 
8 Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/398691751?accountid=14709 
75 
                                                 
counting on its lineup of powerful and well-connected directors, all of whom are paid in closely 
held FirstMark stock. 
The contacts have already helped win key licenses to build a so-called fixed wireless network, 
raised financing for the venture and helped find strategic partners. Ms. Forester “has an 
extraordinary network of friends from politics to society to CEOs and directors,” says Gerard 
Roche, senior chairman of Heidrick & Struggles, a top executive recruiter. “It’s very difficult to 
assemble a group like that. Kissinger doesn’t need another board.” 
Like fixed wireless player Teligent Inc. in the U.S., FirstMark has been bidding in auctions in 
Europe for the spectrum that will enable it to transmit “the last mile,” from base stations to 
rooftop antennas via radio waves, and deliver voice, data, Internet and video. The move comes 
amid increasing demand for broadband in Europe, which many players hope to exploit. 
“Competing with an incumbent telephone company is a good business to be in,” says Ms. 
Forester. “There’s a great market opportunity, and we have the expertise to do it.” 
Of course, succeeding won’t be easy. German utility giant Viag AG was the biggest winner in 
Germany, a formidable threat for an upstart. Teligent itself is making a push in Europe, and it is 
run by executives with hands-on operating experience in the fixed wireless business. For all their 
contacts, Ms. Forester and Mr. Price, the two CEOs, have limited operating experience. 
Other risks include the possibility that financial markets will turn and the company won’t be able 
to raise the more than $1 billion in financing it’s expecting to get in the next 18 months. 
“The jury is still out on whether that alternative access technology is going to be successful or 
not,” says Keith Mallinson, managing director of the Yankee Group Europe. But, he adds, 
“people want more bandwidth, and as long as it’s cheap, there’s a good chance these businesses 
will do OK.” 
FirstMark has set its sights on Germany as one of the key markets, persuading Helmut Werner, 
the former chief executive of Daimler-Benz AG, to join as chairman of the German subsidiary. 
After filing nearly seven tons of documents in three trucks (authorities asked for 20 copies of 
each application for each of the 262 coverage areas), FirstMark was the biggest foreign winner of 
German licenses this summer and the third-biggest winner overall, garnering more licenses than 
U.S. players Comcast Corp., Teligent and Winstar Communications Inc. 
In addition to the German licenses, FirstMark has permanent licenses in Luxembourg and 
Portugal (with local partners) and provisional licenses in France and Belgium. FirstMark’s 
partners in Spain include such heavy hitters as Mexico’s Telefonos de Mexico SA and Grupo 
Prisa, the Spanish media company. By the end of this year, it will be operational in Germany, 
France and Belgium. 
Most of the directors have used their own Rolodexes to advance FirstMark’s prospects. Mr. 
Jordan brought in Grupo Prisa. Knowing that Mr. Jordan was involved, Mr. Werner came on 
board. 
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“She has the ability to make you feel like this company cannot go forward without you,” says 
Mr. Jordan, who sits on the board of Dow Jones & Co., publisher of The Wall Street Journal, in 
explaining why he said yes to Ms. Forester. 
FirstMark has tried to tap the expertise of each director to help it lay the groundwork for growth. 
Dr. Kissinger, whom Ms. Forester knew socially, helped greatly in Germany by opening doors 
and provided insights into the political landscape, though Dr. Kissinger deadpans that “I’m the 
technical expert.” 
Bernard Smedley, another director, who was head of Motorola’s cellular business, has been 
integral in choosing vendors. Mr. Roberts, a veteran of MCI when it was an upstart, has aided the 
executives in expanding the company and serves as its chairman. Mr. Myhrvold, currently on 
leave from Microsoft, has helped FirstMark decide how to bundle various services the company 
will offer to prospective clients, and which services to bundle. Sir Evelyn has provided useful 
contacts and stressed the importance of being a European company. 
FirstMark is a late 1990s version of a start-up. Its offices are in the same swank Madison Avenue 
building as the upscale retailer Barney’s. Its board meetings aren’t like those of publicly held 
corporate boards. At one meeting Sir Evelyn brought in chocolates for everyone. While there are 
agendas, there’s also plenty of improvisation. 
Ms. Forester was an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett when she joined Metromedia. Mr. 
Kluge told her cellular “would be bigger than radio and television,” she recalls. But when she left 
to strike out on her own, even Mr. Kluge hesitated to back her.  
In the first deal Ms Forester put together after leaving Metromedia, she persuaded Motorola – 
with the help of Mr. Smedley – to back her in acquiring a small paging business in Puerto Rico. 
Motorola didn’t want control of a service company because it didn’t want to be seen as a 
competitor to its customers. As a result, she held a 60% stake in the company. When it was sold, 
she reaped a gain of more than $25 million. 
Her bigger financial success, however, was having the foresight in the early 1990s to apply for 
wireless spectrums that weren’t being used. Though she originally thought the licenses she 
obtained would be used for video on demand rather than telephony and Internet access, she 
picked up four major cities – New York, Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco. She says she 
applied for only four licenses so as not to attract undue attention. 
The licenses she acquired were purchased by Teligent for 5% of Teligent’s stock and $10 million 
in cash before Teligent went public. Though Ms. Forester has sold some of her Teligent stock, 
Teligent shares have skyrocketed, fattening her coffers. 
For his part, Mr. Price helped build Lazard’s telecom and technology practice, and advised the 
likes of SBC Communications. He was an early investor in other successful telecom start-ups. “I 
spent my whole life advising the best and the brightest, and kept looking at these people and 
said, ‘Why aren’t I doing it?’” he explains. 
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Ms. Forester says she persuaded Mr. Price to join her as an equal partner after he missed out on 
investing in her U.S. operations before Teligent’s stock took off. When Ms. Forester set her 
sights on Europe, “he wanted in, and I said, ‘Sorry. I don’t need the money. I need a partner.’” 
Mr. Price bought stock in FirstMark, became co-chief executive, and the two financed the first 
year of operation from their own pockets. So far the company has raised $65 million in equity 
from WorldOnline International, a Dutch Internet service provider, and Sandler Capital, a 
communications and technology investment firm. Other investors include Credit Suisse First 
Boston. 
But not everybody in Mr. Price’s family appreciates his entrepreneurial zeal. When his daughter, 
Allie, had her bas mitzvah in March, his mother-in-law went up to his new partner and said, “So 
you’re Lynn Forester. Ever since he met you, he hasn’t had a paycheck.” 
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 Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of Sample Firms 
Fiscal Year # of Firms Total Assets ($mn) Sales ($mn) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
2000 1,287 10,012 1,575 4,305 1,073 
2001 1,570 10,974 1,449 4,235 977 
2002 1,618 11,509 1,507 4,154 961 
2003 3,080 7,515 581 2,528 271 
2004 3,664 7,360 480 2,484 235 
2005 3,930 7,604 497 2,699 246 
2006 4,079 8,449 560 2,956 279 
2007 4,111 9,253 626 3,158 309 
2008 3,823 9,461 667 3,382 324 
2009 3,691 9,510 728 3,182 318 
2010 3,458 12,316 826 3,780 408 
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics of Directors’ External Connection 
Panel A: Directors’ External Connections by Types of Directors 
Type of Director N Mean Median Max StDev 
Employee Directors 79,667 247.0 123 3038 315.2 
Grey Directors 47,220 326.8 167 4563 419.1 
Independent Directors 266,594 417.7 255 4688 477.7 
Total 393,481 372.2 213 4688 447.9 
 
Panel B: Directors’ External Connections by Industry 
Industry N Mean Median Max Stdev 
Consumer Non-Durables 1,599 392.2 327 1,574 277.2 
Consumer Durables 718 350.3 293 1,325 229.2 
Manufacturing 3,230 385.9 339 1,541 255.6 
Energy 1,489 324.6 271 1,389 228.6 
Chemicals 827 457.8 424 1,623 299.6 
Business Equipment 6,069 418.5 371 1,727 260.5 
Telecommunication 885 382.5 329 1,249 239.2 
Utilities 1,078 400.8 372 1,006 212.4 
Wholesale and Retail, 3,028 346.6 306 1,206 210.7 
Healthcare 3,685 391.2 331 1,481 259.1 
Finance 7,835 291.3 226 1,665 244.6 
Other* 4,414 350.2 293 1,641 232.2 
*Other: Mines, Construction, Building Materials, Transportation, Business Services, Entertainment Industry 
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Table 1.3. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics  
Variable Mean Median StDev Q1 Q3 
External Connections 372.246 213.456 447.949 177.000 484.818 
Professional Connections 247.385 208.833 183.635 109.778 332.111 
Educational Connections 72.330 54.778 63.743 25.727 99.250 
Other Connections 36.289 17.000 48.176 1.875 53.556 
∆ADEC 0.020 0.000 0.201 -0.010 0.049 
∆APC 0.027 0.000 0.216 -0.005 0.052 
∆AEC 0.006 0.000 0.359 -0.041 0.047 
∆AOC 0.008 0.000 0.620 -0.065 0.045 
log(SALES) 5.863 5.963 2.289 4.326 7.428 
log(ROA) -3.248 -3.046 1.115 -3.925 -2.445 
log(COGS/SALES) -0.545 -0.467 0.667 -0.842 -0.247 
log(SG&A/SALES) -1.412 -1.344 0.902 -1.922 -0.941 
log(Total Assets) 6.493 6.558 2.222 4.998 7.919 
log(Market-to-Book) 0.703 0.642 0.863 0.213 1.156 
Leverage 0.339 0.298 0.268 0.000 0.409 
Firm Age (year) 20.685 18.244 16.875 3.77 51.05 
Board Size 8.668 8.000 2.824 7.000 10.000 
# of Independent Directors 6.230 6.000 2.579 4.000 8.000 
% of Independent Directors 68.69 74.85 0.158 35 100 
% of Busy Directors 17.28 18.22 18.08 0 50 
CEO/Chair Duality (%) 61.25     
Intra-Board Ties 0.155 0.069 0.299 0.011 0.499 
Tie to the CEO (%) 18.79 10.14 0.202 2.44 80.01 
Industry Experience (%) 19.82 17.79 0.199 4.06 28.83 
Board Experience (year) 14.677 9.110 12.059 3.554 17.782 
Graduate Degree (%) 0.522 0.398 0.412 0.055 0.600 
Elite Education (%) 0.304 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.518 
      
No. of Observations 34,857     
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
Variables 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
1. External Connections 1         
2. log(SALES) 0.50 *** 1        
3. log(ROA) 0.03 *** 0.39 *** 1       
4. log(COGS/SALES) -0.03 *** -0.15 *** -0.30 *** 1      
5. log(SG&A/SALES) -0.05 *** -0.54 *** -0.38 *** -0.34 *** 1     
6. log(Total Assets) 0.43 *** 0.85 *** 0.32 *** -0.13 *** -0.37 *** 1    
7. log(Market to Book) 0.19 *** -0.01 * -0.03 *** -0.04 *** 0.14 *** -0.10 *** 1   
8. Leverage  0.52 * 0.20 *** -0.05 *** 0.18 *** 0.10 *** 0.20 *** -0.06 *** 1  
9. Firm Age  0.20 *** -0.05 0.18 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 *** 0.50 *** 0.01 *** 1 
10. Board Size 0.24 *** 0.49 *** 0.15 *** -0.06 *** -0.16 *** 0.64 *** -0.04 *** 0.21 *** -0.01 *** 
11. % Outside Directors 0.01 * -0.65 *** -0.07 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 -0.15 *** 0.01 
12. Busy Directors 0.02 ** -0.11 *** -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 *** 0.14 *** 0.01 *** 
13. CEO/Chair Duality (%) -0.01 0.45 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 *** 0.06 *** -0.26 *** 
14. Intra-Board Ties 0.25 *** 0.05 0.14 *** 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.10 *** 0.01 0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
15. Tie to the CEO -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.20 *** 0.05 *** 0.23 *** -0.02 *** 
16. Industry Experience 0.20 *** 0.15 0.04 -0.15 *** -0.02 *** 0.30 *** 0.01 *** -0.15 *** 0.01 *** 
17. Board Experience 0.03 *** 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 0.20 *** 0.05 *** -0.02 *** 0.13 *** 
18. Graduate Degree 0.03 *** 0.20 0.03 0.01 *** 0.10 *** 0.33 *** -0.03 *** 0.11 *** -0.03 *** 
19. Elite Education 0.01 *** 0.30 -0.01 -0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** 0.01 *** 
           
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations (Continued) 
Variables 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  
1. External Connections          
2. log(SALES)          
3. log(ROA)          
4. log(COGS/SALES)          
5. log(SG&A/SALES)          
6. log(Total Assets)          
7. log(Market to Book)          
8. Leverage                    
9. Firm Age                    
10. Board Size 1         
11. % Outside Directors 0.21 *** 1        
12. Busy Directors 0.28 *** 0.33 *** 1       
13. CEO/Chair Duality (%) 0.05 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 1      
14. Intra-Board Ties 0.30 *** 0.02 0.24 *** 0.33 *** 1     
15. Tie to the CEO 0.20 *** -0.15 *** 0.01 *** 0.10 *** 0.46 *** 1    
16. Industry Experience 0.30 *** 0.01 *** 0.44 *** 0.03 *** 0.36 *** 0.03 *** 1   
17. Board Experience 0.45 *** 0.03 *** 0.39 *** 0.03 *** 0.21 *** 0.01 *** 0.38 *** 1  
18. Graduate Degree 0.15 *** 0.01 *** 0.22 *** 0.15 *** 0.31 *** 0.47 *** 0.02 *** 0.65 *** 1 
19. Elite Education 0.24 *** 0.03 *** 0.15 *** 0.02 *** 0.22 *** 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.19 *** 
          
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.4. Relationship between Changes in Sales and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.082 *** 0.052 *** 0.076 *** 0.048 ***
 
(7.30) 
 
(4.16) 
 
(6.79) 
 
(3.86) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
 
0.047*** 
 
0.040*** 
  
(4.02) 
  
(3.45) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(3.58) 
 
(4.05) 
 
(3.64) 
 
(3.89) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 
 
(28.31) 
 
(26.38) 
 
(22.14) 
 
(19.95) 
 Leveragei,t 2.255*** 2.252*** 2.042*** 2.038*** 
 (4.62) (4.60) (4.04) (3.98) 
Firm Agei,t -0.056 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 *** -0.051 *** 
 (-5.12) (-5.08) (-5.04) (-4.99) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 * 
 (-2.51) (-2.50) (-2.58) (-2.47) 
% Outside Directorsi,t 0.055 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.048 *** 
 (6.11) (6.10) (6.15) (6.10) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.008 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.006 * 
 (1.72) (1.70) (1.69) (1.68) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 
 (0.68) (0.66) (0.66) (0.64) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.125 *** 0.121 *** 0.131 *** 0.122 *** 
 (5.11) (5.08) (5.12) (5.10) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.48) (3.44) (3.43) (3.42) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.111 *** 0.111 *** 0.108 *** 0.110 *** 
 (4.10) (4.09) (4.02) (4.06) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.911 *** 0.903 *** 0.909 *** 0.908 *** 
 (4.62) (4.50) (4.54) (3.53) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.042 ** 0.039 ** 0.040 ** 0.038 ** 
 (2.02) (2.00) (2.00) (1.98) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.033 ** 0.032 ** 0.030 ** 0.029 ** 
 (2.20) (2.19) (2.19) (2.18) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  28,192
 
24,165
 
28,009
 
24,008
 R2 0.030
 
0.030
 
0.062
 
0.064
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Panel B: Independent Directors  
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.055 *** 0.040 *** 0.052 *** 0.040 ***
 
(5.96) 
 
(3.94) 
 
(5.68) 
 
(3.95) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.034*** 
  
0.028*** 
   
(3.56) 
   
(3.02) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.005*** 0.006 *** 0.005*** 0.006 *** 
 
(3.56) 
 
(4.02) 
 
(3.61) 
 
(3.86) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 
 
(28.23) 
 
(27.44) 
 
(25.00) 
 
(19.89) 
 Leveragei,t 1.506*** 1.471*** 1.364*** 1.361*** 
 (4.65) (4.64) (4.07) (4.03) 
Firm Agei,t -0.037 *** -0.036 *** -0.037 *** -0.034 *** 
 (-5.15) (-5.11) (-5.14) (-5.08) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 ** -0.002 ** 
 
(-2.46)  (-2.42)  (-2.50)  (-2.41)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.037 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.032 *** 
 (6.14) (6.14) (6.15) (6.13) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 
 (1.75) (1.73) (1.72) (1.71) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.012 0.011  0.011  0.011  
 
(0.71) (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.084 *** 0.083 *** 0.088 *** 0.088 *** 
 (5.14) (5.12) (5.16) (5.16) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.51) (3.49) (3.49) (3.44) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.074 *** 0.075 *** 0.072 *** 0.073 *** 
 (4.14) (4.17) (4.10) (4.12) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.609 *** 0.603 *** 0.607 *** 0.607 *** 
 (4.65) (4.61) (4.62) (4.62) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.028 ** 0.026 ** 0.027 ** 0.025 ** 
 (2.05) (2.02) (2.04) (2.01) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.022 ** 0.022 ** 0.021 ** 0.020 ** 
 (2.24) (2.23) (2.22) (2.21) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  28,116
 
24,101
 
27,936
 
23,947
 R2 0.029
 
0.030
 
0.062
 
0.064
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Table 1.5. Relationship between Changes in ROA and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.024 *** 0.015 * 0.025 *** 0.016 * 
 
(2.84) 
 
(1.66) 
 
(2.92) 
 
(1.69) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.003   
0.003 
   
(0.33) 
   
(0.31) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.003*** 0.003***  0.002** 0.002** 
 
(3.02) 
 
(2.90) 
 
(2.31) 
 
(2.30) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
 
(10.26) 
 
(10.26) 
 
(9.98) 
 
(10.22) 
 Leveragei,t 2.244*** 2.268*** 2.151*** 2.263*** 
 (4.66) (4.91) (4.58) (4.82) 
Firm Agei,t -0.056 *** -0.086 *** -0.053 *** -0.076 *** 
 (-5.16) (-5.92) (-5.12) (-5.83) 
Board Sizei,t -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 * -0.002 * 
 
(-1.88)  (-1.87)  (-1.88)  (-1.88)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.055 *** 0.083 *** 0.050 *** 0.072 *** 
 (6.15) (6.55) (6.11) (6.44) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.008 * 0.010 * 0.007 * 0.009 * 
 (1.76) (1.79) (1.74) (1.77) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.018 0.027  0.016  0.024  
 
(0.62)  (0.79)  (0.62)  (0.74)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.124 *** 0.121 *** 0.129 *** 0.124 *** 
 (5.15) (5.12) (5.16) (5.14) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (3.52) (3.48) (3.47) (3.46) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.110 *** 0.109 *** 0.105 *** 0.101 *** 
 (4.15) (4.13) (4.06) (4.04) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.907 *** 1.009 *** 0.869 *** 1.356 *** 
 (4.66) (4.98) (4.54) (5.92) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.042 ** 0.040 ** 0.040 ** 0.035 ** 
 (2.06) (2.05) (2.05) (2.02) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.033 ** 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.030 ** 
 (2.25) (2.23) (2.23) (2.22) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  27,469
 
23,756
 
27,273
 
23,587
 R2 0.004
 
0.005
 
0.017
 
0.018
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.022 *** 0.011  0.023 *** 0.012  
 
(3.24) 
 
(1.42) 
 
(3.42) 
 
(1.55) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.004   
-0.005 
   
(-0.6) 
   
(-0.64) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.003*** 0.003***  0.002** 0.002** 
 
(2.85) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(2.14) 
 
(2.05) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
 
(10.53) 
 
(9.98) 
 
(9.32) 
 
(8.59) 
 Leveragei,t 2.077*** 3.025*** 2.006*** 3.816*** 
 (4.67) (5.66) (4.09) (7.43) 
Firm Agei,t -0.052 *** -0.080 *** -0.049 *** -0.070 *** 
 (-5.17) (-5.33) (-5.12) (-5.24) 
Board Sizei,t -0.001 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.003 * 
 
(-1.77)  (-1.84)  (-1.84)  (-1.85)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.051 *** 0.057 *** 0.066 *** 0.066 *** 
 (6.16) (6.16) (6.22) (6.21) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.007 * 0.006 * 0.006 * 0.006 * 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.73) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.017 0.015  0.015  0.014 
 
(0.73)  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.69)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.115 *** 0.116 *** 0.116 *** 0.115 *** 
 (5.16) (5.17) (5.17) (5.15) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (3.53) (3.59) (3.52) (3.52) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.102 *** 0.101 *** 0.096 *** 0.091 *** 
 (4.16) (4.14) (4.07) (4.05) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.839 *** 0.824 *** 0.704 *** 0.691 *** 
 (4.67) (4.66) (4.09) (4.03) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.039 ** 0.037 ** 0.035 ** 0.032 ** 
 (2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.03) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.030 ** 0.029 ** 0.028 ** 0.027 ** 
 (2.26) (2.24) (2.24) (2.23) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  27,402
 
23,587
 
27,402
 
23,535
 R2 0.005
 
0.018
 
0.005
 
0.018
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Table 1.6. Relationship between Changes in Cost of Goods Sold and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.031 *** -0.023 * -0.031 *** -0.024 * 
 
(-2.59) 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(-2.59) 
 
(-1.81) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.012   
-0.015 
   
(-0.93) 
   
(-1.15) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.002  0.003  0.002  0.005** 
 
(1.14) 
 
(1.21) 
 
(1.17) 
 
(2.07) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 
(-12.31) 
 
(-11.69) 
 
(-10.19) 
 
(-9.67) 
 Leveragei,t 2.252*** 2.233*** 2.039*** 2.009*** 
 (4.66) (4.65) (4.18) (4.01) 
Firm Agei,t -0.056 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.048 *** 
 (-5.16) (-5.12) (-5.08) (-5.03) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  
 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (-0.16)  (-0.51)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.055 *** 0.070 *** 0.059 *** 0.062 *** 
 (6.15) (7.51) (6.19) (6.22) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.008 * 0.008 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 
 (1.76) (1.74) (1.73) (1.72) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.018 0.023  0.017  0.021  
 
(0.72)  (0.75)  (0.70)  (0.73)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.125 *** 0.170 *** 0.131 *** 0.170 *** 
 (5.15) (5.42) (5.16) (5.44) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (3.52) (3.48) (3.47) (3.46) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.111 *** 0.110 *** 0.108 *** 0.105 *** 
 (4.15) (4.13) (4.06) (4.04) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.910 *** 1.216 *** 0.908 *** 1.171 *** 
 (4.66) (5.65) (4.58) (5.51) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.042 ** 0.052 ** 0.040 ** 0.049 ** 
 (2.06) (2.08) (2.05) (2.06) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.033 ** 0.043 ** 0.030 ** 0.037 ** 
 (2.25) (2.33) (2.23) (2.30) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  28,140
 
24,123
 
27,958
 
23,967
 R2 0.006
 
0.006
 
0.014
 
0.016
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 






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

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


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−
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.011  -0.002  -0.012  -0.004  
 
(-1.12) 
 
(-0.14) 
 
(-1.18) 
 
(-0.32) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.016   
-0.019 
   
(-1.60) 
   
(-1.62) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002 
 
(1.24) 
 
(1.81) 
 
(1.64) 
 
(1.62) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 
(-12.5) 
 
(-11.82) 
 
(-10.36) 
 
(-9.73) 
 Leveragei,t 0.796*** 0.977*** 0.721*** 0.929*** 
 (4.63) (5.62) (4.45) (5.24) 
Firm Agei,t -0.020 *** -0.026 *** -0.019 *** -0.023 *** 
 (-5.13) (-5.39) (-5.11) (-5.29) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  
 
(0.35)  (0.30)  (0.37)  (0.52)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.019 *** 0.025 *** 0.018 *** 0.022 *** 
 (6.12) (6.32) (6.11) (6.20) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
 (1.73) (1.71) (1.70) (1.69) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.006 0.007  0.006  0.007  
 
(0.69)  (0.70)  (0.67)  (0.68)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.044 *** 0.060 *** 0.046 *** 0.060 *** 
 (5.12) (5.39) (5.19) (5.38) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.49) (3.45) (3.44) (3.43) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.039 *** 0.053 *** 0.038 *** 0.050 *** 
 (4.12) (4.31) (4.10) (4.22) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.322 *** 0.430 *** 0.321 *** 0.414 *** 
 (4.63) (4.99) (4.51) (4.75) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.015 ** 0.017 ** 0.014 ** 0.017 ** 
 (2.03) (2.06) (2.02) (2.05) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.012 ** 0.015 ** 0.011 ** 0.013 ** 
 (2.22) (2.32) (2.22) (2.29) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  28,068
 
24,062
 
27,889
 
23,909
 R2 0.006
 
0.006
 
0.014
 
0.016
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
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Table 1.7. Relationship between Changes in SG&A Expense and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.005  -0.018 * -0.006  -0.016 * 
 
(-0.6) 
 
(-1.88) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(-1.70) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.012   
-0.013 
   
(-1.34) 
   
(-1.45) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(3.11) 
 
(3.13) 
 
(3.20) 
 
(3.21) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 
(-14.79) 
 
(-13.73) 
 
(-12.17) 
 
(-10.66) 
 Leveragei,t 2.396*** 2.366*** 1.808*** 1.787*** 
 (4.67) (4.61) (4.09) (4.07) 
Firm Agei,t -0.059 *** -0.016 *** -0.049 *** -0.017 *** 
 (-5.17) (-3.13) (-5.09) (-3.24) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
(0.46)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.49)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.058 *** 0.055 *** 0.046 *** 0.046 *** 
 (6.16) (6.12) (6.05) (6.04) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.008 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.73) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.019 0.015  0.015  0.014  
 
(0.73)  (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.69)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.133 *** 0.137 *** 0.126 *** 0.134 *** 
 (5.16) (5.23) (5.17) (5.15) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.53) (3.49) (3.48) (3.47) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.118 *** 0.133 *** 0.109 *** 0.105 *** 
 (4.16) (4.24) (4.07) (4.05) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.968 *** 0.966 *** 0.805 *** 0.801 *** 
 (4.67) (4.66) (4.59) (4.53) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.045 ** 0.042 ** 0.045 ** 0.043 ** 
 (2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.03) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.035 ** 0.039 ** 0.027 ** 0.020 ** 
 (2.26) (2.34) (2.24) (2.21) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  23,187
 
19,909
 
23,022
 
19,765
 R2 0.010
 
0.010
 
0.025
 
0.025
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.003  -0.017 * -0.002  -0.014 * 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-1.79) 
 
(-0.22) 
 
(-1.75) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.006   
-0.007 
   
(-0.82) 
   
(-0.91) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 
(3.22) 
 
(3.11) 
 
(3.44) 
 
(3.43) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.026*** 
 
(-14.77) 
 
(-13.83) 
 
(-12.17) 
 
(-11.80) 
 Leveragei,t 1.526*** 1.386*** 1.451*** 1.431*** 
 (4.65) (4.38) (4.47) (4.41) 
Firm Agei,t -0.038 *** -0.032 *** -0.031 *** -0.031 *** 
 (-5.15) (-5.10) (-5.07) (-5.02) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
(0.27)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.10)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.037 *** 0.034 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 *** 
 (6.14) (6.11) (6.02) (6.01) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 
 (1.75) (1.73) (1.72) (1.71) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.012 0.012  0.012  0.011  
 
(0.71)  (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.67)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.085 *** 0.074 *** 0.074 *** 0.059 *** 
 (5.14) (4.89) (4.89) (4.64) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.51) (3.47) (3.46) (3.45) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.075 *** 0.071 *** 0.071 *** 0.070 *** 
 (4.14) (4.12) (4.05) (4.03) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.616 *** 0.670 *** 0.513 *** 0.692 *** 
 (4.65) (5.64) (4.27) (6.01) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.028 ** 0.027 ** 0.025 ** 0.028 ** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (2.04) (2.11) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.022 ** 0.026 ** 0.017 ** 0.026 ** 
 (2.24) (2.29) (2.10) (2.28) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  23,121
 
19,852
 
22,959
 
19,711
 R2 0.010
 
0.010
 
0.025
 
0.026
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
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Table 1.8. Relationship between Changes in Sales and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t 0.066 ***    
  
0.027 ** 
 
(6.39) 
     
(2.34) 
 ∆AECi,t 
  
0.021*** 
  
0.017** 
   
(3.31) 
   
(2.19) 
 ∆AOCi,t 0.005* 0.004  
    (1.65)  (1.01) 
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 ** 
 
(3.66) 
 
(3.69) 
 
(3.61) 
 
(3.31) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 
 
(22.17) 
 
(21.95) 
 
(20.45) 
 
(20.64) 
 Leveragei,t 1.828*** 2.623*** 1.786*** 2.822*** 
 (4.69) (5.68) (4.36) (6.05) 
Firm Agei,t -0.045 *** -0.069 *** -0.048 *** -0.071 *** 
 (-5.19) (-6.15) (-5.28) (-6.26) 
Board Sizei,t -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.002  -0.001  
 
(-2.89)  (-2.78)  (-1.56)  (-1.36)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.045 *** 0.066 *** 0.045 *** 0.066 *** 
 (6.18) (6.28) (6.20) (6.27) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.006 * 0.005 * 0.006 * 0.005 * 
 (1.79) (1.77) (1.76) (1.75) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.015 0.022  0.015  0.022  
 
(0.75)  (0.83)  (0.73)  (0.81)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.101 *** 0.161 *** 0.115 *** 0.183 *** 
 (5.18) (6.15) (5.29) (6.27) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (3.55) (3.71) (3.60) (3.65) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.090 *** 0.143 *** 0.094 *** 0.152 *** 
 (4.18) (5.16) (4.29) (5.27) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.739 *** 1.154 *** 0.795 *** 1.257 *** 
 (4.69) (6.68) (4.98) (6.98) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.034 ** 0.030 ** 0.035 ** 0.033 ** 
 (2.09) (2.08) (2.08) (2.07) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.027 ** 0.031 ** 0.026 ** 0.030 ** 
 (2.28) (2.36) (2.26) (2.30)  
     Observations  23,969  23,969  23,969  23,969
 R2 0.062   0.061   0.057   0.062
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t 0.043 ***    0.026 * 
 
(4.93)      (1.75)  
∆AECi,t   0.021 ***   0.009 * 
 
  (3.81)    (1.67)  
∆AOCi,t     0.003 0.003  
     (0.15)  (0.11)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 ** 0.002  
 
(3.60)  (3.30)  (2.36)  (1.55)  
log(Market to Book)i,t 0.065 *** 0.066 *** 0.059 *** 0.062 *** 
 
(22.02)  (22.40)  (20.13)  (20.18)  
Leveragei,t 1.181 *** 1.695 *** 1.154 *** 1.824 *** 
 (4.67) (6.16) (4.59) (7.03) 
Firm Agei,t -0.029 *** -0.045 *** -0.031 *** -0.046 *** 
 (-5.17) (-6.13) (-5.29) (-6.24) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.001  -0.001  
 
(-2.52) (-2.55) (-1.23) (-1.26) 
% Outside Directorsi,t 0.029 *** 0.033 *** 0.029 *** 0.033 *** 
 (6.16) (6.16) (6.20) (6.15) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.004 * 0.006 * 0.004 * 0.005 * 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.73) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.009 0.010  0.010  0.010  
 
(0.73) (0.71) (0.71) (0.70) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.065 *** 0.104 *** 0.074 *** 0.118 *** 
 (5.16) (7.13) (5.84) (8.15) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.53) (3.49) (3.48) (3.47) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.058 *** 0.093 *** 0.061 *** 0.098 *** 
 (4.16) (6.14) (4.37) (6.35) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.477 *** 0.746 *** 0.514 *** 0.813 *** 
 (4.67) (4.66) (4.09) (4.03) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.022 ** 0.022 ** 0.023 ** 0.024 ** 
 (2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.13) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 
 (2.26) (2.24) (2.24) (2.23) 
     Observations  22,347  22,347  22,347  22,347  
R2 0.063  0.062  0.062  0.064  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Table 1.9. Relationship between Changes in ROA and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t 0.020 **    
  
0.007 * 
 
(2.20) 
     
(1.65) 
 ∆AECi,t 
  
0.010** 
  
0.008   
   
(2.09) 
   
(1.36) 
 ∆AOCi,t 0.002  -0.004  
     (1.62)  (-1.37)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.001  0.001  
 
(2.29) 
 
(2.24) 
 
(1.17) 
 
(1.17) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(9.08) 
 
(9.49) 
 
(8.60) 
 
(8.49) 
 Leveragei,t 0.547*** 0.784*** 0.534*** 0.744*** 
 (4.70) (4.69) (4.12) (4.56) 
Firm Agei,t -0.014 *** -0.021 *** -0.014 *** -0.021 *** 
 (-5.20) (-5.36) (-5.22) (-5.37) 
Board Sizei,t -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  
 
(-1.24)  (-1.28)  (-1.53)  (-1.54)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.013 *** 0.020 *** 0.014 *** 0.020 *** 
 (6.19) (6.29) (6.23) (6.28) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
 (1.80) (1.78) (1.77) (1.76) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.004 0.006  0.004  0.007  
 
(0.76)  (0.77)  (0.74)  (0.78)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.030 *** 0.048 *** 0.034 *** 0.055 *** 
 (5.19) (5.26) (5.22) (5.98) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.56) (3.52) (3.51) (3.50) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.027 *** 0.023 *** 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 
 (4.19) (4.17) (4.20) (4.28) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.221 *** 0.245 *** 0.238 *** 0.276 *** 
 (4.70) (4.91) (4.77) (5.06) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.010 ** 0.015 ** 0.010 ** 0.016 ** 
 (2.10) (2.19) (2.09) (2.22) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.008 ** 0.012 ** 0.008 ** 0.012 ** 
 (2.29) (2.37) (2.27) (2.36) 
     Observations  23,275
 
23,275
 
23,275
 
23,275
 R2 0.032
 
0.031
 
0.037
 
0.032
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t 0.019 ***    0.017 ** 
 
(2.99)      (2.22)  
∆AECi,t   0.006    0.011 ** 
 
  (1.54)    (2.06)  
∆AOCi,t     0.002  0.008 * 
     (1.59)  (1.94)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.002 ** 0.002 * 0.002  0.001  
 
(2.13)  (1.66)  (1.32)  (1.19)  
log(Market to Book)i,t 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 
 
(9.33)  (9.61)  (8.28)  (8.58)  
Leveragei,t 0.534 *** 0.566 *** 0.521 *** 0.524 *** 
 (4.71) (4.80) (4.63) (4.67) 
Firm Agei,t -0.013 *** -0.020 *** -0.014 *** -0.021 *** 
 (-5.21) (-5.37) (-5.23) (-5.38) 
Board Sizei,t -0.002 * -0.001 * -0.001 -0.002 * 
 
(-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.40) (-1.76) 
% Outside Directorsi,t 0.013 *** 0.019 *** 0.013 *** 0.019 *** 
 (6.12) (6.25) (6.11) (6.26) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.002 * 0.003 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
 (1.81) (1.79) (1.78) (1.77) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.004 0.006  0.004  0.006  
 
(0.77) (0.79) (0.76) (0.78) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.030 *** 0.047 *** 0.033 *** 0.053 *** 
 (5.20) (5.37) (5.21) (5.99) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.57) (3.53) (3.52) (3.51) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.026 *** 0.042 *** 0.028 *** 0.044 *** 
 (4.20) (5.18) (4.29) (5.19) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.216 *** 0.337 *** 0.232 *** 0.367 *** 
 (4.71) (6.70) (4.93) (6.97) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.010 ** 0.011 ** 0.010 ** 0.012 ** 
 (2.11) (2.12) (2.10) (2.27) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.008 ** 0.012 ** 0.008 ** 0.012 ** 
 (2.30) (2.38) (2.28) (2.37) 
     Observations  21,702  21,702  21,702  21,702  
R2 0.015  0.015  0.015  0.017  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Table 1.10. Relationship between Changes in Cost of Goods Sold and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t -0.081 ***    
  
-0.080 ***
 
(-4.93) 
     
(-4.02) 
 ∆AECi,t 
  
-0.027*** 
 
-0.028*** 
   
(-4.08) 
  
(-3.61) 
 ∆AOCi,t 0.002  0.003  
    (1.11) (0.87) 
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  
 
(1.57) 
 
(1.46) 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.87) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.032*** -0.033***  -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 
(-10.20) 
 
(-10.22) 
 
(-9.83) 
 
(-9.76) 
 Leveragei,t 5.982*** 5.837*** 5.417*** 5.383*** 
 (4.66) (4.65) (4.08) (4.02) 
Firm Agei,t -0.149 *** -0.143 *** -0.146 *** -0.145 *** 
 (-5.16) (-5.02) (-5.08) (-5.03) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
(-0.16)  (-0.18)  (-0.13)  (-0.11)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.146 *** 0.186 *** 0.138 *** 0.184 *** 
 (6.15) (6.25) (6.12) (6.24) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.021 * 0.020 * 0.019 * 0.019 * 
 (1.76) (1.74) (1.73) (1.72) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.048 0.047  0.045  0.045  
 
(0.72)  (0.70)  (0.70)  (0.69)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.332 *** 0.350 *** 0.347 *** 0.352 *** 
 (5.15) (5.22) (5.26) (5.24) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.008 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 
 (3.52) (3.81) (3.47) (3.46) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.294 *** 0.300 *** 0.286 *** 0.307 *** 
 (4.15) (4.63) (4.06) (4.84) 
Board Experiencei,t 2.417 *** 3.229 *** 2.411 *** 3.111 *** 
 (4.66) (5.65) (4.48) (5.42) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.111 ** 0.119 ** 0.106 ** 0.113 ** 
 (2.06) (2.15) (2.04) (2.12) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.088 ** 0.082 ** 0.080 ** 0.089 ** 
 (2.25) (2.23) (2.20) (2.27) 
     Observations  23,934
 
23,934
 
23,934
 
23,934
 R2 0.032  0.031  0.033  0.032
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; 
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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t -0.009     -0.009  
 
(-0.94)      (-0.74)  
∆AECi,t   -0.012 **   -0.015 ** 
 
  (-2.08)    (-2.06)  
∆AOCi,t     0.001  0.006  
     (1.26)  (1.41)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.003  0.002 0.002  0.001  
 
(1.64)  (1.13)  (1.27)  (0.56)  
log(Market to Book)i,t -0.033 *** -0.034 ***  -0.030 *** -0.033 *** 
 
(-10.36)  (-10.51)  (-9.72)  (-9.85)  
Leveragei,t 0.643 *** 0.788 *** 0.582 *** 0.750 *** 
 (4.67) (4.86) (4.49) (4.73) 
Firm Agei,t -0.016 *** -0.021 *** -0.016 *** -0.019 *** 
 (-5.17) (-5.33) (-5.19) (-5.32) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000 0.001  0.000  
 
(-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.15) (-0.06) 
% Outside Directorsi,t 0.016 *** 0.020 *** 0.015 *** 0.018 *** 
 (6.16) (6.36) (6.15) (6.25) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.73) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.005 0.007  0.005  0.006  
 
(0.73) (0.81) (0.71) (0.79) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.036 *** 0.048 *** 0.037 *** 0.049 *** 
 (5.16) (5.43) (5.17) (5.45) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.53) (3.59) (3.58) (3.57) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.032 *** 0.043 *** 0.031 *** 0.041 *** 
 (4.16) (4.34) (4.15) (4.31) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.260 *** 0.247 *** 0.259 *** 0.234 *** 
 (4.67) (4.56) (4.65) (4.43) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.012 ** 0.012 ** 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 
 (2.07) (2.06) (2.06) (2.03) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.009 ** 0.009 ** 0.008 ** 0.008 ** 
 (2.26) (2.24) (2.24) (2.23) 
 
        
Observations  22,318  22,318  22,318  22,318  
R2 0.014  0.014  0.014  0.015  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; 


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Table 1.11. Relationship between Changes in SG&A Expense and Changes in Directors’ External Connections 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: All Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t -0.006       
-0.002  
 
(-0.71) 
     
(-0.26) 
 ∆AECi,t 
  
-0.003  
  
-0.007   
   
(-0.66) 
   
(-1.34) 
 ∆AOCi,t  0.001  0.001  
     (1.30)  (0.39)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
 
(3.30) 
 
(3.27) 
 
(3.77) 
 
(3.87) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
 
(-12.17) 
 
(-11.94) 
 
(-11.29) 
 
(-11.71) 
 Leveragei,t 2.611*** 2.660*** 2.970*** 2.966*** 
 (4.69) (4.78) (5.11) (5.05) 
Firm Agei,t -0.065 *** -0.057 *** -0.053 *** -0.049 *** 
 (-5.19) (-5.15) (-5.11) (-5.06) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
(0.17)  (0.15)  (0.20)  (0.26)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.064 *** 0.057 *** 0.070 *** 0.056 *** 
 (6.18) (6.18) (6.22) (6.17) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.009 * 0.010 * 0.007 * 0.011 * 
 (1.79) (1.82) (1.76) (1.85) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.021 0.025  0.026  0.025  
 
(0.75)  (0.83)  (0.83)  (0.81)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.145 *** 0.141 *** 0.126 *** 0.127 *** 
 (5.18) (5.15) (5.10) (5.11) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.55) (3.31) (3.50) (3.39) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.129 *** 0.136 *** 0.124 *** 0.136 *** 
 (4.18) (4.26) (4.14) (4.27) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.055 *** 1.090 *** 1.077 *** 1.087 *** 
 (4.69) (4.78) (4.87) (4.75) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.049 ** 0.043 ** 0.049 ** 0.047 ** 
 (2.09) (2.08) (2.08) (2.07) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.038 ** 0.030 ** 0.039 ** 0.038 ** 
 (2.28) (2.20) (2.28) (2.27) 
     Observations  8,807
 
7,671
 
8,736
 
7,608
 R2 0.047
 
0.043
 
0.118
 
0.120
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; 


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Panel B: Independent Directors 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆APCi,t -0.004     -0.008  
 
(-0.58)      (-0.95)  
∆AECi,t   -0.001    -0.003  
 
  (-0.32)    (-0.59)  
∆AOCi,t     -0.001  -0.001  
     (-1.04)  (-0.51)  
log(Total Assets)i,t 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
 
(3.45)  (3.54)  (3.46)  (3.81)  
log(Market to Book)i,t -0.028 *** -0.029 *** -0.026 *** -0.026 *** 
 
(-12.17)  (-12.64)  (-11.19)  (-11.06)  
Leveragei,t 1.812 *** 1.458 *** 1.367 *** 1.365 *** 
 (4.63) (4.22) (4.15) (4.09) 
Firm Agei,t -0.045 *** -0.042 *** -0.047 *** -0.044 *** 
 (-5.13) (-5.09) (-5.15) (-5.11) 
Board Sizei,t 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  
 
(-0.07) (-0.01) (0.03) (-0.04) 
% Outside Directorsi,t 0.044 *** 0.042 *** 0.035 *** 0.032 *** 
 (6.12) (6.10) (6.06) (6.01) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.006 * 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 
 (1.73) (1.71) (1.70) (1.69) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.014 0.014  0.011  0.011  
 
(0.69) (0.67) (0.63) (0.63) 
Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.100 *** 0.128 *** 0.188 *** 0.188 *** 
 (5.12) (5.29) (5.93) (5.91) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.49) (3.45) (3.44) (3.43) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 0.072 *** 0.074 *** 
 (4.12) (4.10) (4.03) (4.07) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.732 *** 0.702 *** 0.609 *** 0.608 *** 
 (4.63) (4.52) (4.35) (4.33) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.034 ** 0.039 ** 0.037 ** 0.035 ** 
 (2.03) (2.05) (2.04) (2.03) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.022 ** 0.020 ** 
 (2.22) (2.22) (2.20) (2.19) 
 
        
Observations  18,004  18,004  18,004  18,004  
R2 0.025  0.025  0.022  0.026  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi APCAPCAPC ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AECAECAEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi AOCAOCAOC ; 


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Table 1.12. Relationship between Changes in Firm Operating Performances and Changes in 
Directors’ External Connections by Industry 
 Dependent Variables 
Industry ∆SALESi,t ∆ROAi,t ∆COGSi,t ∆SG&Ai,t 
Consumer Non-Durables 0.050 * 0.004  0.003  -0.026  
(1.84)  (1.16)  (0.18)  (-1.36)  
Consumer Durables 0.059  0.032  -0.036  -0.066 * 
(1.29)  (0.89)  (-0.97)  (-1.73)  
Manufacturing 0.090 *** 0.020  -0.005  -0.041 * 
(3.06)  (1.20)  (-0.38)  (-1.83)  
Energy -0.003  0.147 *** 0.017  0.131  
(-0.04)  (2.97)  (0.19)  (1.62)  
Chemicals 0.006  -0.002  0.010  0.060  
(0.08)  (-0.26)  (0.20)  (1.05)  
Business Equipment 0.052 ** -0.008  -0.027  -0.016  
(2.41)  (-0.34)  (-1.16)  (-0.95)  
Telecommunication 0.085  0.071  -0.077  0.154 ** 
(1.31)  (1.39)  (-1.44)  (2.25)  
Utilities 0.268 *** -0.003  -0.014  0.193  
(4.13)  (-0.17)  (-0.42)  (0.66)  
Wholesale and Retail, 0.012  0.022  -0.006  0.014  
(0.75)  (1.56)  (-0.92)  (1.09)  
Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs 
0.117 * 0.069  -0.103  0.002  
(1.73)  (1.50)  (-1.25)  (0.05)  
Finance 0.110 *** 0.030 *** -0.059 *** 0.024  
(5.53)  (4.26)  (-2.72)  (1.54)  
Other* 0.122 *** -0.025  -0.018  -0.071 ** 
(3.84)  (-0.99)  (-0.62)  (-2.22)  
*Other: Mines, Construction, Building Materials, Transportation, Business Services, Entertainment Industry 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two−tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES ; )ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA ; 
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Table 1.13. DuPont Analysis I: Relationship between Changes in Asset Turnover and Changes in 
Directors’ External Connections 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ATOi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.027 * 0.027 * 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 
 
(1.75) 
 
(1.73) 
 
(2.01) 
 
(1.99) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.013   
0.014 
   
(1.13) 
   
(1.22) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 
(-7.37) 
 
(-7.91) 
 
(-6.23) 
 
(-6.75) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 
(7.22) 
 
(6.80) 
 
(6.42) 
 
(5.78) 
 Leveragei,t 2.579*** 2.754*** 2.342*** 2.496*** 
 (4.68) (4.87) (4.30) (4.44) 
Firm Agei,t -0.064 *** -0.069 *** -0.060 *** -0.067 *** 
 (-5.18) (-5.29) (-5.10) (-5.25) 
Board Sizei,t 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
 
(1.84)  (1.85)  (1.87)  (1.92)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.063 *** 0.065 *** 0.067 *** 0.062 *** 
 (6.17) (6.17) (6.21) (6.16) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.019 * 0.013 * 0.012 * 0.010 * 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.75) (1.74) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.021 0.021  0.019  0.020  
 
(0.74)  (0.72)  (0.70)  (0.71)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.143 *** 0.131 *** 0.144 *** 0.126 *** 
 (5.17) (5.14) (5.18) (5.11) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
 (3.54) (3.50) (3.49) (3.48) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.127 *** 0.105 *** 0.119 *** 0.109 *** 
 (4.17) (4.05) (4.12) (4.07) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.042 *** 1.052 *** 0.998 *** 1.057 *** 
 (4.68) (4.77) (4.40) (4.84) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.048 ** 0.041 ** 0.044 ** 0.045 ** 
 (2.10) (2.02) (2.07) (2.08) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.038 ** 0.039 ** 0.033 ** 0.030 ** 
 (2.27) (2.28) (2.15) (2.11) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  28,192
 
24,165
 
28,009
 
24,008
 R2 0.005
 
0.005
 
0.020
 
0.023
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
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Table 1.14. DuPont Analysis II: Relationship between Changes in Profit Margin and Changes in 
Directors’ External Connections 
 Dependent Variable: ∆PMi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.029  0.004  0.026  0.001  
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.02) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.041   
0.042 
   
(1.41) 
   
(1.42) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.004  0.009 * 0.000  0.003  
 
(1.03) 
 
(2.15) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(0.7) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 
 
(15.29) 
 
(14.62) 
 
(12.85) 
 
(12.00) 
 Leveragei,t 2.709*** 2.645*** 2.355*** 2.673*** 
 (4.71) (4.50) (4.13) (4.60) 
Firm Agei,t -0.067 *** -0.054 *** -0.063 *** -0.052 *** 
 (-5.21) (-5.07) (-5.13) (-5.02) 
Board Sizei,t -0.005 * -0.004  -0.002  -0.001  
 
(-1.73)  (-1.42)  (-0.58)  (-0.35)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.066 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.087 *** 
 (6.40) (6.20) (6.21) (6.83) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.010 * 0.010 * 0.008 * 0.010 * 
 (1.81) (1.79) (1.78) (1.79) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.022 0.023  0.020  0.029  
 
(0.77)  (0.77)  (0.75)  (0.83)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.150 *** 0.142 *** 0.151 *** 0.138 *** 
 (5.20) (5.17) (5.21) (5.11) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 
 (3.57) (3.73) (3.52) (3.55) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.133 *** 0.115 *** 0.125 *** 0.118 *** 
 (4.12) (3.89) (4.09) (3.98) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.095 *** 1.066 *** 1.058 *** 1.036 *** 
 (4.71) (4.50) (4.46) (4.27) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.050 ** 0.050 ** 0.046 ** 0.048 ** 
 (2.11) (2.10) (2.05) (2.09) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.040 ** 0.042 ** 0.035 ** 0.042 ** 
 (2.23) (2.28) (2.12) (2.27) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  17,743
 
15,525
 
17,628
 
15,427
 R2 0.013
 
0.014
 
0.036
 
0.037
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 








−







=∆
−
−
1,
1,
,
,
, lnln
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti Sales
Net Income
Sales
Net Income
PM . 
110 
Table 1.15. Relationship between Changes in Sales and Changes in Directors’ External Connections: 
Alternative Samples 
Panel A: Firms with Sales Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.038 ** 0.029 ** 0.034 ** 0.025 ** 
 
(2.13) 
 
(2.08) 
 
(1.97) 
 
(2.02) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.072*** 
  
0.067*** 
   
(3.54) 
   
(3.39) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 
(13.11) 
 
(11.31) 
 
(11.49) 
 
(10.17) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.009* 0.010** 
 
(-3.07) 
 
(-2.88) 
 
(1.89) 
 
(2.03) 
 Leveragei,t 1.052*** 1.049*** 1.028*** 1.024*** 
 (4.65) (4.54) (4.27) (4.19) 
Firm Agei,t -0.026 *** -0.020 *** -0.028 *** -0.021 *** 
 (-5.15) (-5.01) (-5.07) (-5.02) 
Board Sizei,t 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.002  0.002  
 
(2.82)  (2.75)  (1.14)  (1.29)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.026 *** 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.028 *** 
 (6.14) (6.19) (6.18) (6.19) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.004 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 0.005 * 
 (1.75) (1.75) (1.72) (1.75) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.008 0.013 0.009  0.013  
 
(0.71)  (0.79)  (0.69)  (0.78)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.058 *** 0.053 *** 0.066 *** 0.055 *** 
 (5.14) (5.09) (5.25) (5.11) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (3.51) (3.47) (3.46) (3.45) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.054 *** 0.058 *** 
 (4.14) (4.14) (4.15) (4.23) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.415 *** 0.434 *** 0.428 *** 0.424 *** 
 (4.65) (4.84) (4.77) (4.71) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.020 ** 0.020 ** 0.020 ** 0.020 ** 
 (2.05) (2.04) (2.04) (2.01) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.015 ** 0.014 ** 0.015 ** 0.014 ** 
 (2.24) (2.22) (2.23) (2.22) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  8,807
 
7,671
 
8,736
 
7,608
 R2 0.047
 
0.043
 
0.118
 
0.120
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Panel B: Firms with ROA Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SALESi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.049 *** 0.034 ** 0.045 *** 0.030 ** 
 
(3.11) 
 
(2.43) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(2.21) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.068*** 
  
0.057*** 
   
(4.15) 
   
(3.49) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 
(7.07) 
 
(7.08) 
 
(7.08) 
 
(7.10) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 
 
(15.83) 
 
(14.79) 
 
(11.99) 
 
(10.92) 
 Leveragei,t 1.350*** 1.338*** 1.319*** 1.305*** 
 (4.65) (4.64) (4.07) (4.01) 
Firm Agei,t -0.034 *** -0.031 *** -0.036 *** -0.032 *** 
 (-5.15) (-5.11) (-5.17) (-5.12) 
Board Sizei,t 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  
 
(0.51)  (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.25)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.033 *** 0.039 *** 0.034 *** 0.039 *** 
 (6.14) (6.24) (6.18) (6.23) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.005 * 0.007 * 0.005 * 0.006 * 
 (1.75) (1.83) (1.72) (1.81) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.011 0.011  0.011  0.010  
 
(0.71)  (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.67)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.075 *** 0.069 *** 0.085 *** 0.065 *** 
 (5.14) (5.11) (5.25) (5.08) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.51) (3.47) (3.46) (3.45) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.066 *** 0.060 *** 0.070 *** 0.063 *** 
 (4.14) (4.02) (4.25) (4.09) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.546 *** 0.553 *** 0.587 *** 0.529 *** 
 (4.65) (4.68) (4.97) (4.31) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.025 ** 0.027 ** 0.026 ** 0.029 ** 
 (2.05) (2.08) (2.07) (2.11) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.020 ** 0.020 ** 0.019 ** 0.020 ** 
 (2.24) (2.22) (2.22) (2.21) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  13,744
 
11,854
 
13,652
 
11,776
 R2 0.024
 
0.026
 
0.068
 
0.078
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi SALESSALESSALES . 
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Table 1.16. Relationship between Changes in ROA and Changes in Directors’ External Connections: 
Alternative Samples 
Panel A: Firms with Sales Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.032 ** 0.027 ** 0.032 ** 0.025 ** 
 
(2.06) 
 
(2.00) 
 
(2.04) 
 
(1.98) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.001   
-0.007 
   
(0.03) 
   
(-0.32) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 
(7.30) 
 
(7.28) 
 
(7.26) 
 
(7.25) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  -0.000 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-0.16) 
 Leveragei,t 2.992*** 2.987*** 2.601*** 2.656*** 
 (4.66) (4.65) (4.38) (4.42) 
Firm Agei,t -0.074 *** -0.075 *** -0.070 *** -0.072 *** 
 (-5.16) (-5.17) (-5.08) (-5.13) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003  -0.003  -0.004 * -0.004 * 
 
(-1.57)  (-1.60)  (-1.81)  (-1.78)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.073 *** 0.070 *** 0.066 *** 0.066 *** 
 (6.15) (6.11) (6.09) (6.08) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.011 * 0.011 * 0.009 * 0.012 * 
 (1.76) (1.74) (1.73) (1.79) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.024 0.026  0.022  0.022  
 
(0.72)  (0.74)  (0.70)  (0.70)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.166 *** 0.168 *** 0.167 *** 0.163 *** 
 (5.15) (5.19) (5.16) (5.11) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
 (3.52) (3.48) (3.47) (3.46) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.147 *** 0.138 *** 0.138 *** 0.119 *** 
 (4.15) (4.07) (4.06) (3.84) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.209 *** 1.217 *** 1.158 *** 1.207 *** 
 (4.66) (4.75) (4.38) (4.70) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.056 ** 0.053 ** 0.051 ** 0.056 ** 
 (2.06) (2.02) (2.00) (2.07) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.044 ** 0.048 ** 0.038 ** 0.048 ** 
 (2.25) (2.33) (2.18) (2.33) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  8,385
 
7,366
 
8,310
 
7,300
 R2 0.009
 
0.008
 
0.034
 
0.034
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Panel B: Firms with ROA Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ROAi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t 0.040 *** 0.036 *** 0.033 *** 0.029 ** 
 
(3.64) 
 
(2.98) 
 
(3.10) 
 
(2.42) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
0.030*** 
  
0.020* 
   
(2.61) 
   
(1.73) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 
(27.04) 
 
(25.24) 
 
(23.61) 
 
(21.74) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 
 
(-5.93) 
 
(-5.11) 
 
(-5.12) 
 
(-4.84) 
 Leveragei,t 3.755*** 3.668*** 3.265*** 3.291*** 
 (4.62) (4.51) (4.04) (4.11) 
Firm Agei,t -0.093 *** -0.084 *** -0.088 *** -0.084 *** 
 (-5.12) (-5.00) (-5.04) (-4.99) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 
 
(-2.75)  (-2.84)  (-2.74)  (-2.74)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.092 *** 0.089 *** 0.083 *** 0.083 *** 
 (6.11) (6.08) (6.01) (6.01) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.013 * 0.013 * 0.011 * 0.011 * 
 (1.72) (1.73) (1.69) (1.63) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.030 0.035  0.027  0.030  
 
(0.68)  (0.76)  (0.62)  (0.68)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.208 *** 0.236 *** 0.209 *** 0.230 *** 
 (5.11) (5.58) (5.12) (5.51) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
 (3.48) (3.44) (3.43) (3.42) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.185 *** 0.198 *** 0.173 *** 0.175 *** 
 (4.11) (4.49) (4.02) (4.05) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.517 *** 1.406 *** 1.453 *** 1.468 *** 
 (4.32) (4.21) (4.24) (4.28) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.070 ** 0.104 ** 0.064 ** 0.095 ** 
 (2.02) (2.11) (2.01) (2.08) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.055 ** 0.055 ** 0.048 ** 0.052 ** 
 (2.21) (2.20) (2.16) (2.19) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  13,679
 
11,790
 
13,582
 
11,707
 R2 0.078
 
0.076
 
0.125
 
0.123
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ROAROAROA . 
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Table 1.17. Relationship between Changes in Cost of Goods Sold and Changes in Directors’ External Connections: 
Alternative Samples 
Panel A: Firms with Sales Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.043 * -0.045 * -0.039 * -0.039 * 
 
(-1.94) 
 
(-1.82) 
 
(-1.80) 
 
(-1.65) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.054** 
  
-0.041* 
   
(-2.15) 
   
(-1.69) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 
(-6.68) 
 
(-5.42) 
 
(-3.45) 
 
(-2.81) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.011** 0.028*** 0.013**  0.012** 
 
(2.20) 
 
(3.48) 
 
(2.22) 
 
(2.21) 
 Leveragei,t 3.152*** 3.265*** 2.999*** 3.279*** 
 (3.97) (4.27) (3.84) (4.34) 
Firm Agei,t -0.078 *** -0.078 *** -0.077 *** -0.078 *** 
 (-5.18) (-5.14) (-5.10) (-5.15) 
Board Sizei,t -0.003  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  
 
(-1.37)  (-1.42)  (-1.34)  (-1.48)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.077 *** 0.088 *** 0.073 *** 0.087 *** 
 (6.17) (6.37) (6.14) (6.36) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.011 * 0.011 * 0.010 * 0.011 * 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.75) (1.74) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.025 0.022  0.024  0.029  
 
(0.74)  (0.72)  (0.72)  (0.87)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.175 *** 0.237 *** 0.183 *** 0.238 *** 
 (5.17) (6.14) (5.18) (6.16) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
 (3.54) (3.56) (3.49) (3.48) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.155 *** 0.211 *** 0.151 *** 0.199 *** 
 (4.17) (4.55) (4.08) (4.46) 
Board Experiencei,t 1.273 *** 1.201 *** 1.270 *** 1.239 *** 
 (4.68) (3.87) (4.66) (4.09) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.059 ** 0.058 ** 0.056 ** 0.056 ** 
 (2.08) (2.07) (2.07) (2.07) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.046 ** 0.054 ** 0.042 ** 0.052 ** 
 (2.27) (2.30) (2.25) (2.28) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  8,786
 
7,656
 
8,715
 
7,593
 R2 0.013
 
0.012
 
0.090
 
0.089
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 






−







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−
−
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,
,
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Panel B: Firms with ROA Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆COGSi,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.042 *  -0.042 * -0.043 *  -0.046 * 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(-1.85) 
 
(-1.67) 
 
(-1.86) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.059** 
  
-0.062** 
   
(-2.20) 
   
(-2.39) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t -0.003  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(-1.38) 
 
(-1.38) 
 
(-1.39) 
 
(-1.54) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 
(-8.10) 
 
(-7.45) 
 
(-5.15) 
 
(-4.78) 
 Leveragei,t 1.582*** 1.940*** 1.433*** 1.847*** 
 (4.68) (5.67) (4.10) (5.34) 
Firm Agei,t -0.039 *** -0.051 *** -0.039 *** -0.046 *** 
 (-5.18) (-6.14) (-5.10) (-6.05) 
Board Sizei,t 0.003  0.003 *** 0.001  0.001  
 
(1.64)  (1.51)  (1.11)  (1.05)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.039 *** 0.049 *** 0.036 *** 0.043 *** 
 (6.17) (6.27) (6.15) (6.21) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.006 * 0.006 * 0.005 * 0.005 * 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.75) (1.74) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.013 0.015 0.012  0.014 
 
(0.74)  (0.77)  (0.72)  (0.75)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.088 *** 0.119 *** 0.092 *** 0.120 *** 
 (5.17) (6.14) (5.18) (6.16) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (3.50) (3.81) (3.49) (3.78) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.078 *** 0.106 *** 0.076 *** 0.100 *** 
 (4.07) (5.15) (4.01) (5.14) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.639 *** 0.854 *** 0.638 *** 0.823 *** 
 (4.68) (5.97) (4.68) (5.90) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.029 ** 0.037 ** 0.028 ** 0.034 ** 
 (2.08) (2.38) (2.07) (2.34) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.023 ** 0.028 ** 0.021 ** 0.026 ** 
 (2.22) (2.29) (2.20) (2.25) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  13,721
 
11,835
 
13,630
 
11,758
 R2 0.005
 
0.005
 
0.027
 
0.030
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 






−

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
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Table 1.18. Relationship between Changes in SG&A Expense and Changes in Directors’ External Connections: 
Alternative Samples 
Panel A: Firms with Sales Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.014  -0.021  -0.010  -0.025  
 
(-1.20) 
 
(-1.43) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-1.58) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.039* 
  
-0.038* 
   
(-1.69) 
   
(-1.68) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 
(-6.18) 
 
(-5.09) 
 
(-6.96) 
 
(-6.18) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010* 
 
(2.86) 
 
(2.80) 
 
(2.86) 
 
(2.79) 
 Leveragei,t 8.580*** 8.169*** 6.475*** 8.423*** 
 (4.66) (4.45) (4.08) (4.52) 
Firm Agei,t -0.213 *** -0.057 *** -0.174 *** -0.061 *** 
 (-5.16) (-3.12) (-5.08) (-3.13) 
Board Sizei,t -0.004 * -0.003 * -0.003 * -0.002 *  
 
(-1.86)  (-1.85)  (-1.86)  (-1.85)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.209 *** 0.255 *** 0.205 *** 0.257 *** 
 (6.15) (6.65) (6.10) (6.68) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.030 * 0.031 * 0.031 * 0.030 * 
 (1.76) (1.77) (1.77) (1.76) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.068 0.058  0.054  0.059  
 
(0.73)  (0.67)  (0.61)  (0.69)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.476 *** 0.433 *** 0.415 *** 0.437 *** 
 (5.55) (5.10) (4.89) (5.14) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.011 *** 0.013 *** 0.010 *** 0.012 *** 
 (3.52) (3.68) (3.47) (3.66) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.422 *** 0.418 *** 0.342 *** 0.331 *** 
 (4.15) (4.13) (4.06) (4.01) 
Board Experiencei,t 3.466 *** 2.954 *** 2.882 *** 2.480 *** 
 (4.66) (4.25) (4.18) (4.01) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.160 ** 0.141 ** 0.157 ** 0.141 ** 
 (2.06) (1.92) (2.05) (1.91) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.126 ** 0.134 ** 0.125 ** 0.134 ** 
 (2.25) (2.27) (2.25) (2.26) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  7,226
 
6,289
 
7,161
 
6,230
 R2 0.017
 
0.014
 
0.086
 
0.101
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 


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Panel B: Firms with ROA Decrease Before Director Appointments 
 Dependent Variable: ∆SG&Ai,t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 ∆ADECi,t -0.002  -0.013  -0.003  -0.009  
 
(-0.16) 
 
(-1.01) 
 
(-0.29) 
 
(-0.75) 
 ∆ADECi,t−1 
  
-0.026* 
  
-0.025* 
   
(-1.90) 
   
(-1.88) 
 log(Total Assets)i,t -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 
(-4.33) 
 
(-4.75) 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-4.68) 
 log(Market to Book)i,t -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 
(-3.94) 
 
(-4.68) 
 
(-3.18) 
 
(-3.55) 
 Leveragei,t 0.843*** 0.813*** 0.636*** 0.638*** 
 (4.69) (4.58) (3.11) (3.15) 
Firm Agei,t -0.021 *** -0.026 *** -0.017 *** -0.026 *** 
 (-5.19) (-5.25) (-5.10) (-5.26) 
Board Sizei,t -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 ** -0.002 * 
 
(-3.95)  (-3.25)  (-2.12)  (-1.65)  % Outside Directorsi,t 0.021 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 
 (6.18) (6.08) (6.12) (6.12) 
Busy Directorsi,t 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 * 
 (1.79) (1.77) (1.76) (1.75) 
CEO/Chair Dualityi,t 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.007 
 
(0.75)  (0.73)  (0.73)  (0.71)  Intra-board Social Tiesi,t 0.047 *** 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 0.045 *** 
 (5.18) (5.10) (5.10) (5.16) 
Relationship with CEOi,t 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 
 (3.55) (3.51) (3.50) (3.49) 
Industry Experiencei,t 0.041 *** 0.042 *** 0.044 *** 0.043 *** 
 (4.18) (4.20) (4.29) (4.27) 
Board Experiencei,t 0.341 *** 0.394 *** 0.383 *** 0.366 *** 
 (4.69) (5.68) (5.11) (5.05) 
Graduate Degreei,t 0.016 ** 0.014 ** 0.012 ** 0.014 ** 
 (2.09) (2.08) (2.08) (2.08) 
Elite Educationi,t 0.012 ** 0.013 ** 0.019 ** 0.019 ** 
 (2.25) (2.26) (2.29) (2.29) 
     
Year Fixed Effect No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effect No
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
     Observations  11,160
 
9,684
 
11,077
 
9,613
 R2 0.010
 
0.012
 
0.035
 
0.038
 ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
i = index for firms; 
t = index for fiscal years; 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−=∆ tititi ADECADECADEC ; 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Director Compensations 
Panel A: Outside Directors Compensation 
  
Total Compensation 
($1000s) 
Cash Compensation 
($1000s) 
Equity-based 
Compensation ($1000s) 
 
N Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
           
2000 5,997 183 45 1,036 36 25 181 147 12 990 
2001 7,172 176 50 2,463 36 25 150 140 14 2,442 
2002 7,409 142 50 1,390 39 25 203 103 14 1,341 
2003 8,049 171 63 3,033 37 30 94 134 29 3,024 
2004 8,223 208 93 2,841 43 30 159 165 55 2,825 
2005 8,120 206 120 577 48 35 179 159 75 507 
2006 7,178 256 159 978 65 55 144 191 90 933 
2007 6,288 230 167 674 71 68 68 159 91 643 
2008 5,365 216 166 401 76 74 79 140 87 368 
2009 5,061 270 212 809 81 78 103 189 127 778 
2010 4,845 285 221 1,391 87 84 175 197 129 1,349 
Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation 
Cash compensation = Fees Earned in Cash 
Equity-based Compensation = Stock Awards + Option Awards 
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 Panel B: Grey Directors Compensation 
  
Total Compensation 
($1000s) 
Cash Compensation 
($1000s) 
Equity-based 
Compensation ($1000s) 
 
N Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
           
2000 2,034 247 45 1,654 54 25 299 192 5 1,576 
2001 2,009 343 43 4,635 60 25 279 283 0 4,596 
2002 1,493 309 45 3,063 80 28 444 229 0 2,956 
2003 1,031 526 48 8,446 73 30 245 454 0 8,426 
2004 714 382 80 1,693 128 32 523 254 35 1,374 
2005 619 363 100 1,549 131 35 627 232 43 1,213 
2006 489 669 135 2,912 157 50 520 512 74 2,709 
2007 374 652 150 2,632 113 60 204 539 73 2,505 
2008 294 495 142 1,376 135 65 262 360 64 1,221 
2009 268 703 196 3,340 131 70 380 571 126 3,209 
2010 242 877 217 6,127 161 76 732 716 128 5,943 
Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation 
Cash compensation = Fees Earned in Cash 
Equity-based Compensation = Stock Awards + Option Awards 
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 Panel C: Independent Directors Compensation 
  
Total Compensation 
($1000s) 
Cash Compensation 
($1000s) 
Equity-based 
Compensation ($1000s) 
 
N Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
           
2000 3,963 150 45 465 27 25 61 123 13 454 
2001 5,163 111 50 234 27 25 22 85 20 234 
2002 5,916 100 50 214 29 25 39 71 18 207 
2003 7,018 119 65 237 32 30 34 87 34 229 
2004 7,509 191 94 2,926 35 30 30 156 56 2,926 
2005 7,501 193 120 400 41 35 41 153 75 395 
2006 6,689 226 160 628 59 56 44 168 91 625 
2007 5,914 204 168 186 68 68 47 135 92 184 
2008 5,071 200 167 236 73 75 49 127 88 233 
2009 4,793 246 213 243 78 78 55 168 127 239 
2010 4,603 254 221 229 84 84 62 170 129 226 
Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation 
Cash compensation = Fees Earned in Cash 
Equity-based Compensation = Stock Awards + Option Awards 
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 Panel D: Employee Directors Compensation 
  
Total Compensation 
($1000s) 
Cash Compensation 
($1000s) 
Equity-based 
Compensation ($1000s) 
 
N Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
           
2000 1,544 13,714 3,477 102,873 1,476 908 2,979 12,239 2,240 102,163 
2001 1,771 7,686 3,362 13,945 1,337 879 2,494 6,349 2,233 13,386 
2002 1,741 5,796 2,705 8,847 1,348 923 1,580 4,448 1,550 8,102 
2003 1,698 6,631 3,081 11,012 1,542 1,009 1,898 5,088 1,845 10,157 
2004 1,585 7,205 3,523 11,918 1,753 1,175 1,926 5,452 2,114 11,002 
2005 1,473 8,167 4,167 14,609 1,963 1,345 2,395 6,204 2,496 13,854 
2006 1,282 10,328 5,322 19,646 1,594 925 2,879 8,734 4,101 19,016 
2007 1,026 11,507 6,533 20,930 1,366 900 2,559 10,141 5,404 20,179 
2008 846 10,963 6,050 19,311 1,443 951 3,828 9,520 4,994 18,560 
2009 740 12,114 7,905 14,460 1,210 978 1,445 10,904 6,990 14,026 
2010 699 13,049 9,121 17,771 1,384 1,000 1,899 11,665 7,752 17,465 
Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation 
Cash compensation = Salary + Bonus 
Equity-based Compensation = Option Pay 
 
122 
 Panel E: Employee Directors Compensation (Excluding CEO) 
  
Total Compensation 
($1000s) 
Cash Compensation 
($1000s) 
Equity-based 
Compensation ($1000s) 
 
N Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
           
2000 702 6,033 2,306 11,436 1,189 737 1,962 4,844 1,443 10,706 
2001 778 5,103 2,164 9,051 1,145 725 2,987 3,959 1,304 8,217 
2002 719 3,847 1,925 6,066 1,117 735 1,698 2,730 956 4,993 
2003 650 4,353 2,001 6,877 1,302 807 2,080 3,051 999 5,466 
2004 548 4,657 2,422 7,294 1,400 911 1,728 3,257 1,158 6,370 
2005 479 5,409 2,586 9,130 1,675 973 2,422 3,733 1,059 8,014 
2006 426 6,665 3,093 11,584 1,487 700 3,176 5,178 2,026 10,628 
2007 315 7,763 3,674 14,534 1,230 700 2,660 6,533 2,861 13,398 
2008 252 6,828 2,992 14,105 1,247 653 2,868 5,581 2,020 13,213 
2009 201 7,061 3,585 12,268 928 703 1,216 6,133 2,863 11,915 
2010 173 8,926 4,092 20,347 1,192 750 2,210 7,734 3,139 20,137 
Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation 
Cash compensation = Salary + Bonus 
Equity-based Compensation = Option Pay 
 
123 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of Director Departures and Appointments 
Year Firms Directors Departures Appointments 
2003 3,998 15,247 34 12 
2004 4,206 16,357 277 380 
2005 4,990 16,963 1,131 1,131 
2006 5,015 17,254 1,922 2,151 
2007 5,411 17,882 2,401 2,738 
2008 5,822 18,315 2,499 2,876 
2009 5,934 18,852 2,818 2,790 
2010 6,142 19,240 2,657 2,693 
2011 6,058 19,562 1,968 2,199 
Mean 5,286 17,741 1,745 1,886 
Total 47,576 159,672 15,707 16,970 
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics of Firms, Boards, Executives and Directors Characteristics 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics  
Variable Mean Median StDev Q1 Q3 
Log(External connections) 5.626 5.732 0.795 5.176 6.184 
Log(Professional connections) 5.215 5.342 0.836 4.698 5.805 
Log(Educational connections) 3.847 4.023 1.123 3.288 4.610 
Log(Other connections) 2.769 3.166 1.764 1.792 4.115 
Log(Total compensation) 5.179 4.977 1.802 4.025 5.717 
Log(Cash compensation) 4.239 3.912 1.488 3.332 4.605 
Log(Equity-based compensation) 5.192 4.787 1.849 4.094 5.790 
Log(Total assets) 9.039 9.377 1.671 8.004 9.946 
Log(Market to book) 0.609 0.654 0.986 0.017 1.254 
ROA 0.024 0.030 0.373 0.002 0.073 
Stock return 0.003 0.004 0.080 -0.021 0.031 
Director tenure (year) 7.785 5.700 7.293 2.600 10.800 
Percentage of tie to the CEO 40.7% 0.0% 49.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
Log(Board size) 2.348 2.398 0.287 2.197 2.565 
Percentage of inside directors 29.0% 25.0% 18.5% 14.3% 40.0% 
CEO tenure (years) 5.485 3.600 60.021 1.000 6.045 
Percentage of dual CEO/Chair 61.3%     
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations 
Variables 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 1. Log(External connections) 
            2. Log(Total compensation) 0.075 *** 
          3. Log(Cash compensation) 0.030 *** 0.864 *** 
        4. Log(Equity-Based compensation) 0.013 *** 0.972 *** 0.768 *** 
      5. Log(Total assets) 0.249 *** 0.072 *** 0.099 *** 0.029 *** 
    6. Log(Market to book) 0.198 *** 0.131 *** 0.080 *** 0.110 *** -0.268 *** 
  7. ROA 0.029 *** 0.034 *** 0.043 *** 0.022 *** 0.087 *** 0.206 *** 
8. Stock return -0.002 
 
0.027 *** -0.001 
 
0.050 *** -0.003 
 
0.229 *** 
9. Director tenure (year) -0.154 *** 0.060 *** 0.106 *** 0.026 *** -0.006 * 0.044 *** 
10. Percentage of tie to the CEO 0.110 *** 0.055 *** 0.089 *** 0.051 *** 0.084 *** -0.054 *** 
11. Log(Board Size) 0.173 *** -0.005 
 
0.047 *** -0.050 *** 0.462 *** 0.106 *** 
12. Percentage of Inside Directors -0.193 *** -0.075 *** -0.022 *** 0.062 *** -0.108 *** -0.138 *** 
13. Dual CEO/Chair 0.084 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.138 *** 0.068 *** 
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlations (Continued) 
Variables 7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
1. Log(External connections) 
          
  
2. Log(Total compensation) 
          
  
3. Log(Cash compensation) 
          
  
4. Log(Equity-based compensation) 
          
  
5. Log(Total assets) 
          
  
6. Log(Market to book) 
          
  
7. ROA 
          
  
8. Stock return 0.146 *** 
        
  
9. Director tenure (year) 0.053 *** 0.002 
       
  
10. Percentage of tie to the CEO -0.022 *** -0.021 *** 0.021 *** 
    
  
11. Log(Board size) 0.058 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.136 *** 
  
  
12. Proportion of inside directors -0.030 *** 0.019 *** -0.001 
 
0.030 *** -0.020 ***   
13. Dual CEO/Chair 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.063 *** 0.023 *** 0.126 *** 0.007 ** 
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
127 
Table 2.4. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 34.587 *** 4.627 *** 6.620 * 
 (5.41)  (8.52)  (1.71)  
Log(Total assets) 33.561 *** 7.515 *** 22.156 *** 
 (4.12)  (9.92)  (2.66)  
Log(Market to book) 52.501 *** 4.511 *** 56.221 *** 
 (4.32)  (4.89)  (3.42)  
ROAt-1 99.223   15.178 *** 135.231   
 (1.55)  (3.99)  (1.33)  
Stock Returnt-1 143.251   -6.547   210.368   
 (1.42)  (-0.65)  (1.01)  
Director tenure 0.059   0.844 *** -1.022   
 (0.09)  (9.44)  (-0.81)  
Independent director -342.211 *** -51.423 *** -455.121 *** 
 (-11.12)  (-27.89)  (-11.78)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,528  68,583  48,243  
R2 0.0530  0.0374  0.0640  
           
Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.112 *** 0.099 *** 0.089 *** 
 (25.12)  (20.75)  (6.47)  
Log(Total assets) 0.212 *** 0.212 *** 0.241 *** 
 (42.41)  (48.69)  (36.92)  
Log(Market to book) 0.259 *** 0.098 *** 0.368 *** 
 (29.17)  (10.00)  (34.24)  
ROAt-1 0.344 *** 0.294 *** 0.457 *** 
 (8.78)  (9.14)  (8.47)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.753 *** -0.068   1.579 *** 
 (8.38)  (-1.02)  (16.83)  
Director tenure 0.013 *** 0.026 *** 0.005   
 (16.19)  (36.77)  (0.87)  
Independent director -0.166 *** -0.240 *** -0.274 *** 
 (-12.73)  (-23.22)  (-14.5)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,456  59,352  48,205  
R2 0.2945  0.3933  0.1823  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.5. Connections and Outside Directors’ Compensation: Subsample Analysis 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 31.195 *** 4.216 *** 6.698 * 
 (5.26)  (8.01)  (1.73)  
Log(Total assets) 29.278 *** 7.621 *** 22.547 *** 
 (4.39)  (10.05)  (2.69)  
Log(Market to book) 54.691 *** 4.651 *** 56.004 *** 
 (4.56)  (5.01)  (3.19)  
ROAt-1 90.724   15.040 *** 133.890   
 (1.45)  (3.74)  (1.28)  
Stock Returnt-1 140.657   -5.890   200.126   
 (1.38)  (-0.51)  (0.98)  
Director tenure 0.051   0.801 *** -1.125   
 (0.11)  (9.81)  (-0.98)  
Independent director -46.235  -12.897  -56.984  
 (-1.12)  (-1.28)  (-1.15)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  56,697  50,214  42,589  
R2 0.0559  0.0497  0.0741  
           
Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.107 *** 0.074 *** 0.094 *** 
 (24.04)  (18.25)  (8.04)  
Log(Total assets) 0.227 *** 0.258 *** 0.232 *** 
 (44.69)  (49.14)  (34.52)  
Log(Market to book) 0.269 *** 0.087 *** 0.351 *** 
 (29.98)  (9.45)  (32.98)  
ROAt-1 0.414 *** 0.201 *** 0.482 *** 
 (8.51)  (7.99)  (9.04)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.863 *** -0.056   1.781 *** 
 (8.56)  (-0.99)  (18.56)  
Director tenure 0.025 *** 0.029 *** 0.004   
 (17.00)  (37.05)  (0.75)  
Independent director -0.045  -0.062  -0.057  
 (-1.13)  (-1.30)  (-1.28)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  56,004  49,997  41,874  
R2 0.3167  0.4021  0.1983  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.6. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 2157.635 *** 323.681 *** 1984.005 *** 
 (6.55)  (16.12)  (5.01)  
Log(Total assets) 3145.247 *** 382.578 *** 2805.201 *** 
 (10.45)  (21.35)  (8.15)  
Log(Market to book) 2972.275 *** 286.254 *** 2512.526 *** 
 (6.85)  (9.83)  (3.83)  
ROAt-1 2001.965   -65.241   2387.496   
 (0.98)  (-0.55)  (0.97)  
Stock Returnt-1 20251.478 *** 801.025 *** 28101.502 *** 
 (3.99)  (2.73)  (4.81)  
Director tenure -30.014   3.005   -3.562   
 (-0.89)  (1.59)  (-0.10)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,604  13,754  10,773  
R2 0.0349  0.1286  0.0310  
           
Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.382 *** 0.258 *** 0.399 *** 
 (24.17)  (18.11)  (22.63)  
Log(Total assets) 0.391 *** 0.225 *** 0.436 *** 
 (35.27)  (28.20)  (34.22)  
Log(Market to book) 0.451 *** 0.265 *** 0.532 *** 
 (19.01)  (15.02)  (18.65)  
ROAt-1 0.526 *** 0.518 *** 0.211 ** 
 (4.72)  (8.83)  (2.48)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.291   0.413 ** 0.728 *** 
 (1.63)  (2.56)  (2.92)  
Director tenure -0.020 *** 0.006 *** -0.008 *** 
 (-8.93)  (4.20)  (-4.97)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,521  12,461  10,768  
R2 0.3458  0.2672  0.34  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.7. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Outside Directors’ Total Compensation 
 Dependent Variables: Total Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Professional connections) 24.582 ** 
    
22.481 ** 
 (2.53)  
    
(1.99)  
Log(Educational connections) 
  
0.240  
  
4.211   
   
(0.05)  
  
(0.53)  
Log(Other connections) 
    
6.831  7.525   
     
(0.96)  (1.18)  
Log(Total assets) 20.216 *** 26.454 *** 20.081 * 35.643 *** 
 (2.95)  (4.09)  (1.70)  (3.28)  
Log(Market to book) 45.087 *** 53.544 *** 44.674 ** 58.708 *** 
 (3.68)  (4.49)  (2.07)  (3.09)  
ROAt-1 96.663   75.519   155.344   100.213   
 (1.41)  (1.11)  (1.16)  (0.87)  
Stock Returnt-1 126.737   157.088   128.188   166.917   
 (0.88)  (1.10)  (0.44)  (0.66)  
Director tenure 0.076   -0.363   -1.316   -1.976   
 (0.07)  (-0.32)  (-0.66)  (-1.11)  
Independent director -334.107 *** -392.975 *** -417.002 *** -437.538 *** 
 
(-12.97)  (-14.96)  (-8.87)  (-10.55)  
Industry experience 100.340   14.566   51.120 ** 55.342   
 
(1.16)  (1.27)  (2.15)  (1.53)  
Graduate degrees 60.120 ** 10.566 ** 42.310 ** 37.665 ** 
 
(2.48)  (2.46)  (2.57)  (2.50)  
Elite education 70.156 *** 9.742 *** 51.120 *** 43.673 *** 
 
(2.78)  (2.65)  (2.78)  (2.74)  
         Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         Observations  55,060  55,060  55,060  55,060  
R2 0.0706  0.0700  0.0690  0.0876  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
 131 
 
Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Outside Directors’ Total Compensation 
 Dependent Variables: Total Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Professional connections) 0.101 ***     0.075 *** 
 (24.19)      (11.53)  
Log(Educational connections)   0.002     0.003   
 
  (0.76)    (0.98)  
Log(Other connections)     0.002   0.006  
 
    (0.92)  (1.64)  
Log(Total assets) 0.133 *** 0.151 *** 0.151 *** 0.137 *** 
 (39.15)  (43.21)  (34.62)  (28.93)  
Log(Market to book) 0.146 *** 0.168 *** 0.163 *** 0.148 *** 
 (24.11)  (25.92)  (20.60)  (17.93)  
ROAt-1 0.260 *** 0.219 *** 0.278 *** 0.256 *** 
 (7.62)  (5.91)  (5.63)  (5.09)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.558 *** 0.558 *** 0.782 *** 0.869 *** 
 (7.85)  (7.19)  (7.38)  (7.91)  
Director tenure 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 
 (14.20)  (13.40)  (10.96)  (11.12)  
Independent director -0.144 *** -0.155 *** -0.132 *** -0.145 *** 
 
(-11.31)  (-10.90)  (-7.61)  (-8.04)  
Industry experience 0.413   0.060   0.211 ** 0.228   
 
(1.16)  (1.28)  (2.16)  (1.53)  
Graduate degrees 0.249 ** 0.044 ** 0.176 *** 0.156 ** 
 
(2.49)  (2.47)  (2.59)  (2.52)  
Elite education 0.289 *** 0.040 *** 0.212 *** 0.180 *** 
 
(2.80)  (2.67)  (2.80)  (2.75)  
 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
        
Observations  55,060  55,060  55,060  55,060  
R2 0.2945  0.2951  0.2945  0.4147  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.8. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation 
by Types of External Connections 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Employee Directors’ Total Compensation 
 Dependent Variables: Total Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Professional connections) 2208.1 ***     3028.2 ** 
 (5.54)      (2.56)  
Log(Educational connections)   695.3 **   667.6 ** 
 
  (2.49)    (2.01)  
Log(Other connections)     454.6   41.3   
 
    (1.14)  (0.09)  
Log(Total assets) 2640.5 *** 3015.9 *** 3295.1 *** 2602.1 *** 
 (8.72)  (9.39)  (5.43)  (3.72)  
Log(Market to book) 2117.2 *** 2140.1 *** 2054.3 ** 1470.8   
 (4.08)  (3.70)  (1.98)  (1.29)  
ROAt-1 1870.2   -376.0   -1433.6   -1272.1   
 (0.76)  (-0.14)  (-0.27)  (-0.23)  
Stock Returnt-1 18035.1 *** 20253.6 *** 52948.5 *** 58515.7 *** 
 (3.23)  (3.12)  (3.86)  (3.98)  
Director tenure -21.2   -115.7 ** -180.0 ** -178.3 ** 
 (-0.51)  (-2.39)  (-2.15)  (-1.96)  
Industry experience 1007.5   304.2   208.0 ** 506.6   
 
(1.17)  (1.27)  (2.16)  (1.53)  
Graduate degree 604.9 ** 181.5 ** 124.4 ** 303.6 ** 
 (2.49)  (2.46)  (2.57)  (2.51)  
Elite education 705.8 *** 212.2 *** 145.3 *** 354.5 *** 
 (2.79)  (2.67)  (2.79)  (2.75)  
 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
        
Observations  12,587  12,587  12,587  12,587  
R2 0.0349  0.1286  0.0310  0.0768  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Employee Directors’ Total Compensation 
 Dependent Variables: Total Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Professional connections) 0.299 ***     0.328 *** 
 (24.64)      (13.11)  
Log(Educational connections)   0.048 ***   0.011 *** 
 
  (6.05)    (2.94)  
Log(Other connections)     0.042 *** 0.005   
 
    (4.70)  (0.47)  
Log(Total assets) 0.256 *** 0.316 *** 0.306 *** 0.222 *** 
 (27.81)  (33.15)  (22.49)  (15.01)  
Log(Market to book) 0.265 *** 0.299 *** 0.283 *** 0.230 *** 
 (16.79)  (17.38)  (12.14)  (9.55)  
ROAt-1 0.308 *** 0.255 *** 0.311 *** 0.320 *** 
 (4.08)  (3.11)  (2.65)  (2.74)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.278   0.084   0.403   0.682 ** 
 (1.63)  (0.43)  (1.31)  (2.19)  
Director tenure -0.009 *** -0.016 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** 
 (-7.03)  (-11.04)  (-8.74)  (-7.89)  
Industry experience 0.137   0.041   0.028 ** 0.069   
 
(1.17)  (1.27)  (2.16)  (1.54)  
Graduate degree 0.082 ** 0.025 ** 0.017 *** 0.041 ** 
 
(2.49)  (2.47)  (2.60)  (2.52)  
Elite education 0.097 *** 0.029 *** 0.020 *** 0.048 *** 
 
(2.81)  (2.69)  (2.82)  (2.77)  
 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
        
Observations  12,587  12,587  12,587  12,587  
R2 0.2963  0.2954  0.2957  0.4158  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.9. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation 
after controlling for Governance Characteristics 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 15.362 *** 2.343 *** 4.728   
 (2.63)  (4.13)  (0.42)  
Log(Total assets) 20.807 *** 4.158 *** 19.800 ** 
 (3.05)  (8.75)  (2.13)  
Log(Market to book) 45.699 *** 3.696 *** 48.199 *** 
 (3.73)  (4.31)  (2.95)  
ROAt-1 95.365   13.178 *** 141.189   
 (1.39)  (3.05)  (1.36)  
Stock Returnt-1 123.715   -7.122   221.234   
 (0.86)  (-0.75)  (1.05)  
Director tenure 0.039   0.601 *** -1.244   
 (0.04)  (7.72)  (-0.84)  
CEO Connections 45.887 *** 5.112 *** 59.276 *** 
 (2.90)  (4.57)  (2.83)  
Intra-board connections 19.245 *** 2.348 *** 36.472 *** 
 (2.88)  (3.55)  (3.02)  
Independent director -334.571 *** -44.346 *** -471.317 *** 
 (-12.98)  (-25.17)  (-12.62)  
Industry experience 80.145   12.001   88.621   
 (1.11)  (1.21)  (1.16)  
Graduate degrees 40.123 ** 9.225 ** 32.697 ** 
 (2.46)  (2.35)  (2.48)  
Elite education 49.174 *** 9.789 *** 36.471 *** 
 (2.69)  (2.58)  (2.64)  
Log(Board size) -76.196 ** 12.112 *** -134.100 *** 
 (-2.20)  (5.04)  (-2.73)  
Proportion of inside directors -93.811   -25.020 *** 28.624   
 (-1.54)  (-5.96)  (0.32)  
Log(CEO tenure) -98.726 *** -17.146 *** -55.147 *** 
 (-5.43)  (-6.33)  (-4.69)  
Dual CEO/Chair -49.802 *** -11.219 *** -52.999 ** 
 
(-2.70)  (-8.70)  (-2.16)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,528  68,583  48,243  
R2 0.0530  0.0374  0.0640  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.086 *** 0.053 *** 0.028 *** 
 (21.37)  (18.89)  (5.31)  
Log(Total assets) 0.137 *** 0.109 *** 0.150 *** 
 (40.49)  (45.16)  (34.86)  
Log(Market to book) 0.151 *** 0.036 *** 0.244 *** 
 (24.83)  (8.35)  (32.38)  
ROAt-1 0.251 *** 0.174 *** 0.310 *** 
 (7.35)  (7.08)  (6.45)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.537 *** -0.055   1.334 *** 
 (7.55)  (-1.07)  (13.76)  
Director tenure 0.007 *** 0.013 *** 0.000   
 (13.71)  (33.69)  (0.55)  
CEO Connections 0.000   0.047 *** -0.017 * 
 (0.01)  (8.45)  (-1.81)  
Intra-board connections 0.012 *** 0.006 *** 0.023 *** 
 (2.90)  (3.56)  (3.05)  
Independent director -0.147 *** -0.190 *** -0.201 *** 
 (-11.54)  (-21.10)  (-11.70)  
Industry experience 0.050   0.030   0.058   
 (1.12)  (1.21)  (1.16)  
Graduate degrees 0.0251 ** 0.02337 ** 0.021 ** 
 (2.46)  (2.37)  (2.50)  
Elite education 0.030 *** 0.02485 *** 0.023 *** 
 (2.70)  (2.59)  (2.65)  
Log(Board size) -0.193 *** 0.191 *** -0.656 *** 
 (-11.20)  (15.70)  (-28.92)  
Proportion of inside directors -0.345 *** -0.104 *** 0.016   
 (-11.45)  (-4.90)  (0.39)  
Log(CEO tenure) -0.064 *** -0.045 *** -0.036 *** 
 (-5.43)  (-6.34)  (-4.71)  
Dual CEO/Chair -0.038 *** -0.078 *** -0.018 **  
 
(-4.21)  (-11.93)  (-1.71)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,456  59,352  48,205  
R2 0.2945  0.3933  0.1823  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.10. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation 
after controlling for Governance Characteristics 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 1828.797 *** 223.411 *** 1843.802 *** 
 (4.92)  (11.04)  (4.14)  
Log(Total assets) 2781.236 *** 309.244 *** 2730.140 *** 
 (9.34)  (19.16)  (7.76)  
Log(Market to book) 2216.394 *** 238.493 *** 2080.200 *** 
 (4.29)  (8.54)  (3.42)  
ROAt-1 1862.939   -67.147   2387.496   
 (0.75)  (-0.52)  (0.82)  
Stock Returnt-1 17681.353 *** 783.442 *** 24290.480 *** 
 (3.17)  (2.61)  (3.46)  
Director tenure -32.501   3.569   -3.267   
 (-0.78)  (1.62)  (-0.06)  
CEO Connections 910.559   128.684 *** 1038.592   
 (1.31)  (3.36)  (1.28)  
Intra-board connections 255.319 *** 24.879 *** 1593.161 *** 
 (2.90)  (3.58)  (3.02)  
Industry experience 1060.084   128.052   3863.442   
 (1.12)  (1.22)  (1.16)  
Graduate degrees 535.486 ** 97.943 ** 1421.178 ** 
 (2.48)  (2.35)  (2.48)  
Elite education 653.680 *** 104.035 *** 1591.537 *** 
 (2.69)  (2.59)  (2.65)  
Log(Board size) 609.409   334.145 *** -961.186   
 (0.43)  (4.33)  (-0.57)  
Proportion of inside directors -2484.021   -63.220   -1851.608   
 (-1.04)  (-0.49)  (-0.65)  
Log(CEO tenure) -1307.162 *** -182.223 *** -2399.360 *** 
 (-5.45)  (-6.35)  (-4.69)  
Dual CEO/Chair 1130.946   185.366 *** 1237.666   
 
(1.25)  (3.72)  (1.18)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,604  13,754  10,773  
R2 0.0349  0.1286  0.0310  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.245 *** 0.137 *** 0.267 *** 
 (21.50)  (17.08)  (19.50)  
Log(Total assets) 0.276 *** 0.168 *** 0.339 *** 
 (30.32)  (26.13)  (31.24)  
Log(Market to book) 0.279 *** 0.141 *** 0.321 *** 
 (17.65)  (12.56)  (17.12)  
ROAt-1 0.305 *** 0.382 *** 0.202 ** 
 (4.02)  (7.13)  (2.26)  
Stock Returnt-1 0.228   0.291 ** 0.619 *** 
 (1.33)  (2.41)  (2.86)  
Director tenure -0.010 *** 0.004 *** -0.007 *** 
 (-8.25)  (3.99)  (-4.52)  
CEO Connections 0.018   0.050 *** 0.025   
 (0.83)  (3.32)  (1.02)  
Intra-board connections 0.034 *** 0.003 *** 0.214 *** 
 (2.90)  (3.56)  (3.05)  
Industry experience 0.141   0.017   0.521   
 (1.12)  (1.23)  (1.17)  
Graduate degrees 0.071 ** 0.013 ** 0.189 ** 
 (2.48)  (2.36)  (2.50)  
Elite education 0.087 *** 0.014 *** 0.211 *** 
 (2.69)  (2.59)  (2.66)  
Log(Board size) 0.330 *** 0.408 *** 0.070   
 (7.63)  (13.37)  (1.33)  
Proportion of inside directors -0.908 *** -0.293 *** -0.977 *** 
 (-12.42)  (-5.66)  (-11.12)  
Log(CEO tenure) -0.176 *** -0.024 *** -0.323 *** 
 (-5.47)  (-6.38)  (-4.7)  
Dual CEO/Chair 0.104 *** 0.103 *** 0.088 *** 
 
(3.78)  (5.27)  (2.75)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,521  12,461  10,768  
R2 0.3458  0.2672  0.34  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.11. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation: 
Median Regression 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 9.763 *** 2.277 *** 5.310 *** 
 (23.17)  (20.03)  (9.55)  
Log(Total assets) 15.867 *** 4.725 *** 12.649 *** 
 (51.70)  (48.26)  (38.41)  
Log(Market to book) 23.602 *** 5.872 *** 19.922 *** 
 (39.02)  (38.07)  (30.34)  
ROAt-1 44.594 *** 12.942 *** 34.156 *** 
 (8.28)  (8.02)  (6.62)  
Stock Returnt-1 -30.092 *** -25.214 *** 23.048 *** 
 (-3.79)  (-14.91)  (2.78)  
Director tenure 0.611 *** 0.435 *** 0.158 ** 
 (10.24)  (19.63)  (2.27)  
CEO Connections -8.637 *** -0.982 *** -10.088 *** 
 (-9.96)  (-3.38)  (-10.14)  
Intra-board connections 1.367 *** 0.254 *** 4.593 *** 
 (2.89)  (3.59)  (3.03)  
Independent director -4.424 *** 0.083   -1.546   
 (-3.19)  (0.23)  (-0.77)  
Industry experience 5.693   1.299   11.160   
 (1.12)  (1.21)  (1.16)  
Graduate degrees 2.850 ** 1.005 ** 4.093 ** 
 (2.47)  (2.36)  (2.49)  
Elite education 3.486 *** 1.063 *** 4.566 *** 
 (2.71)  (2.58)  (2.64)  
Log(Board size) -28.950 *** 9.266 *** -69.071 *** 
 (-15.51)  (16.51)  (-31.22)  
Proportion of inside directors -159.002 *** -47.011 *** -35.361 *** 
 (-63.83)  (-66.11)  (-9.85)  
Log(CEO tenure) -7.034 *** -1.868 *** -6.910 *** 
 (-5.44)  (-6.34)  (-4.73)  
Dual CEO/Chair -17.573 *** -3.503 *** -10.304 *** 
 
(-18.25)  (-10.32)  (-10.24)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,951  69,115  48,613  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Outside Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.105 *** 0.063 *** 0.060 *** 
 (22.38)  (18.96)  (10.87)  
Log(Total assets) 0.136 *** 0.126 *** 0.139 *** 
 (40.05)  (51.11)  (44.03)  
Log(Market to book) 0.199 *** 0.146 *** 0.210 *** 
 (30.26)  (37.9)  (33.94)  
ROAt-1 0.586 *** 0.650 *** 0.540 *** 
 (8.12)  (12.14)  (7.06)  
Stock Returnt-1 -0.085   -0.875 *** 0.392 *** 
 (-0.89)  (-14.32)  (4.62)  
Director tenure 0.007 *** 0.010 *** 0.002 ** 
 (11.59)  (22.51)  (2.28)  
CEO Connections -0.083 *** -0.024 *** -0.115 *** 
 (-10.16)  (-3.83)  (-11.84)  
Intra-board connections 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.006 *** 
 (2.90)  (3.59)  (3.03)  
Independent director -0.005   -0.057 *** -0.021   
 (-0.27)  (-6.05)  (-0.88)  
Industry experience 0.007   0.004   0.014   
 (1.13)  (1.21)  (1.17)  
Graduate degrees 0.003 ** 0.003 ** 0.005 ** 
 (2.47)  (2.37)  (2.50)  
Elite education 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.006 *** 
 (2.71)  (2.60)  (2.68)  
Log(Board size) -0.285 *** 0.216 *** -0.753 *** 
 (-13.35)  (15.25)  (-36.72)  
Proportion of inside directors -1.980 *** -1.344 *** -0.445 *** 
 (-70.26)  (-62.90)  (-10.42)  
Log(CEO tenure) -0.008 *** -0.006 *** -0.009 *** 
 (-5.48)  (-6.39)  (-4.73)  
Dual CEO/Chair -0.151 *** -0.164 *** -0.113 *** 
 
(-15.38)  (-19.95)  (-9.01)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  64,946  58,814  48,575  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.12. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation: 
Median Regression 
Panel A: Dollar Value of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 963.893 *** 124.265   946.443 *** 
 (20.65)  (136.19)  (21.09)  
Log(Total assets) 1386.321 *** 94.317   1358.539 *** 
 (39.63)  (103.21)  (37.87)  
Log(Market to book) 2172.262 *** 92.671   2035.570 *** 
 (29.74)  (109.75)  (28.70)  
ROAt-1 271.935   129.293   712.229   
 (0.51)  (170.87)  (1.29)  
Stock Returnt-1 -2508.230 *** 190.164   -3354.650 *** 
 (-3.70)  (355.30)  (-4.29)  
Director tenure -32.151 *** 0.199   -12.439 * 
 (-7.04)  (2.00)  (-1.85)  
CEO Connections 11.331   43.882   69.815   
 (0.11)  (68.14)  (0.71)  
Intra-board connections 15.012 *** 1.556 *** 90.957 *** 
 (2.91)  (3.58)  (3.06)  
Industry experience 62.330   7.906   222.112   
 (1.13)  (1.23)  (1.17)  
Graduate degrees 31.516 ** 6.053 ** 81.541 ** 
 (2.50)  (2.37)  (2.49)  
Elite education 38.511 *** 6.468 *** 90.954 *** 
 (2.71)  (2.59)  (2.67)  
Log(Board size) 925.239 *** 284.644   -113.344   
 (5.50)  (328.02)  (-0.71)  
Proportion of inside directors -4728.660 *** -352.482 *** -3954.570 *** 
 (-20.27)  (-292.67)  (-15.33)  
Log(CEO tenure) -77.241 *** -11.352 *** -137.667 *** 
 (-5.47)  (-6.38)  (-4.77)  
Dual CEO/Chair 186.506 ** 104.712   119.913   
 
(2.07)  (130.45)  (1.03)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,707  13,925  10,835  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel B: Natural Logarithm of Employee Directors’ Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Log(External connections) 0.281 *** 0.130 *** 0.303 *** 
 (23.04)  (14.81)  (20.02)  
Log(Total assets) 0.255 *** 0.118 *** 0.296 *** 
 (28.77)  (19.41)  (29.06)  
Log(Market to book) 0.369 *** 0.111 *** 0.416 *** 
 (27.69)  (12.24)  (21.86)  
ROAt-1 0.540 *** 0.260 *** 0.352 *** 
 (3.18)  (5.23)  (3.31)  
Stock Returnt-1 -0.021   0.487 *** -0.073   
 (-0.12)  (4.34)  (-0.28)  
Director tenure -0.007 *** 0.003 *** -0.002   
 (-7.20)  (3.66)  (-1.18)  
CEO Connections -0.016   0.032 ** -0.034   
 (-0.72)  (2.24)  (-1.42)  
Intra-board connections 0.004 *** 0.000 *** 0.027 *** 
 (2.92)  (3.59)  (3.09)  
Industry experience 0.018   0.002   0.064   
 (1.13)  (1.23)  (1.16)  
Graduate degrees 0.009 ** 0.002 ** 0.024 ** 
 (2.49)  (2.38)  (2.51)  
Elite education 0.011 *** 0.002 *** 0.027 *** 
 (2.74)  (2.61)  (2.69)  
Log(Board size) 0.262 *** 0.414 *** -0.064   
 (5.63)  (13.89)  (-1.22)  
Proportion of inside directors -1.374 *** -0.202 *** -1.254 *** 
 (-23.08)  (-5.18)  (-15.35)  
Log(CEO tenure) -0.023 *** -0.003 *** -0.040 *** 
 (-5.52)  (-6.37)  (-4.75)  
Dual CEO/Chair 0.097 *** 0.161 *** 0.058 ** 
 
(3.30)  (10.11)  (2.01)  
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Observations  12,690  12,564  10,830  
           
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.13. Logit Regression Analysis of Director Appointments 
 
Dependent Variable: 
1: Obtaining a new director appointment of the exiting director 
0: Obtaining no new director appointment of the exiting director 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Professional connections 0.052 ***   0.040 *** 0.024 *** 
 (17.14)   (15.69) (13.25) 
Educational connections  0.003 ***  0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
  (4.21)  (4.36) (3.02) 
Other connections   0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
   (2.46) (2.54) (2.11) 
Social tie to the CEO 23.317 *** 22.127 *** 21.124 *** 19.875 *** 20.698 *** 
 (4.08) (3.98) (3.63) (3.52) (4.02) 
Connections to board members 17.852 *** 17.145 *** 17.725 *** 16.411 *** 18.115 *** 
 (3.46) (3.22) (3.31) (3.15) (3.69) 
Number of qualifications 0.365 *** 0.145 *** 0.158 *** 0.116 *** 0.134 *** 
 (5.01) (4.25) (4.32) (4.10) (4.58) 
Graduate degrees 0.112 *** 0.039 *** 0.033 *** 0.024 *** 0.056 *** 
 (4.98) (4.64) (4.49) (4.16) (6.54) 
Professional certifications 0.121 *** 0.054 *** 0.042 *** 0.039 *** 0.013 *** 
 (5.58) (4.79) (4.76) (4.71) (3.54) 
No. of current other directorships 6.104 *** 1.537 *** 1.562 *** 1.423 *** 1.410 *** 
 (6.86) (5.95) (6.23) (6.11) (5.58) 
Aggregate board experience  0.548 *** 0.146 *** 0.171 *** 0.155 *** 0.325 *** 
 (4.14) (4.31) (4.76) (4.54) (7.98) 
Big corporate board experience 0.167 *** 0.087 *** 0.055 *** 0.048 *** 0.133 *** 
 (5.74) (5.96) (5.83) (5.13) (9.74) 
Age -0.124 *** -0.069 *** -0.059 *** -0.057 *** -0.023 *** 
 (-9.82) (-8.98) (-8.41) (-8.39) (-7.93) 
Gender 0.362 0.116  0.110  0.112  0.116  
 (1.10) (1.06) (0.98) (1.03) (1.10) 
Firm size 0.123 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 0.026 *** 0.035 *** 
 (5.03) (4.77) (4.32) (4.25) (5.21) 
Prior two year average ROA 0.131 * 0.031  0.038  0.032 * 0.029  
 (1.76) (1.55) (1.55) (1.65) (1.60) 
Previous year stock return 0.144  0.041  0.048  0.039  0.046  
 (0.76) (0.70) (0.77) (0.76) (0.99) 
Restatements -0.198 *** -0.124 *** -0.120 *** -0.121 *** -0.119 *** 
 (-6.57) (-5.95) (-5.91) (-5.93) (-5.89) 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No Yes 
Observations  15,267  15,267  15,267  15,267  15,267  
Chi Square 286.22  265.89  262.09  342.08  681.29  
Prob of Chi Square 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 2.14. Logit Regression Analysis of Director Appointments: Alternative Samples 
 
Dependent Variable: 
1: Obtaining a new director appointment  
0: Obtaining no new director appointment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Professional connections 0.018 ***   0.017 *** 0.011 *** 
 (5.35)   (5.34) (4.98) 
Educational connections  0.002 *  0.001 * 0.001 * 
  (1.88)  (1.86) (1.77) 
Other connections   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.91) (0.88) (0.68) 
Social tie to the CEO 11.046 *** 10.985 *** 10.542 *** 10.435 *** 14.351 *** 
 (3.44) (3.32) (3.05) (2.99) (4.62) 
Connections to board members 15.671 7.674 *** 7.464 *** 14.216 *** 18.215 *** 
 (3.78) (3.21) (2.95) (3.60) (4.45) 
Number of qualifications 0.224 *** 0.136 *** 0.125 *** 0.219 *** 0.298 *** 
 (4.42) (4.14) (4.03) (4.40) (5.27) 
Graduate degrees 0.051 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.048 *** 0.071 *** 
 (4.47) (4.35) (4.31) (4.45) (5.25) 
Professional certifications 0.052 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** 0.048 *** 0.059 *** 
 (4.77) (4.24) (4.25) (4.73) (4.68) 
No. of current other directorships 2.615 *** 1.572 *** 1.541 *** 2.511 *** 2.883 *** 
 (6.23) (5.02) (4.98) (6.01) (6.22) 
Aggregate board experience  0.274 *** 0.208 *** 0.212 *** 0.233 *** 0.301 *** 
 (4.61) (4.01) (4.10) (4.22) (4.91) 
Big corporate board experience 0.055 *** 0.025 *** 0.027 *** 0.041 *** 0.088 *** 
 (4.20) (3.15) (3.16) (3.89) (5.40) 
Age -0.050 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 *** -0.041 *** -0.057 *** 
 (-8.51) (-5.33) (-5.34) (-7.86) (-8.11) 
Gender 0.199  0.142  0.149  0.201  0.209  
 (0.95) (0.89) (0.90) (1.00) (1.03) 
Firm size 0.059 *** 0.023 *** 0.027 *** 0.049 *** 0.059 *** 
 (3.90) (3.32) (3.30) (3.77) (4.43) 
Prior two year average ROA 0.053  0.034  0.034  0.051 0.079 * 
 (1.54) (1.21) (1.22) (1.54) (1.67) 
Previous year stock return 0.068  0.037  0.039  0.060  0.089  
 (0.67) (0.46) (0.47) (0.66) (0.74) 
Restatements -0.254 *** -0.261 *** -0.249 *** -0.252 *** -0.235 *** 
 (-8.41) (-8.62) (-8.32) (-8.38) (-8.22) 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No Yes 
Observations  159,672  159,672  159,672  159,672  159,672 
Chi Square 167.63  159.21  158.49  166.09  342.88 
Prob of Chi Square 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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